


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
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OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

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Brevet Brigadier General Archibald Henderson

Opinions or assertions in the articles are the private ones of the writers, and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.

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
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


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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. 21

MAY, 1937

No. 2

COMMANDANTS OF THE MARINE CORPS

By C. H. METCALF

Lieutenant-Colonel U. S. Marine Corps

■ The retirement of Major General John H. Russell as Commandant of the Marine Corps on December 1, 1936, and the selection of Thomas Holcomb as his successor to its highest office was the occasion which prompted the preparation of this brief work on all of the commanders of the Corps throughout its history. Such a work now appears to be of timely interest and particularly so since little published information is available on the subject. Most of the personnel of the Corps as well as many other interested persons are familiar with the pictures of the different commandants which have been published from time to time or otherwise made available, but few are aware of the accomplishments of especially the earlier commandants and what transpired during their tenures of office particularly during the first one hundred years of the history of the organization. There is an excellent collection of large portraits of fourteen of the commandants in the historic old quarters of the Major General Commandant at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C. It has occurred to the writer on a number of occasions while looking at this collection of the long line of leaders of our Corps which look down from the walls of practically every room on the main floor of the Commandant's quarters, that there must be many interesting things about each of them which if known would dispel the atmosphere of strangeness which seems to radiate from old and unknown portraits. The men whose likenesses are there portrayed when they were the leaders of the Marine Corps were the center of interesting surroundings and with one or two possible exceptions they were probably surrounded with a host of admirers and friends. The present generation of the Marine Corps owes much to its predecessors and especially to the commandants whose tours of duty have passed into history. The writer feels that the present generation should know more of its long line of distinguished leaders and thereby be enabled to look upon the likenesses which have been left behind as being those of their friends and forbears who mean much to them.

With the above thoughts in mind the Historical Section of Headquarters, Marine Corps, set to work, did the necessary research and wrote somewhat hastily this little work which it is hoped will prove interesting as well as helpful to the personnel of the Corps and its many interested friends.

The work is presented in the form of sketches of each of the commandants. The method of approach in pre-

paring that relating to each leader of the Corps has been first to give a brief biographical account of his life when material was available up to the time he was made the Commandant of the Corps and then to narrate briefly the principal happenings during his tenure of office, and in some cases to attempt an appraisal of the contribution each made toward the permanent betterment of the Marine Corps. Taken as a whole the sketches present an outline history of the Corps.

The preparation of this little work has been materially assisted by the timely suggestions of the living retired commandants of the Marine Corps, Mrs. George Barnett and a number of officers and members of their families. The writer is likewise indebted to Mr. James C. Jenkins and Mr. Jesse Mello, civilian clerks and research assistants in the Historical Section, for their material assistance rendered in performing the necessary research and in writing and revising the manuscript.


The sources on which this brief work is based are the original records on file in the Headquarters of the Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., and the few available published works. Where valuations are attempted or comparisons made they are largely the reflection of the expression of contemporaries as shown by original documents or other writings while in the cases of more recent commandants expressed opinions made to the writer by older officers were largely the basis for any estimates or comparisons attempted.

This historical and biographical presentation is offered as a preliminary to a history of the U. S. Marine Corps now being prepared by the writer and his assistants, and which it is hoped will be ready for publication in about two more years. When presented this history will appear in one medium-sized volume and it is hoped will present the essential and interesting facts in the history of the Marine Corps.

SAMUEL NICHOLAS

COMMANDANT OF THE CONTINENTAL MARINES

Samuel Nicholas, the first officer commissioned in the Continental Marines by the Second Continental Congress, was born in Philadelphia in 1744. The Naval Committee on November 5, 1775, nominated Esek Hopkins as commander-in-chief of the Continental Fleet and commissioned Samuel Nicholas as captain of Marines for the *Alfred* (*Black Prince*). On November 10 Congress authorized the raising of two battalions of Marines. That date has been officially proclaimed as the birthday of the Marine Corps. Captain Nicholas' commission was confirmed by Congress on November 28,



**SAMUEL
NICHOLAS**
*Commandant of the
Continental Marines
1776-1781*

prior to the confirmation of any other officer of the naval service. His is the oldest continental naval commission in existence. Before this, however, officers serving on Lake Champlain were performing duties which were afterwards acknowledged by Congress to be those of officers of Marines in the Continental service and their pay was antedated accordingly.

Upon receiving his commission Nicholas opened up a recruiting rendezvous in the old Tun Tavern in Philadelphia to enlist Marines for his ship, the *Alfred*, which was commissioned December 3, 1775. That vessel was first commanded by Captain Saltonstall and its first lieutenant was John Paul Jones. By authority of the Continental Congress a number of other vessels were provided for the Navy in the vicinity of Philadelphia and Marine detachments were recruited for them as they had been for the *Alfred*. As soon as sufficient vessels were outfitted and sufficiently manned Commodore Hopkins set out an expedition in the spring of 1776 to the Bahamas with Samuel Nicholas acting as his squadron Marine officer. The expedition surprised the British garrison at New Providence and Nicholas with a landing force of about two hundred Marines landed and captured the town and the forts which defended it. Hopkins' fleet then returned north and in April engaged the British ship *Glasgow* off Long Island, Captain Nicholas taking part in the action as Marine officer on the *Alfred*, Hopkins' flagship. Soon afterwards the fleet dispersed to various duties and Nicholas returned to Philadelphia. He was promoted to the rank of major in June, 1776, and took charge of the training of four companies of Marines who were being prepared for duty on board the frigates then under construction. During the following December Nicholas with part of these Marines joined Washington's army, participated in the Battles of Trenton and Princeton and remained with Washington during the remainder of the winter.

During the following summer Nicholas served as commanding officer of Marine in Philadelphia and appears to have exercised a certain amount of supervision over all Continental Marines and in addition acted as muster master for the Navy. He continued throughout

the remainder of the war to serve in the vicinity of Philadelphia.


In addition to the Continental Marines which were recruited in the vicinity of Philadelphia there were many others who served in the various parts of the colonies and in Europe. Prior to the establishment of the Continental Marines several of the navies of the states maintained contingents of Marines on board their vessels and ashore. John Paul Jones had large detachments of Marines on each of the vessels which he used in his daring exploits against the British in European waters. A detachment of Marines was raised for Pollock's fleet which operated on the Mississippi and along the Gulf Coast. A battalion of Marines played a conspicuous part in the Penobscot Expedition in 1779 and near the close of the war two additional expeditions were sent to the Bahamas which were accompanied by Marines. A considerable number of privateers which operated at various times during the war carried Marine detachments.

At the close of the war the Continental Marines were discontinued. From the few remaining records it is believed that Major Nicholas continued to reside in Philadelphia. He was a charter member of the Society of Cincinnati of Pennsylvania and served for a number of years on the Standing Committee of that organization. He died in Philadelphia on August 27, 1790, and was buried in the Friends' Burial Ground in that city. His memory has been perpetuated in the naval service of the United States by the naming in his honor of the destroyer *Nicholas* on May 12, 1919.

WILLIAM WARD BURROWS

FIRST COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

On July 12, 1798, the day following the approval of an act of Congress establishing the United States Marine Corps, President John Adams appointed William Ward Burrows as Major Commandant of the newly-created organization. Burrows had served in the Revolutionary War with the state troops of South Carolina, but had more recently become a citizen of Philadelphia, where he was a resident at the time of his elevation to the highest office in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps,



**WILLIAM WARD
BURROWS**
*First Commandant of
the Marine Corps
1800-1804*

as well as the Navy, had had its humble beginning a short time prior to its actual authorization as a Corps and both were formed to meet an impending national crisis. The first Marine units to be organized by Major Burrows were ship detachments for newly-acquired vessels of the American Navy which were being hurriedly placed in commission at Philadelphia and hurried off to sea to fight cruisers and destroy commerce in the naval war with France. During the first several months that Burrows held the position as Commandant his principal concern was the supplying and keeping up to strength the Marine detachments for the vessels of the Navy.

The Headquarters of the Corps was in a camp near Philadelphia until the national capital began its move to Washington in 1800. A small detachment of Marines was sent to the new capital in March of that year to protect the newly-established navy yard, while Major Burrows, with his staff and Headquarters troops, moved to Washington late in July and set up their camp on the site where the Naval Hospital now stands. Burrows was shortly afterwards promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The quasi war with France continued until September, 1800, when matters were finally adjusted with Napoleon. The insistence of Congress that the cost of the naval establishments be immediately reduced caused considerable embarrassment to Burrows in his effort to establish the Marine Corps on a peacetime basis. The wars with the Barbary States broke out soon afterwards and the main concern of the Corps was then to supply detachments to naval vessels for duty in the Mediterranean.

The organization under its first Commandant and for a number of years afterwards had no particular reputation and it therefore attracted few desirable men into its ranks who cared to make its service their life-time career. The turn over of officers was quite rapid and even the Commandant himself, apparently seeing no great future in his branch of the naval service and for personal reasons, principally health, resigned his commission on March 6, 1804. His character is aptly depicted by his distinguished contemporary, Washington Irving, who described Burrows as "a gentleman of accomplished mind and polished manner." "His virtue as a man procured him many warm, sincere and affectionate friends" commented a contemporary newspaper which further added "his services in nursing the infant Corps over which he presided, so useful to our naval enterprises, ought to be particularly commended by a grateful country." Under his guidance many of the traditions and the *esprit de corps* had their beginnings. Burrows was not only the leader of the Corps but he also played an important civic, business and social part in the life of both Philadelphia and Washington where many of the distinguished personages of his time were his personal and intimate friends.

Burrows died just one year after resigning from the Marine Corps and was buried in the Presbyterian Cemetery in Georgetown. His remains were removed in 1892 to their present resting place in Arlington National Cemetery.

The pastel portrait of William Ward Burrows, which is reproduced herein, was painted in 1935 by Edith Mc-

Cartney, of Washington. The artist had no actual likeness of Colonel Burrows and painted the picture after a careful study of existing pictures of his father and some of his living descendants. It is painted in imitation of the portrait fashion of the early nineteenth century and all of the details of the uniform and hairdress are based on the most careful research.

FRANKLIN WHARTON


SECOND COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

At the time of the resignation of Burrows, Captain Franklin Wharton, next senior officer of the Corps, was immediately appointed as its Lieutenant Colonel Commandant. Wharton was born July 23, 1767, in Philadelphia, and had been commissioned as a captain in the Marine Corps on August 3, 1798. During the naval war with France he had served on board the frigate *United States* and since the close of that belligerent affair had been commanding officer of Marines at Philadelphia. Franklin Wharton possessed a substantial personal fortune which he did not hesitate to spend in advancing the good of his Corps. He entertained elaborately not only for his brother officers, but distinguished personages from every walk of life. He appears to have had considerable professional ability, but according to his own statements was never able to establish the Corps in the outstanding position which it deserved in the esteem of the country.

At the time Wharton assumed the duties of Commandant practically our entire navy was involved in the war with the Barbary Corsairs which began about three years before. The Marine Corps' principal task was to supply Marine detachments for the increasing number of vessels in the war being waged with the several Barbary states extending along the north coast of Africa. The difficulties were finally adjusted in 1808 by the United States forcing from three of its enemies the most favorable treaties that had yet been obtained by any power. Peace having been restored, Congress again insisted on rigid economy in the naval service and as the ships returned from the war zone they were either placed out of commission or their crews greatly reduced. Wharton, like the first commandant, had many difficulties in

FRANKLIN WHARTON

Second Commandant
of the Marine Corps
1804-1818



attempting to carry on the numerous duties which were required at the seven shore stations in addition to service on board the vessels of the navy. It was during the early years of his tenure of office that the old Marine barracks in Washington, including the present Commandant's Quarters, were completed, mostly by the labor of Marines.

The Corps was not increased during the first two years of the war and due to the favoritism shown the volunteer state troops over the regular establishments, the Marine Corps was never quite able during that period to maintain even its peacetime strength. The Commandant's principal task was to supply Marines for the ever-increasing number of naval vessels which were being provided not only on the high seas, but also on the lakes lying along the northern frontier. The shortage of Marines was so great that soldiers took their places on Perry's squadron on Lake Erie and on MacDonough's squadron on Lake Champlain. The most trying time for Wharton and the Headquarters of the Corps came, of course, during the British raid of the Capital in 1814.

For some reason Wharton did not visualize what was expected of him during that great national crisis and when the British were approaching Washington from the Patuxent River he "sent" all available men from the vicinity under his adjutant, Samuel Miller, and several other officers to do what they could to assist Commodore Joshua Barney's squadron which had been trapped in the Patuxent and help delay the advance of the British toward Washington. The British drove the American forces back to Bladensburg and the Marines and naval contingent retired across the Eastern Branch. The few available Marines in the vicinity and the remnant of Barney's squadron who were now fighting on shore made a heroic stand to turn back the British on the hills in the rear of Bladensburg. Wharton still took no part in the military operations, but with his paymaster fled from the city along with the civil officials and did not stop until he reached Fredericktown (Frederick, Maryland). Irrespective of what his motive or point of view was for personally not taking the field, the incident created an impression against him that followed him to his dying day.

The officers of the Corps were as a whole anxious to see him superseded and on one occasion several of them petitioned the President for his successor to be named. The dissatisfaction growing out of the incident reached its climax three years after when Captain Archibald Henderson submitted charges and specifications against the Commandant for which he was ordered to be tried by court-martial. The most damaging of the accusations against him was contained in a specification which read "In that, notwithstanding it was communicated to him that his military character had been assailed in its tenderest point, in consequence of the course he pursued at the time of the capture of the city of Washington by the enemy, he did decline, and has ever since declined (the communications have been made to him to the same effect, of late date), to take any effectual measures to put a stop to reports so highly injurious to his own character, and of great disadvantage to the corps under his command," and by another which asserted

among other things "that he had failed to take the field." Wharton was acquitted of all charges in his trial by general court-martial. His term of office came to a close, however, about one year later by his death in New York on September 1, 1818.

In spite of those serious mishaps and the fact that he had many enemies, Wharton made some substantial contribution to the organization and efficient running of the Marine Corps. For the first time, under his guidance, uniforms and military equipment were standardized and military practices became more uniform throughout the organization. During his administration and guidance the Marine Band was developed and won the national reputation which it still maintains. He was forward looking in his attitude towards the rum ration and its general effects upon drunkenness among the men of the Corps. When the rum ration was increased in 1805 Wharton ordered that it be well diluted with water and issued twice a day in the hopes apparently that drunkenness would thereby be reduced. He used the standard punishment of stopping the rum ration to a considerable advantage against Marines who were prone to over-indulgence. The return to peace after the War of 1812 brought with it the usual reaction against the regular services and Wharton was faced with the problem of reducing the Corps from its wartime strength to approximately one-third of the strength authorized in 1814.

Little is known of the personal life of Franklin Wharton. Some of his descendants assert that he was married three times, while other references mention only one wife. He had six sons and two daughters. His principal personal interest aside from his family and official duties appears to have been Washington real estate, of which he had many valuable holdings at the time of his death.

ANTHONY GALE

THIRD COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

For some time after the passing of Franklin Wharton there was a great deal of hesitation about filling the vacant office. Major Anthony Gale was the next senior officer but he was known to be a man of no great ability and on a number of occasions had been reported for gross personal misconduct. Some of the reports against him had even been investigated by a Court of Inquiry, but no further action had ever been taken. His reputation and character were well known to the Secretary of the Navy, but nevertheless after a delay of six months, during which time Archibald Henderson temporarily acted as head of the Marine Corps, the important position was entrusted to the irresponsible Gale, apparently for the sole reason that he was the Corps' senior officer. The remaining records of his term of office clearly indicate his hopeless inefficiency. He continued in office for less than two years. His personal conduct continued to grow more disgraceful and he was court-martialled and dismissed from the service on October 18, 1820. Every effort has been made to locate a likeness of Colonel Gale but so far, perhaps fortunately, none has been found.

ARCHIBALD HENDERSON

FOURTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS


With the previous Commandant having been removed from his position in a very embarrassing manner, the position was filled apparently without the slightest hesitation by the appointment of Major Archibald Henderson who at once took over the conduct of the affairs of the Marine Corps and continued to run the organization attending to what now seems almost minute details for more than thirty-eight years. He was appointed as Lieutenant Colonel Commandant October 17, 1820, and was afterwards twice promoted in that position, being the first Commandant to be honored with the rank of General officer. Profiting by the mistakes of his predecessors and by his high sense of duty, Henderson made himself in every way an outstanding leader and by his untiring efforts raised the efficiency of the Corps, making it equal to any branch of the regular service as a fighting organization and by a series of dramatic incidents which received wide attention he raised the Corps to a position of high reputation with the rest of the services and with the central government as well as with the people of the nation.

For some time previous to his appointment as Commandant of the Corps there was little doubt but that he was the logical officer to fill that important position. He felt quite sure about the matter himself and even at the time Gale was made Commandant was an active candidate for the appointment. He did not hesitate on that occasion to write personally to the President expressing strongly his claims for appointment to the position. At the time of his elevation to the commandancy he had had fourteen years commissioned service in the Corps and during that intensely active period had had sufficient experience both in war and peace to develop him into a leader of unquestioned ability. Henderson was born at Colchester, Fairfax County, Va., on December 21, 1783. Nothing is known about his early life and education. He was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps on June 4, 1806, and promoted to First Lieutenant during the following March. He served on shore until October, 1807, when he went to sea, first

on the *Wasp* and two months later transferred to the *Constitution*. In June, 1809, he was transferred to Charleston, S. C., as officer in charge of Marines on the gunboat flotilla at that place. He continued on duty in the vicinity of Charleston until September, 1811, when he was assigned to command the Marine detachment on the frigate *President*. He had in the meantime been promoted to captain on April 1, of that year. Soon after the outbreak of the War of 1812 he returned on board the famous frigate *Constitution* and while serving on that vessel during the remainder of the war took part in the famous engagement with the *Java* and in the battle between the *Constitution* and the two British ships *Cyane* and *Levant*. For his gallant service during the latter action he received a silver medal and together with a number of other officers, the thanks of Congress. Virginia later presented him with a jewelled sword with an inscription on it, in testimony of "the high sense entertained by his native state of gallantry and good conduct" during the above mentioned battle and for "his patriotic services generally during the war with Great Britain. Honor to the brave." He was brevetted major in 1814.

During the years immediately following the war Henderson served first as commanding officer at Boston, and later at Portsmouth, N. H. He acted as commandant of the Corps for several months during the winter of 1818-19. At the time of his appointment as Commandant he was serving as commanding officer of Marines at the naval station, New Orleans. When he entered upon the duties of the new office the morale of the Corps was probably at its lowest ebb due to the unfortunate incidents during the administrations of the two previous commandants and to the fact that the country had more or less thrown the regular services aside after the War of 1812, being then interested only in its internal development.

With very little hesitation but apparently after considerable study of the situation Henderson energetically began to apply himself to the raising of the Marine Corps to a standard of efficiency to which it obviously should have been elevated. By paying particular attention to the uniforms of the Corps he effected a standardization and uniformity throughout the Corps. Soon after his appointment he personally inspected all of the shore stations of the Corps and many of the ships detachments. From the very beginning of his commandancy he initiated the policy of the closest and most cordial cooperation with the Navy. He made the closest scrutiny of all funds appropriated for the Marine Corps and even devised means for saving postage by pooling the mail from different stations before being forwarded to its destination. He even personally supervised most of the duties now designated for the quartermaster department and personally handled a great many of the legal affairs pertaining to the pay and allowances of the personnel of the Corps. He always vigorously insisted that the Corps was strictly a military organization and that its efficiency even while on guard depended largely upon its military bearing. He appears never to have failed to do all in his power to foster *esprit de corps*. He was always on the alert to see that both officers and

ARCHIBALD
HENDERSONFourth Commandant
of the Marine Corps
1820-1859

men got their just rights, whether it was in pay, proper consideration, due allowance of servants for officers or whatnot.

In handling the officers of the Corps he appears to have been particularly thorough. He insisted that they make frequent inspections and as far as possible conduct the drills and instructions of the Marines. All newly appointed officers of the Corps were stationed for a time at his headquarters (the present Marine Barracks, Washington) where he personally saw that each was given a basic training before being sent to sea which was normally the first post of duty for the junior officers of the Corps. To assist in the training of the newly appointed officers and to form the nucleus for a land force he initiated the practice of maintaining a skeletonized battalion at headquarters which was kept trained in the latest developments of infantry tactics as well as in the use of artillery. During most of his career a large number of graduates from West Point were not being taken into the army and Henderson recommended that, as far as possible, these young men should be appointed as officers of the Corps. He insisted on strict subordination on the part of the officers of the Corps and found it necessary to court-martial several for breaches in this connection. When the Navy Department countermanded one of his orders for a captain (brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) to go to sea, he vigorously appealed to the President and asked to be sustained in the point he had taken in order to vindicate his own position and thereafter to be assured proper respect and subordination by his officers.

The tour of duty of Henderson as Commandant of the Marine Corps was made up of eventful years in the history of the Corps. It was continually finding larger fields of usefulness. It rendered invaluable aid to the civil authorities during several serious domestic disturbances; it fought pirates in the Mediterranean, in Florida and in the East and West Indies; it intervened to protect Americans in Haiti and China; it furnished a military force in support of the famous Wilkes Exploring Expedition; it came to the timely assistance of the Army in wars against the Indians of Georgia and Florida, and it played an important part in the conquest of California and rendered conspicuous service on a number of other occasions during the Mexican War. The efficiency which Henderson had so ably injected into the ranks of the Corps, showed itself conspicuously during all of those operations.

Henderson's ability as an executive and a genuine leader of men showed itself in an impressive manner on several occasions. The most noteworthy of these was during the second Seminole Indian war in Florida when he offered the services of every available Marine to assist the Army and personally placed himself at the head of a regiment of Marines and led them in the wars against the Indians. During these operations Henderson was given command of the second brigade consisting of seven regiments of regular and volunteer troops in addition to his Marines and led it during an attack against the Seminoles on the Hatchee-Lustee river. By these acts he doubtless did more than any other officer of the Corps has been able to do in placing the organization

in an outstanding position in the minds of the American people and in the opinion of the federal government. Previous to that time the Corps had had a good reputation most of the time with the naval establishment but was little heard of elsewhere and received scant support or recognition. The policies carried out by Henderson during the Mexican War in which he insisted that every possible Marine be placed in the theater of operations made for the Marine Corps an enviable reputation.

During the years following the Mexican War and up to the end of his eventful career, Henderson's principal concern was to provide sufficient Marine detachments for our ever-expanding navy. The Marines, during this period, had perhaps the most far-flung experiences of any time during their history. In addition to the shore stations and in the Home Squadron they maintained detachments on five foreign squadrons which covered practically the entire world. It was during this time that a special battalion of Marines was provided to take part in Perry's expedition to Japan where, under the command of a future Commandant of the Marine Corps, Jacob Zeilin, it did its part to add dignity to the spectacular pageants which accompanied Perry's negotiations. The Marines of the East India Squadron maintained the fighting spirit which had been developed during the recent war while participating in several attacks along the coast of China. Other Marines acquitted themselves in a praiseworthy manner in fighting the savages of the South Sea Islands and along the west coast of Africa. It was during this period that our interventions in Spanish American countries had their beginnings and the Marines on several occasions landed for the protection of American lives and property. In all of these far-flung operations the Marine Corps maintained a zest for fighting which had been inculcated by Henderson's policies during the early years of his career as Commandant.

Throughout practically his entire career Henderson continued personally to supervise the many affairs of the organization in the energetic manner that he resorted to when he first became Commandant. His letters indicate that he conformed to the usual practices of the socially elite of the times by spending a few weeks at Saratoga practically every year. As far as his letters disclose he was not blessed with any considerable private fortune but probably maintained his position on his salary of slightly under \$75 per month and allowances for rations, servants, forage, travel, quarters, etc., all of which amounted to a little more than \$300 a month. He maintained his leadership in cases of national emergency until the end of his long career as is exemplified by his personal participation in the suppression of the Plug-Ugly Riot in Washington in 1857, when, in civilian clothes, he personally mingled with the rioters and with his own hands prevented them from discharging a cannon into the ranks of a Marine battalion which had been sent to break up the riot.

When the career of Henderson drew to a close, in spite of appearances the Corps began to lose some of its fighting efficiency. The fact was manifested by the failure of the Marines to show the old-time zest for fighting at the outbreak of the Civil War. All of the higher ranking officers of the Corps had grown old along

with the Commandant and a reaction had obviously set in although it had not manifested itself before Henderson died in office on January 6, 1859. The funeral of General Henderson was conducted at the Marine Barracks four days later and was attended by the President of the United States with his cabinet and many high ranking officers of the regular service. He was interred in the old Congressional Cemetery, Washington, D. C. He was survived by three daughters and three sons; one of his sons, Charles A. Henderson, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps on March 18, 1847, participated in the Mexican War and during his father's declining years acted as his aide. Upon the approach of the Civil War, Lieutenant Henderson resigned from the Marine Corps and joined the Confederacy. The memory of Brigadier General Archibald Henderson, the grand old man of the Marine Corps, has been fittingly commemorated by the naming of the navy transport *Henderson*.

JOHN HARRIS

FIFTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS


The fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps, Colonel John Harris, quite unlike his more distinguished predecessor became the leader of the Corps in old age and after forty-five years of commissioned service. Harris had originally entered the Corps as a Second Lieutenant on April 14, 1814, and was promoted to First Lieutenant soon afterwards. There is little remaining record that would indicate that he rendered any special services during the War of 1812. In the years following that war he did the usual rounds of duty at sea as commander of Marine guards on a number of the larger naval vessels and at various times was stationed at Erie, Pa., Philadelphia, Norfolk, New York and Boston. He was promoted to Captain by brevet June 28, 1824, for distinguished services on the *Franklin* (74). He was promoted to the regular rank in that grade in June, 1830. He rendered conspicuous service with General Henderson in the Florida Indian wars in 1836-37, in command of a mounted detachment of Marines, for which he was later awarded the brevet rank of major. He returned

to Washington in March, 1837, as the bearer of a treaty which had been made by the commanding general with the Seminole chiefs. From that time until the Mexican War he was assigned to routine post duties and recruiting.

During the Mexican War his services were far less conspicuous than those of a number of other officers of the Corps. He was not interested in going to Mexico on duty unless he could be assured a command commensurate with his rank. His wish was complied with and he was not required to go to the theater of operations until the closing month of the war, when he took a battalion of Marines to Mexico, but arrived after the armistice had been concluded. He was sent with his battalion to Alvarado, Mexico, as part of an occupying force pending negotiations to determine whether or not the Isthmus of Tehuantepec would be placed under American control. The project fell through shortly afterwards, however, and Harris returned to the United States and resumed his usual round of peace-time duties, spending the remainder of the time until he was made Commandant in command of the Marine Barracks at Philadelphia and New York. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel December 10, 1855, and appointed to the office of Colonel Commandant of the Corps, January 7, 1859, the day following the death of General Henderson. Harris no doubt found his position particularly trying on account of having to succeed a Commandant of such distinguished service. The peace-time affairs of the Corps, however, were conducted satisfactorily until the approach of the Civil War.

After the election of Lincoln, the Marine Corps, together with the rest of the military services of the United States began to disintegrate by a large proportion of the commissioned personnel resigning to offer their services to their native southern states. This divided loyalty in the Corps seems to have somewhat affected Harris, although he was not a southerner. When one of the Marine officers resigned during the crisis with the obvious intention of joining the Confederacy, Harris gave him a letter of recommendation commending him highly to any military organization in need of the services of an experienced officer. With the actual outbreak of the war, however, Harris no doubt saw more clearly his obligations to the Union and showed no further wavering of his loyalty. Harris' position grew more difficult by nearly half of the officers of the Corps resigning, many of whom were the younger officers of particularly distinguished records. The situation of the Corps was made still more difficult by the fact that the older officers of the Corps, nearly all of whom remained with the Union, were well on in years and had lost most of their zest for fighting. It must be admitted that Harris' job of preparing the Corps for the long bitter struggle of the Civil War was none too easy when most of the officers of the company rank had to be replaced by inexperienced men.

The Marine Corps failed, in a certain degree, during the Civil War to render the larger usefulness to the nation which it had so ably rendered in previous wars. Just how much of this failure Harris can be blamed with is difficult to state. His letters and other official



JOHN HARRIS
*Fifth Commandant of
the Marine Corps
1859-1864*

records fail to disclose any recommendations for the expansion of the Marine Corps sufficiently to meet the great national emergency. He seems to have been content with supplying Marines to guard the shore establishments of the navy and supplying Marine detachments for the larger vessels and was therefore satisfied with expanding the Corps only slightly in excess of its peacetime strength. There is no evidence that he appreciated the value of an expeditionary force of Marines of sufficient strength to assist the fleet in its operations along the Confederate coast. The record of the Marine Corps in the Civil War and during the remainder of Harris' tour as Commandant may be epitomized by saying that it was brilliantly successful as parts of the crew of naval vessels but nearly always a failure when fighting on shore.

The principal operations during the war in which the Marines participated ashore were: the efforts at the outbreak of the war for holding the naval establishments in the South (most of which proved futile), the participation of a battalion of Marines in the Battle of Bull Run, the landing of a force from the ships of the navy which materially assisted in the capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet, the taking part in the capturing and holding of the islands controlling Port Royal, S. C., and with numerous other expeditions along the Carolina coasts, assisting in the capture and holding of New Orleans and near the end of the war materially aiding in the capture of Fort Fisher. The Marines at sea particularly distinguished themselves as gun crews on the larger vessels of the navy, in the attacks on various Confederate forts along the Mississippi, notably at New Orleans and Vicksburg, and in the Battle of Mobile Bay.

According to the records left by Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy during the Civil War, the Marine Corps was seriously disrupted by all of the older officers of the Corps being at loggerheads with Colonel Harris, who in turn showed little trust in any of them. The only one of them which he entrusted with command of troops in the field, Major John G. Reynolds, he later turned upon and caused him to be tried by court-martial on charges which indicated to Welles that the wrong spirit prevailed between the senior officers of the Corps. Reynolds was promptly acquitted of the charges Harris had brought against him and the Secretary of the Navy admonished the Commandant that unless more harmonious relations prevailed that it might be necessary to eliminate the higher ranking officers of the Corps, an expedience to which Welles actually resorted in choosing the successor to Harris some two years later. Welles had obviously by this time given up all hope of restoring good feelings among the field officers. Harris' tour as Commandant and his long career of about fifty years as a Marine officer came to its close by his death in Washington on May 12, 1864.

An accurate appraisal of Colonel John Harris' career as Commandant of the Marine Corps is difficult to make under the circumstances. It is evident that he had a great deal of difficulty with the senior officers of the Corps and he did not succeed, if he so desired, in having the Corps expanded to the war time needs of the country. If, according to his estimate the main func-

tion of the Corps was to furnish ships' guards and guard naval property ashore the success of the Corps during the Civil War was above serious questioning. Marine detachments were supplied to a maximum of over one hundred vessels and while serving on board the ships of the navy these Marines almost invariably rendered distinguished service. That the Corps failed to produce a successful fighting organization for duty in the field is equally evident. How much of the blame for the latter and how much of the praise of the former can be given to Harris is difficult to state. The remaining records are mostly those of his rather severe critics and his true ability may not be successfully appraised for that reason. That the difficulties which he encountered were too great for a man of seventy or over seems to be quite evident.

JACOB ZEILIN

SIXTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The selection of a successor for John Harris as Commandant of the Marine Corps proved to be one of the most startling upsets that the Corps has ever witnessed in the selection of its commanding officer. Jacob Zeilin, who at the time of his selection on June 30, 1864, had only been a major for a short time was chosen over the heads of all the older field officers of the Corps. He may be classed as another of the patriarchs of the Marine Corps, but in spite of his considerable age at the time of his selection he served as Commandant of the Corps for a period of twelve years, conducting its affairs in spite of the many difficulties, due principally to the post-Civil War reaction against the regular services, with a show of unquestioned ability.

Jacob Zeilin was born in Philadelphia on July 16, 1806, and was appointed as a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps from his native state on October 1, 1831. Little is known of his early life or education. He received his early Marine Corps training under Colonel Henderson at the Headquarters of the Corps and then did shore duty at Philadelphia and Gosport (Portsmouth), Va. He first went to sea for a long and eventful cruise on the sloop of war *Erie* in March, 1832,

JACOB ZEILIN
Sixth Commandant of
the Marine Corps
1864-1876



which lasted for more than five years. He was promoted to First Lieutenant on September 12, 1836. He served for a short tour at Charlestown, Mass., and again went to sea, this time on the *Columbus* (74), and spent much of his time on the Brazil Station. After serving ashore again on the east coast of the United States he was transferred for duty on board the frigate *Congress* attached to the Pacific Squadron, and while on that duty had numerous wartime experiences in the conquest of California and the capture of several important places along the West Coast of Mexico during the Mexican War.

He participated in the capture and occupation of Santa Barbara and San Pedro early in August, 1846, and a short time afterwards assisted in the first capture of Los Angeles. In August of that year, with the Marines of the squadron he recaptured San Pedro which in the meantime had been lost to the insurgent Californians. Early in December, 1846, he took part in the relief column which rescued the beleaguered General Kearney at San Bernardo Ranch—Kearney having just arrived in California at the end of his famous march from Fort Leavenworth. Early the following year he acted as adjutant of Commodore Stockton's mixed column of sailors, Marines, volunteers and a few regulars which marched from San Diego and decisively defeated the Californians in the Battle of San Gabriel, near Los Angeles. For his heroic conduct during this battle and the subsequent defeat of the Californians, Zeilin was brevetted a major.

He served as military commandant at San Diego until the conquest of California was completed and the army took over its affairs, and then together with the rest of the Marines of the Pacific Squadron participated in the capture of important ports along the west coast of Mexico. He was regularly commissioned as captain September 14, 1847. After the close of the war he returned to the east coast of the United States for duty where he served at Norfolk and New York. He was selected to accompany Commodore Perry as Fleet Marine Officer during the famous expedition to Japan in 1853. He commanded the battalion of Marines from Perry's Squadron in the escorts of honor which were landed to accompany Perry during two occasions of the elaborate ceremonies. From then until the outbreak of the Civil War he served at Washington and Norfolk and on the European Squadron. He participated with the Marine battalion in the Battle of Bull Run and was wounded during that unfortunate affair. He was promoted to the regular rank of major on July 26, 1861, a rank he had held by brevet for fourteen years. During the first two years of the war he performed only garrison duties. In 1863 he was given command of a battalion of Marines which was sent to support the naval force attempting to capture Charleston, S. C. He was none too well pleased with his organization and soon afterwards was sent north because of illness. He then resumed the performance of garrison duty at Portsmouth, N. H., which he continued until he was made Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps and ordered to Washington.

As indicated in the preceding sketch, Gideon Welles

was none too well pleased with the services of the field officers of the Marine Corps during the Civil War. He comments in his diary that the selection of a successor to Harris caused considerable embarrassment and that the more senior officers of the Corps were not the type to "elevate or give efficiency" to it. He further commented "to supersede them will cause much dissatisfaction. Every man who is overslaughed and all of his friends will be offended with me for what will be deemed an insult. But there is a duty to be performed." Welles accordingly solved the difficulty by ordering all officers senior to Zeilin into retirement and on the following day appointed him as Commandant of the Corps.

Zeilin's tour of duty as Commandant was one filled with difficulties which were well nigh impossible for him to overcome. During the remainder of the Civil War the best he could do with the few Marines available was to keep the ships' detachments of the more than a hundred vessels of the navy which carried Marines partially supplied. No Marines were available to form separate units either for duty with the army or in support of the Fleet. The Marines at sea, however, continued to render gallant service throughout the remainder of the war. Zeilin experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining the strength of the Corps even to its small authorized strength due to the tremendous number of desertions which were taking place in the Union forces as the war dragged on.

After the close of the war Congress, as usual, insisted on drastic reduction of personnel and the Marine Corps with its reduced strength was required to guard tremendous naval supplies and ships which had been placed out of commission. During the ten years following the war the Commandant's task was to carry on all of the duties expected of the Corps with decreasing appropriations and allowances of Marines. Even the pay was reduced and with that came a renewal of widespread desertions which continued for several years to come. The Corps at times got under 2,000 in strength and the proportion of men at sea rose for a short period to nearly two-thirds.

In spite of the many difficulties Zeilin kept up the degree of efficiency among the Marines ashore. He made annual inspections of all the nearby Marine Corps posts. The new system of army drill and tactics was adopted for the Marine Corps in 1867 and every available Marine at sea and ashore trained in them. Zeilin was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General Commandant March 2, 1867, which promotion carried with it a substantial increase in the pay and allowances for the office. During the later years of his tour of duty the Marines participated a number of times in riot duty, took part in the expedition to Korea, assisted in enforcing revenue laws and participated in some of the extensive inter-oceanic canal surveys in Central America. In 1872 Congress increased the pay of Marines, but even then the flood of desertions in the regular services did not appreciably decrease. Shortly before Zeilin retired from office a move was set on foot to change the entire status of the Marine Corps by absorbing it almost completely into the line of the navy. Zeilin strongly recommended against this change and the Marine Corps continued as a sepa-

rate Corps. Zeilin retired after having served over forty-five years on November 1, 1876, being the first Commandant of the Corps to retire in office. He died in Washington November 18, 1880.

Brigadier General Zeilin's record as commandant of the Marine Corps clearly indicates that he was a man of considerable ability and that Gideon Welles' drastic action when choosing him was probably justified by subsequent events. Zeilin was not subjected as were a number of the other commandants to trying conditions during periods of great national emergency, but it was his lot to do the best he could for the Marine Corps during a period when belt-tightening was in style as Congress insisted that the Corps get along on as little as possible with little thought as to the effect on the efficiency of the organization. Zeilin's memory has been perpetuated in the naval service by the naming of Destroyer Number 313 in his honor.

CHARLES G. McCAWLEY

SEVENTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Charles G. McCawley, son of a Marine officer (Captain James McCawley, 1820-1836), was born in Philadelphia on January 29, 1827. His early schooling was in various schools in Pennsylvania, but upon the death of his father in 1839, young McCawley at the age of twelve entered business in New Orleans with his uncle, William McCawley. He attended to furthering his education there by going to night school, and on March 3, 1847, was appointed to the Marine Corps from Louisiana, receiving his commission as Second Lieutenant.

He sailed almost immediately for Vera Cruz, Mexico, where he joined Scott's army and participated with the battalion of Marines in the storming of the Castle of Chapultepec and the capture of the City of Mexico. As a result of his gallant and meritorious services in these actions he was awarded the brevet rank of first lieutenant on September 13, 1847. From 1848 to 1861 he served at sea in the Mediterranean and Home Squadrons on board the *Cumberland*, *Independence*, *Princeton*, *Macedonian* and *Mississippi*, and at the shore stations at

Boston, New York and Philadelphia. He was accorded the regular rank of first lieutenant on January 2, 1855, nearly eight years after having received the brevet rank, and was promoted to captain on July 26, 1861.

After the beginning of the Civil War he joined the battalion of Marines at Bay Point, S. C., returning with the battalion to Washington in April, 1862. During the following month he was sent in command of two hundred Marines to reoccupy the Norfolk Navy Yard. That important naval establishment had been captured by the Confederates earlier in the war and they had evacuated it upon the approach of the Federal forces under General Wool. Wool's troops occupied the Yard and turned it over to McCawley's detachment, who again raised the Union flag over that station. In July, 1863, he joined the battalion of Marines ordered for service in the South Atlantic Squadron and served with same on Morris Island, S. C., during the bombardment and destruction of Fort Sumter, and when taking part in the bombardment and occupation of Forts Wagner and Gregg. Captain McCawley, commanding a detachment of about 125 Marines, acted as one of five naval divisions in a boat attack against Fort Sumter on the night of September 8. The attack was supported by a heavy fire from the supporting vessels but resulted in considerable confusion and only a small part of the attacking force effected a landing and they were forced to surrender. The boats under McCawley's immediate control turned back with the remainder of the attacking force and did not make a landing. McCawley's own report of the affair seems to indicate no conspicuous gallantry. Nevertheless, he was later brevetted major for the part he took in this operation. He served in the operations on Folly Island and towards the close of the year returned with the battalion to Philadelphia.

He was promoted to Major on June 10, 1864, and served at the Marine rendezvous, Philadelphia, until March, 1865, when he was ordered to command the Marine barracks at Boston. He became a Lieutenant-Colonel on December 5, 1867, and remained in command at Boston until June, 1871, when he was ordered to command the Marine barracks at Washington, D. C., and to superintend recruiting. He had a short tour of duty in New York attending to the organizing of the recruiting service there, returning to Washington in November, 1872. He was made Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps on November 1, 1876. During his tenure of office the Marines participated actively in the quelling of the terrible and unprecedented labor riots which had paralyzed business in nine states, and which had led to wholesale arson and murder; in the protection of American lives and property in Panama in 1885, when the country was in the throes of a revolt against Colombia, and performed similar services on Navassa Island and in the city of Valparaiso, Chile. They also distinguished themselves in the work of suppressing seal poaching in the Bering Sea.

McCawley was retired upon reaching the age of sixty-four on January 29, 1891, and in the following March a stroke of paralysis led to his last illness and death on October 13, at Rosemont, Pa., where he had sought to regain his health. He was buried in the old



CHARLES G.
McCAWLEY
Seventh Commandant
of the Marine Corps
1876-1891

churchyard at Abington, Pa. Colonel McCawley's memory has been perpetuated in naval service by the naming of Destroyer Number 276 in his honor. The citation in that connection mentions his gallant service in Mexico, the reoccupation of the Norfolk Navy Yard and the attack on Fort Sumter.

The Marine Corps during the fifteen years that Colonel McCawley was Commandant drifted along in its post-Civil War doldrums. Throughout this time the strength of the Corps was maintained at less than two thousand by the meager appropriations which were allowed to it. The barracks and other buildings used by the Marine Corps gradually ran down in spite of McCawley's efforts to maintain them in a reasonable state of repair. Through his efforts, however, new barracks were provided at League Island and Annapolis, and the re-establishment of the post at Pensacola. He recommended in 1878 that officers for promotion be required by law to take regular examination and that second lieutenants be appointed from graduates of the United States Military Academy. Failing in this, in 1882, he recommended that new officers be appointed from graduates of the Naval Academy, and from the following year until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War all new Marine officers were obtained from that institution. He established more up to date training of enlisted men in both the infantry and artillery arms. The Marine Corps continued to be plagued with a large percentage of desertions and McCawley made several constructive recommendations for remedial legislation. He initiated the present practice of manufacturing clothes for Marines in the Quartermaster Depot at Philadelphia taking the place of the previous system of having them manufactured by contract. He made several minor improvements looking to the better discipline of the Corps and further improved the position of the Marine Band by reclassification of their positions. He attempted to procure the necessary legislation for a number of other improvements to the Corps, but never succeeded in getting the necessary laws enacted due, no doubt, to the reactionary spirit of the country towards the regular military establishments during this period.

Colonel McCawley was survived by a son, Charles L. McCawley, who was commissioned an officer in the Marine Corps and served as its Quartermaster from May, 1913, until his retirement in August, 1929.


CHARLES HEYWOOD

EIGHTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The eighth Commandant of the Marine Corps was born in Maine on October 3, 1839, but was appointed as a Second Lieutenant of Marines from New York, April 5, 1858. During that year he was stationed at the Marine Barracks in Washington and at Brooklyn, and while at the latter station served in the quarantine riots at Staten Island. Heywood was on special duty on the *Niagara* and later on the *St. Louis* of the Home Squadron, seeking the fillibusters in Central America under Walker. He was invalided from Aspinwall (Colon) in January, 1860, and some time afterwards ordered to the sloop of war *Cumberland*, flagship of the Squadron of Observation at

CHARLES HEYWOOD

*Eighth Commandant
of the Marine Corps
1891-1903*



Vera Cruz, Mexico. In March of 1861 he returned on the *Cumberland* to Hampton Roads and was present at the time of the destruction of the Norfolk Navy Yard.

In May, 1861, Heywood was promoted to First Lieutenant, and as such landed with the Marines at Hatteras Inlet, and was present at the capture of Forts Clark and Hatteras. He was promoted to Captain in November of that year, and during the winter of 1861-62 participated actively in a number of boat expeditions in the James River. In the fight between the *Cumberland* and *Merri-mac* in March, 1862, his conduct was particularly noteworthy while commanding the after gun deck division, firing the last gun in the fight and saving himself by jumping overboard as the *Cumberland* went down with her flag flying. He was most favorably mentioned for his gallant conduct and received the brevet rank of major for his services during the engagement. For some time afterwards he was actively employed, both on shore and at sea in search for the notorious *Alabama*, until he applied for duty on board the flagship *Hartford* and was ordered to her as fleet marine officer of the West Gulf Squadron. He served with the Marines on shore at Pensacola and served on board the *Hartford* in the battle of Mobile Bay, receiving the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel for gallant and meritorious services in the latter engagement, in which he had charge of two nine-inch guns. His services during the Civil War thus secured for him two brevet ranks for distinguished gallantry in the presence of the enemy.

From 1865 to 1867 he performed duty on board various ships, serving as Admiral Farragut's fleet marine officer on the European station and later in the same capacity in the North Atlantic Squadron. During this period he also served at Washington, Norfolk and Brooklyn. In November, 1876, he attained the regular rank of Major to which he had been brevetted more than ten years before, and was ordered to command the Marine Barracks in Washington.

During the serious labor riots of the later summer of 1877 Heywood commanded a battalion of Marines at Baltimore, Philadelphia and Reading. He was honorably

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THE BATTLE OF BIRGOT

BY PAOLO PETRONI

Major of Infantry (General Staff), Italian Army

You will march on overthrowing all obstacles to the goal which will be indicated to you.—MUSSOLINI.

■ At the end of March, 1936, H. E. Graziani, Commanding the Armed Forces in Italian Somalia and Governor of the Colony, ordered the general recommencement of the offensive movement towards the north by the troops of the eastern sector which were extended from the frontier with British Somaliland to the Uebi Scebeli.

In execution of his orders and under his vigorous command the troops very shortly engaged the enemy on a vast front, attaining brilliant successes on all sides. These were crowned by the taking of Dagabur (April 30), the first general objective of the operating columns, and shortly after, the lightening occupation of Giggiga (5 May), Harrar (8 May) and Direedawa (9 May).

Among the events of this campaign the battle of Birgot is one of the most interesting, owing to the number of forces employed, the well-organized defense and the maneuver of attack.

The Theater. The characteristic woodland of Somalia was the dominating feature of the theater of this battle.

Astride the 7th and 8th parallels the sloping plain which gradually rises from the Indian Ocean to the great Harrar range is already around 800 meters above sea level. It is hard to realize this. The immense plain which recent rains have dressed in a beautiful blueish-green are disturbed only by insignificant ranges of hills.

In the center is the Tugh Fafn—Faf for short—a muddy torrent with steep and treacherous banks, sometimes dangerously swollen and sometimes completely dry. It is flanked by two thickly wooded strips of an invitingly cool and peaceful aspect. Here there are luscious clearings, sometimes a kilometer in extent, where herds of gazelles graze.

But the woodland is everywhere—thick, impenetrable, inhospitable and thorny—all the way up from the coast. Here however it is somewhat higher and some of the acacias are more than 10 meters high.

There is no trace of human life—not a shepherd, not a tukul, not a single domestic animal. There are no resources save fresh grazing and firewood. Water is scarce though a little may be found at the bottom of the uadi or torrents and in wells which the floods fill with slime and rubbish.

According to the calendar of the Somalian seasons we were in the "gu" period (March-May) when there is usually no wind, a high temperature and heavy rain. Actually these rules are not invariable. Even in the Black Continent there are exceptional years and also, due to the vastness of the zone, there are variations dependent on the different altitudes and latitudes. Therefore, although the weather may be very hot, there are also windy days which give some respite. The rains are not too troublesome.

Especially during the first period of operations violent hurricanes blew throughout the region causing big floods and rendering the life of the soldiers more difficult and retarding the movements of motorized vehicles. But as a day's rain was usually followed by many hours of sun and wind, the general movement was not completely arrested. Also the troops were so keen to advance and fight that no obstacle would stop them.

The weather element, however, was one of especial interest in regard to the strategic organization of General Graziani's plan of operations.

The enemy and his supporters had believed the rainy season to be their strongest ally. They thought that the attack would be bogged down. The Abyssinian troops, who were supposedly more accustomed to these conditions, would be able to throw themselves on the Italian troops writhing in the swamps, and cut them to pieces.

But very soon the enemy was obliged to see things in a different light. The consequent disillusionment was perhaps one of the elements on which our Commander largely calculated for the operation of his successful strategic surprise.

The Defense.

Birgot is a topographical expression in local use. It consists of a few permanent wells dug in the bed of the Faf close to three *marabutti* which are the only artificial landmarks. From the viewpoint of military operations it is a logistic strait closing in the *tugh* and the Borrahei-Dagabur trail.

To the east there is a well-defined hill; to the west and the center a thick wood; to the south a vast open plain and at a distance of about 4 Kms. a height—Gumar—acting as an advance work. About 7 kms. to the north is the confluence of the Faf and the Giarer with the compulsory ford of Hamanlei. Herein lies its military importance.

The terrain could not have been better exploited by the enemy. Beginning from the north, they had a mobile reserve of variable strength at Hamanlei established against the natural defense works of the precipitous banks of the two torrents. The main forces were in the strait. On the hill of Gumar was a detachment for observation and security services with mobile patrols on foot and on horseback which operated as far as Uarandab. From that hill as far as the strait the whole terrain was cleverly organized with trenches, lookouts, observation posts and snipers' holes.

In the rear were supporting troops and reserves, food and munition dumps, field hospitals and a small car park; everything was well concealed in caves or in tents pitched under the trees.

The banks of the Faf, especially the right one, were also well organized so as to cover all the opposite bank and impede any penetration along the bed of the torrent. The mazes of caverns were masked and fortified, some with double exits, others with mouths opening northward

to surprise any attackers who might overcome the first defenses.

Where the wood was thickest there were crow's nests in the highest trees for observers. Here and there false trenches were marked on the ground, very cleverly placed to deceive air observers.

An interesting fact was that the parapets of the trenches were on the inner edge; this was part of the "backwards" defense organized by Wehib Pasha in spite of the opposition of the Abyssinian commanders.

At the end of March the direct defense of the strait of Birgot was in the hands of a force of about 2,000 men. But as soon as they had news of our movements the enemy sent up a further 2,000 regular troops. Later, during the battle, about 1,000 more were brought up, some on foot and some in trucks, on 24 April.

The commander was the Fituarari Melium, under whose orders was the Agafari Ato Abata, who held the most important position on the hill on the left bank dominating the strait. The Casmagnac Aile, ex-secretary of Nasibu, was in the center. All these men were influential and brave. They had orders to resist to the last man and, in fact, only Melium escaped unharmed; Ata Abata was taken prisoner and Aile was wounded in the breast and arm.

All the principal commanders were in telephonic communication.

Their armament consisted of some small caliber pieces, anti-aircraft and anti-tank Oerlikon guns with perforating, tracing, incendiary and explosive projectiles, numbers of machine guns, automatic rifles and many very good Mausers made in 1933, 1934 and 1935 with the Lion of Judah and the Ethiopian crown carved on the butt and the barrel. Also a couple of prehistoric bomb-throwers with very rudimentary projectiles consisting of a big aluminum shell with a nail for a cap. They also had scimitars, swords and sharp knives for . . . operating on enemy prisoners.

The functioning of the services was very simple. Each soldier had several small sacks of food (dura, bread, flour, dried peas and beans, herbere, taf, onions, garlic, aromatic herbs); large quantities of ammunition in their cartridge belts, baskets, leather bags, gourds or horns; a first aid package; a water flask or waterproof bag; various small pots and pans for preparing their food. In the caverns and trenches there were small dumps of food, munitions and medical supplies and many bottles of mastica, cognac, talla and aerated water.

Other services were very rudimentary and functioned in accordance with the initiative and good will of the chiefs.

The Attacking Troops.

The troops attacking the Abyssinian positions described above formed the *central column* under the orders of General Frusci which, on 23 April, was comprised as follows:

Column Command:

one fast "Navarra" regiment (command, two groups of bands, irregular band of Olol Dinle, 2 platoons tanks with flame throwers);

the Parini legion (command and 2 battalions);
two Arabo-Somali regiments, the 1st and 2nd (one command and three battalions each); commanded by Colonels Maletti and Carnevali;
One Italian motorized 100/17 light artillery group;
two Arabo-Somali 65/17 camel groups;
one group tanks (command, 2 companies tanks, 1 section armored cars);
one group motorized machine guns (Militia);
one reinforced company native workmen;
one section Italian bridge builders;
two platoons Italian water service engineers;
one Italian radio section;
one photoelectric section (2 stations) (Italian);
two field hospitals (only one reached Birgot on the morning of the 24th);
two detachments of a medical section;
two detachments of supply section;
one echelon motor ambulances;
one echelon motor water tanks and one echelon Fiat 634 trucks with food, munitions, various supplies, fuel, oil, etc. (a total of 180 Fiat 634, Ceirano and Ford V8 trucks);
one echelon Caterpillars (15 tractors and 32 trailers) with food, munitions, fuel, oil, etc.; (intangible reserve).

Total: 367 officers, 214 NCOs, 2,000 Italian troops, 8,120 native troops, 1,245 mules, 710 camels and about 400 motor vehicles.

A few brief comments on these troops may be of interest.

The fast "Navarra" regiment, commanded by Consul General Navarra, comprised of Italian and native troops. It had already sustained a fierce battle at Gianagobo and had been through various victorious encounters with the "left column" (nasi). The martial bearing and quick glance of the dubats witnessed to their determination to gain new laurels on the field. They were used to the terrain, speedy marchers trained for assault and battle, very good soldiers, but hard to command, requiring officers with a knowledge of the childish but complex Somalian mind.

The band of the Sultan Olol Dinle had already been well tested. The troops were very similar to the dubat but had only elementary training; they were very suitable for quick advance and flanking actions.

The Parini legion, commanded by H. E. Minister Parini, Consul of the Militia, was a superb unit. It was entirely motorized with the most modern armament and complete equipment. They carried food and fuel sufficient to reach Harrar. But their spirit was the most striking feature. All these legionaries were Italians resident abroad. They spoke all kinds of languages. Some were boys and some hardened men. Beside the recruit marched the veteran with five blue war-service ribbons on his breast. And they were inspired and ready to fight to the death.

The 1st and 2nd Arabo-Somali regiments were two strong units, well disciplined and trained and eager to combat. They are trained to move and fight in the woods with a surprising speed and without fatigue; they are both fast units and assault units.

The Ascari have already given superb proof of their abilities in warfare. They are born warriors of distinguished carriage, and always elegant in their carefully kept many colored uniforms.

The two groups of native artillery are distinguished by their gold sashes and their dainty 65:17 pieces packed on camel back. They followed the 1st and 2nd regiments faithfully through all their vicissitudes. The ascari love their battery and are proud to serve under the Italian government.

The smaller native detachments are similar to the larger Arabo-Somali units, and one and all are anxious to measure themselves against the enemy.

In regard to the Italian troops of the Army and the Militia, we can add nothing to what is already known of them and their superb traditions. Under the most difficult circumstances they all—infantry, artillery, black-shirts, engineers, medical and supply units—showed themselves to be perfectly disciplined soldiers capable of facing all trials for love of their country.

The Services.

In all colonial campaigns the services are of the utmost importance but in this particular one they were vital. It was necessary to organize a mechanism which might ensure life, munitions and assistance to more than 10,000 men, 2,000 animals and 400 motor vehicles practically isolated and operating against a warlike enemy in difficult territory devoid of resources for an indefinite period, in an enterprise which entailed an advance of over 500 kms. But this was not all. The column comprised Italian and native units which required different food and carried a very complex armament.

Furthermore, it had to move for a good part of the way astride a torrent which was not always fordable; that is, in two big sections which in turn might detach smaller sections of variable size.

Finally, it was the season of rains, it was necessary to calculate for the possibility of the column being blocked by water and mud without being able to get supplies from its base (Gabredarre).

Although the planes could be strongly relied on for logistic purposes there was nevertheless the chance that the landing field at Gorrahei might become impracticable.

Thus the central column had to be self-sufficient.

The installation and functioning of the services were aimed towards ensuring autonomy of life and munitions for several days even under the worst conditions. That is to say, the column would count on supplies from Gabredarre whenever possible, but it carried everything necessary for its functioning even if the transportation should be held up by the rains.

The number of trucks available allowed a reserve of 25 days supply of food¹ and 2 to 5 days' fire.

The March towards the Enemy.

Information from various sources indicated the enemy's positions at the end of March on the Garandab-Giggiga route—that is where it most directly interested the central column—as follows:

¹Excluding fresh meat. This had to be found locally. But in practice not even a goat was found. The enemy had managed to remove everything from the path of the troops and the central column was obliged to eat only canned meat for more than 15 days.

At Giggiga: 5,000 men; between Giggiga and Dagabur, 2,000 men; at Dagabur, 4,000 men; at Sassabaneh, 1,000 men; in the Hamanlei zone, 2,000 men; between Sassabaneh and Uarandab, large patrols on foot and on horseback.

To the east between Milmil and Bullaleh and Gunu Gadu, about 3,000 men; to the west, between Farso-Dagamedo-Segag-Duhun-Bircut-Maleico, more than 4,000 men—which later were found to be over 10,000.

All these data were considered approximate; the enemy had many men and adequate motor transport. Therefore they would be able to bring up reinforcements to threatened zones with great speed.

General Frusci decided to maneuver on the two routes astride the Faf. The 2nd Arabo-Somali regiment, the II Camel artillery, a detachment of a medical section and a section of supplies with the corresponding trucks were on the left. The other troops and the command on the right. Communications were effected by radio, airplane and patrols.

The central column left the Gorrahei-Gabredarre zone on 11 April and on the 19th reached Seic Hosc. The advance was carried out with regularity in spite of the bad weather which delayed the march and necessitated the building of several bridges and work on the two trails along the Faf. During the march several units were called away from the column to operate in other sectors.

From Seic Hosc the column sent out reconnaissance and scouting patrols. The first contact was made with the enemy. The latter behaved with caution and fell back, but on the 21st a large patrol attempted to surprise and surround a small group of our scouts. The Ascari threw some bombs and the terrified Abyssinians dispersed. During these encounters our losses were very few, much smaller than those of the enemy.

In the Seic Hosc zone the column halted during April 20, 21 and 22; on the afternoon of the 22nd it was reinforced by the arrival of the Parini legion.

On the 23rd April the central column reached the plain of God Addi (130 kms. from Gorrahei) and took up position astride the Faf facing the advanced enemy positions. The movement was carried out with regularity and order. In the late afternoon the fast Navarra group arrived in trucks which had to be sent back immediately, and all their equipment was transferred to camels. It was impossible to complete this operation before dark and therefore this column joined the line on the following day, the 24th, after some delay.

The enemy positions were swept with powerful reflectors and the night passed quietly.

The order for the attack was given in daytime so that it was possible to make all preparations and arrangements. It was brief and clear and indicated the initial positions and the directions of the attack. The attack was to be made on the following day, April 24, in three phases:

- arrival at bases of departure;
- attack on Gumar-Dahe-Birgot positions;
- attack on Hamanlei positions.

The aim of the attack was to destroy the enemy completely by surrounding his positions.

The Battle.

At 7 A. M. of the 24th the units of the first echelon began the operation. The 2nd regiment (command, II and IV Arabo-Somali battalions) with the II Camel group (less one battery) were on the right bank of the Faf. On its right was the Parini legion (command and two battalions), the II group 100/17 artillery and the I group camel battery (less one battery). On the right again, at wider range, was the I Arabo-Somali battalion with a camel battery in direct support. In the center of the line was the reserve.

The motorized echelons and services remained in safety round the bridge over the Faf which had been built on the afternoon of the 23rd and during the night of the 24th in order to provide swift and secure communication between the two banks in case of a sudden flood.

The Commander of the column followed the Parini Legion. The movement continued speedily until 8 A. M., by which time the sun was high. Meanwhile the terrain had become more heavy and treacherous.

The enemies' observation posts on the Gumar height (left bank of the Faf) gave no sign of life. This height was reached at 8.45; the enemy, who had already undergone aerial bombardment on the 23rd, had fallen back. On the right bank of the Faf the movement continued regularly. There was still no sign of the enemy at 9 A. M.

The commander of the column then decided to send ahead one of his staff officers to acquire direct information as to the enemy's positions. This officer left at once along the trail with the special "S" tank section. After about 4 kms., at the foot of the hill on the left bank of the Faf, the section ran into machine gun and anti-tank fire. At the same time a dense cloud of smoke arose from either side of the trail—the enemy had set light to fires which were intended to stop the passage of the tanks.

The officer then lined up his tanks, which occasionally responded to the enemy's fire with their 37 mm guns; he then got out of his tank and observed the terrain through field glasses, after which he made out a brief report which was immediately transmitted to the Column Commander.

Meanwhile General Frusci had received further information and had been able to make accurate observations from a height.

The heat was very great; there were a few cases of sunstroke among the men of the Parini Legion. On the right bank of the Faf the Commander of the 2nd regiment signalled "All well, movement proceeding regularly."

On the basis of the above elements the General ordered:

- the Commander of the 2nd regiment to continue his movement rapidly;
- the Commander of the 1st Arabo-Somali battalion to rectify the marching direction,² to go towards the top of the hill dominating the strait on the east and destroy the position;
- the commander of the 1st regiment (in reserve) to pass ahead of the Parini Legion. The latter,

which had already been marching for three hours, two of which were under the blazing sun, passed into reserve.

- the commander of the column artillery to support the action of the I Arabo-Somali battalion which was direct and therefore very important, with the 100/17 group and the 1st camel group; first, to cover the valley, wells and trail in the eastern wing of the strait; second, to eliminate the left wing of the defense;
- the commander of the V battalion to close in across the Faf for the tactical communication between the attacking troops on the two banks.

Executing these orders, the advanced troops arrived at 10.30 below the positions of the enemy who only then and very suddenly opened rifle, machine gun and small caliber artillery fire, which caused our first losses. By 11 o'clock the battle was raging. On the right of the Faf the 2nd regiment had encountered superior forces which, however, did not take them by surprise or arrest their march. The action was continued methodically and surely.

At 13 o'clock the *marabutti* of Birgot were wiped out by a superb assault. On the extreme right the 1st battalion supported by the batteries advanced on the objective.

At 1500, after a brilliant assault, the battalion occupied the hill and exterminated the defenders. The artillery then moved their fire to the rear of the position against reinforcements and reserves.

In the center, however, the 1st regiment (III and IV battalions) were in the thick woods and under machine gun and rifle fire from the front, flank and rear. The enemy was hidden in deep holes, in bushes and in the trees; their reinforcements could move quickly under cover of the thick vegetation.

Owing to bad visibility, our artillery could not act effectively. Nor were the tanks of great use owing to the broken and treacherous ground.

Groups of reinforcements coming up into the front line were bombarded from the air, but without any great immediate effect. In fact, the wood was so dense that the aerial observers were unable to see the signals of the most advanced troops of our own side; a few shots fell on our own men but without causing any great damage.

The V Battalion, which had meanwhile been called over to the left bank of the Faf to relieve the pressure on the left flank of the 1st regiment, was engaged by superior forces, but it held on and managed to advance a little.

At 1600 the VI battalion (1st group) had lost 6 officers, as many wounded and more than 100 men killed and wounded.

The III battalion went to the assistance of the VI, but the enemy still resisted. The commander of the regiment reported the situation to the Column Command and asked for reinforcements which, for the moment, were refused.

At 1700 the situation had not changed. The aviators who were following the fight from above, flew as low as possible and dropped messages and sketches and other useful information.

It may be said in passing that by now the troops had

²The battalion had inadvertently borne slightly to the west, being confused by the woodland.

been in movement for 10 hours and fighting for 7, in tremendous heat (42 degrees C. in the shade and 60 degrees C. in the sun). The most hard pressed sections were showing some fatigue.

The Column Command ordered:

- The commander of the V battalion to advance to protect the left flank and the rear of the 1st group and to send out patrols to the west to contact the 2nd group;
- Consul General Navarra—who had joined the column some time previously—to send out a group of bands to reinforce the 1st regiment on the right (the II group was sent);
- the commander of the 2nd regiment and the commander of the I Arabo-Somali battalion to consolidate the positions attained;
- the remaining troops and services to await further orders.

By evening the fight was flagging somewhat, but the respite was brief. It soon flared up again with brisk exchange of rifle fire, the spatter of a machine gun, the salvo of bombs. Something big was about to happen—a counter attack which was soon repulsed.

Meanwhile the first prisoners were arriving at the command, including the Agafari Abata. When interrogated they answered evasively, partly on purpose and partly in the usual way of all colored races. However, some information was extracted from them in regard to their numbers, munition, losses and their first impressions of the battle. We were faced with 4,000 well-trained and organized men, completely armed and munitioned and well supplied with food. We also learned that these men were determined to fight to the last gasp to stop us from gaining further ground, as "peace was imminent."

Thus the situation gradually became clearer and the Column Commander made the following decisions:

At dawn on the 25th the batteries were to be rapidly prepared. The advanced battalions would attack with hand grenades and bayonet. The action was to be regulated by patrols with Very light signals. The tanks would stand by ready for action; the flame throwers to act against the mouths of the caverns. At the same time the other units were to be ready to act on the right either to complete the envelopment or to start pursuit.

At the first light of dawn the batteries opened a fierce but brief fire. Immediately afterwards green and white rockets went up from the woods. The bursting of hand grenades was heard. The first news began to come through to the Column Command—the enemy had been taken by surprise and routed—we were advancing.

Then the Navarra regiment entered into action, pursuing the enemy up the left bank of the Faf. On the right the 2nd regiment advanced.

But the enemy did not retire; they fell back, taking advantage of the woods. Thus rather than a pursuit it was a heavy mopping up action consisting of numerous

small episodes. The Navarra regiment had a difficult task which it carried out laudably.

Here and there an isolated rifle shot broke out from the last defenders of a lost cause. The list of casualties bears witness to the fierce fight:

Our losses: Officers, 10 killed, 11 wounded; Italian men, 1 killed, 15 wounded; natives, 132 killed, 493 wounded.

Enemy losses: More than 1,000 killed ascertained, some dozen wounded, 36 prisoners.

Conclusions.

The Cagnasmac Ali Nur, who took part in the battle of Birgot and other actions on the Somali front, has made some comments on the campaign which may be of interest. He stated:

"In our operations against the Italian forces we felt no inferiority of individual armament. Our guns were excellent, even better than yours. We had plenty of ammunition and machine guns of all calibers. Your tanks gave us only a preliminary surprise. We soon understood that by keeping calm we could escape from them; it is enough to remain outside their narrow range of fire. Also, as their visibility is very limited one can safely move on their flanks even when in action.

"But we were surprised at the bravery of the Italian and native troops and especially at the serenity and daring of the Italian officers. At Hamaneli (11 November, 1935) and in other actions, we were stupefied to see officers leave the tanks amid a hail of bullets. Everywhere we saw the officers lead their soldiers with exemplary bravery.

"We admired the physical resistance of the Italian soldiers even in zones avoided by the natives.

"Your reflectors were a bitter surprise to us; our men were disturbed and uncertain under their potent rays.

"We had thought to be able to stop you at Birgot and gain a great victory. We had sufficient troops on the positions and strong reinforcements and reserves in the rear. Our spirit was high, the orders peremptory and discipline severe.

"But after some hours of fighting I understood that any further resistance would be vain. The battle was lost for us.

"The efficiency of the warlike and chosen army of Nasibu and the very fate of the campaign were badly compromised. We could resist everything—airplanes, tanks, machine guns, rifles, artillery. But we did not know that the Italians had "guns in their pockets."³

We leave the responsibility of his declarations to Ali Nur and the reader may draw the logical conclusions.

The battle of Birgot was one of the fiercest encounters of the campaign on the Somalian front. It was also undoubtedly one of the most decisive factors in the great strategic operation which was soundly planned and swiftly conducted to a happy end by General Graziani in harmony with Marshal Badoglio's general directions. It will, therefore, repay study by those interested in the art of colonial warfare.

In regard to our enemy, we would above all stress the ability with which their strong defensive system was organized, based against a logistic strait (Birgot), pro-

³The hand grenade was a real and terrible surprise to the enemy. Our Ascari had quickly realized its value. If they had been able they would have carried more than they did. The Ascari are natural bomb throwers, as are all shepherds; they could throw them over 80 and even 90 meters. Our "Breda" bombs gave excellent results.

tected in the front by the Gumar hills and to the rear by the tremendous plain of the Giarer. There were thus three obstacles to be overcome within a distance of 12 kms.

Favored by the inclement weather and held by a mass of well-armed and trained combatants, this defensive system was considered invulnerable.

The enemy made two fundamental errors—one of presumption and one of training. The first consists in their having counted on our movement being stopped by the rains. The second regarded the combative training of the troops. Instead of employing their natural and instinctive method of attacking the enemy en masse, the Abyssinian soldiers had been taught to follow the disciplined and ordered methods of Europeans. But, owing either to inefficient instructors or to the mental inability of the pupils, or perhaps merely to the attempt to accomplish too radical a transformation, the result was mechanical and uninspired. We received this impression first when it was found that the machine guns and Oerlikon cannon did not open fire above 4-500 meters even when they were offered obvious and tempting targets. It was confirmed when it was heard that several machine gunners had been severely punished for transgressing these orders—one of them paid with his head for his undisciplined initiative. Finally there happened what had long been foreseen in the Italian army and avoided, thanks to the constant warnings of the High Commands; memories of the war of position which were profoundly rooted in the minds of many officers had acted, through the instructors, on the Abyssinian army which had thus suddenly passed from its atavistic method of mobile and aggressive combat to the paralyzing struggle of trench warfare.

On the attacking side, the battle of Birgot clearly evidenced the efficacy of the war of movement and the value of discipline and method applied without prejudice and without immovable subordination to formulae and general maxims. It also showed the value of surprise, the spirit of enterprise, the cool and calculating courage of the chiefs, the ardor of the troops devoted to their commanders, the exemplary behavior of the officers and the orderly functioning of the services.

The aviation participated in the action with chivalrous comradeship, arousing admiration and winning the undying gratitude of the land forces. In spite of the anti-aircraft fire, the planes always flew low over the woods to attack reinforcements and reserves, signal the enemy movements to the Column Command and maintain communication between the various units.⁴ The terrain was not of the most favorable for observation and aerial firing; nevertheless the air force performed splendid feats in several ways amongst which one of the most important was that of security on the flanks and rear.

The Commander of the Somalian Air Force, General Ranza, himself set an example of daring and enthusiasm. His frequent messages in colored pencil with sketch maps attached will not be forgotten by those who have read into them not only the meaning of the words but also the

⁴More than 50 per cent of the planes were hit by machine gun or Oerlikon fire. Some aviators were wounded and two planes were brought down (fortunately within our lines).

most noble sentiments of military camaraderie.

A foreign journalist who professes himself our "friend" has stated that the battle of Birgot was a high card played with excessive audacity which, in case of failure, would have irreparably compromised the success of the operations. We do not wish to displease our friend by answering that, although he is an officer, he must have forgotten many specific and elementary teachings of history in general and of military history in particular.

We will not invoke the Roman warning "*audaces fortuna iuvat*" because we know, with the German philosopher that "every proverb is true inasmuch as it is untrue." But in war there are always good and bad days. On the other hand, who can claim that the great captains, from Caesar to Napoleon, never employed the element of risk? Fabio Massimo has gone down to history as an exception; but the quick-minded French have somewhat shaken his pedestal of glory by a phrase which reads approximately as follows: "If Fabio Massimo had lost, he would have gone down to history as a 'procrastinator.'"

Nor would the author of the "*Promessi Sposi*" have disturbed the peace of the Prince of Conde if his sleeping on the eve of the famous battle had not represented something exceptional.

Finally, why should Graziani not have won with this card? He had organized it strongly and entrusted it to a brave commander and loyal troops.

Birgot is but one page—undoubtedly the most brilliant—of those which the central column has written in the final chapter of the victorious campaign.

On 10 May, 1936, Year XIV of the Fascist Era, the column entered Giggiga (which was already Italian) after a march of 400 kms. on foot, 160 of which, from Dagabur to Giggiga, were covered in 96 hours.

A few days later, there being no further reason for its existence, the central column was disbanded. But it will always be remembered by those who took part in its story and overcame all obstacles in defense and to the honor of their country.

CITRUS INTERESTS CALL "CATERPILLAR" EXECUTIVE

■ Extensive citrus interests in California which demanded more and more of his personal attention, have resulted in the resignation of H. P. Mee, Vice President of Caterpillar Tractor Co., effective June 1.

The press of executive work and administrative duties in connection with the supervision of all sales, service and advertising activities at "Caterpillar" has required Mr. Mee's continued presence at the Peoria, Illinois, offices and plant. In the meantime, Mr. Mee's citrus holdings in Southern California have been expanded, resulting in his decision to transfer his activities there. He will probably make his home in Santa Barbara.

Mr. Mee joined the C. L. Best Tractor Co., predecessor of "Caterpillar," 17 years ago as Credit Manager. When Best and Holt Companies merged, he became Treasurer, then Secretary-Treasurer, and later Vice President and Treasurer. 1934 saw him promoted to Vice President in charge of sales. Two years later he was advanced to his present administrative post.

DURABLE TRAINING

CAPTAIN HOWARD N. KENYON, U.S.M.C.

"His own character is the arbiter of every one's fortune"
—SYRUS—"Maxims"

■ Experience has taught most mature men that the degree of development of the ability for self improvement is an almost certain index for ascertaining character value. The ability to improve himself has lifted man above other animals and has lifted a few of the particular races of men high above other races. This ability highly developed in the individual has elevated him to such astounding heights and offered such numerous outlets for so many lines of human activity that the persistent quest for knowledge has invariably yielded practical results on the part of those men who have found the pattern to which they wished to be moulded and paid the price in effort. The unqualified right of man to improve his station in life and to determine his own vocation has the legal and moral recognition and support of the greater part of civilized people. Any and every agency that assists men on their upward climb will be freely used and amply justified.

In Haiti during the occupation I witnessed an incident that strongly impressed upon me the character qualities of those persons who seek to extend their scope of learning and understanding in life and of some of the problems that may confront them in their immediate surroundings. At Cerca la Source I had a Sergeant Solomon in the Gendarmerie company who was far above the average man in ability as a sergeant and in his interest in the affairs and facts of life about him. My own American sergeant who served as a second lieutenant in the sub-district at Thomassique was severely handicapped by the effects of rum, native women, bad spelling and his almost total inability to prepare and submit his monthly account current. Thinking that by sending him Sergeant Solomon I was more or less helping him along, I thereby sur-rendered my best man at the district headquarters. I had guessed wrong. My sub-district commander resented the implication that he needed any form of help and without my knowledge sent Solomon out to the two man outpost at Los Palis where privates only were ordinarily stationed. Poor Solomon! I had purposely not told him that I was sending him to help out at sub-district headquarters at Thomassique to prevent his realizing how desperately little the sub-district commander knew. He must have thought that I sent him away to Los Palis to get rid of him. He was an unusually high strung man. He lived only a little over one day at the outpost.

It is hard to forget the death of Sergeant Solomon. At about one o'clock in the morning of the third day after he had been detached from district headquarters I was awakened by the sentry at the barracks with one of the gendarmes from Los Palis. The man from the outpost had walked 22 miles that night. Solomon was dead. He had shot himself with the service rifle. Neither of the gendarmes could give any other reason than that he did not want duty at Los Palis. We awakened some natives who owned horses and after hiring and catching the loose mounts I arrived just as day was breaking where a lone gendarme was still standing his all night vigil

over the body of his sergeant. I examined the remains and the effects on his person. His pockets contained nothing of importance but a single notebook. In this book was a list of every English word Solomon had learned. There was a list of the items of quartermaster property with the prices, a list of the English drill commands and their meaning in French, a list of the names of officers under whom he had served and the diacritical markings to determine the pronunciation, a list of difficult English expressions he had heard often and was trying to learn well and at the last my own name with his markings for the pronunciation and a few expressions I had used that were apparently new to him in the short time I had been in the district.

The book told the story. I shoved it in my pocket and rode on into department headquarters and requested the board of inquest. The inquest was formal and short but I stated to the colonel the whole story and showed him the book of Solomon's years of effort to learn English. The colonel himself knew Solomon and was indignant. I suggested that the sub-district commander be moved. The colonel stated he would move him right out of the Gendarmerie. The move was effected promptly on the following day but the tragedy of the stupidity that had failed to interpret the character of Solomon in time still remained.

Four years had passed. In the fall of 1928 in Nicaragua, I had a patrol composed of two second lieutenants and some eighty odd men of the 16th Company. We had been moving steadily the four days since being out from Corinto Finca. The men had been together in the company for several months and I knew them all fairly well. They pushed the hike along with good will and vigor. On the way to San Antonio the groups into which the company was divided competed for being the first to arrive at the ranch site and take first choice of corrals and billets. One group knew a short cut over Bonitillo that put them a mile in the lead but a fallen tree across the road containing a tropical hornets' nest plunged the men and mules into such disorder that they arrived last on the back breaking trail of mud holes that led up the mountainside to San Antonio at the end of the first day. From our camp there we could see at comparatively close range the square and massive shoulders of Pena Blanca towering high above the surrounding mountains and close to the funnel shaped outline of Chachagon. On the second day we divided and combed Guale, Los Cedros and the area of the mill at Los Angeles. On the evening of the third day we assembled at St. Helena. The morning of the fourth day found us breaking camp at San Vicente on a high plateau where we stayed at the abandoned logging estate that overlooked the jagged seas of mountain tops stretching away northward into Nueva Segovia. From here we prepared to drop down the Cua to the Coco in the day's move. We had purposely made a late start to rest the animals and to allow all hands to bathe in the small pool near the house on the estate.

Our subsistence consisted of the dry rations carried on the animals and whatever we could buy or find along the trail. One of the lieutenants carried the purchase money which was rather sparingly used due to scarcity of inhabitants in that area. In this instance he had a roll of

eighty dollars in new one dollar bills. No money had yet been spent on the trip. During the period for swimming nearly all hands had taken advantage of the chance to get in the water. Immediately after the swim all packs were put up for moving at once. Just before we began leading the mules into position in column the lieutenant who carried the cash whispered to me that someone had removed it from his roll of clothing while he had been swimming. This news was bad but we kept it quiet as the men and pack animals were put into their marching positions and without any disclosure got underway.

It seemed an easy matter to detect theft in a small group of men in a more or less open place where concealment of the stolen money would be next to impossible. We marched a few hundred yards and without warning I ordered a halt and layout of inspection, animal packs and all—the only time I ever did so before or after this event. I explained hastily to the men what we were up against—that the mess money had been taken and we would have to make a thorough job of recovering it. Every man who had money seemed to have no hesitancy in laying it out. I walked rather slowly along the line of laid out gear and nearly naked men as the two lieutenants and senior sergeant went ahead to see that it was in complete readiness. Suddenly I noticed the three of them closely assembled about one man with all eyes in that direction. “We’ve got ‘im,” the sergeant announced. I stepped up at once to look into the find. Private First Class Willis had his gear neatly laid out. His was probably the neatest in the company. Beside his correspondence course pamphlet in engineering with a nearly completed lesson was a neat pile of exactly eighty dollars in new bills. I knew Willis was an excellent man. He was also quite young. He was almost too frightened to speak. No other man in the company had so much money and no one had new bills.

How could one arrive at the facts here? As I proceeded to question Willis I somehow happened to think of the effects found on the body of Sergeant Solomon. When did he work on the last MCI lesson? It was in the frame ranch house at St. Helena by candle light while he was among those of the first patrol to arrive as they awaited several hours for the other two patrols and the train. Where did the exact eighty dollars come from? Was this what he had saved out of three months’ pay to send home? Did the sergeant or any of the men have any reason to suspect this man? They said they did not—but a number of them added they did not need to when he was caught with the goods. When I told Willis I was satisfied with his story nearly everyone near expressed a look of surprise. I ordered packs closed and mules prepared and directed the column to continue the march when ready.

The solution of this case was somewhere close. The loosely built headquarters of the logging company was only a short distance behind us. It was well known that we expected to return on the trail via San Vincente. Every stick and stone at the building must be searched. The result was positive. The bills were neatly concealed near the wall. The real thief was never caught but a man of the command who was later convicted for a similar instance was probably the offender. Two nights later we were again at San Vincente. The men sat up late talking and jesting as we cooked a beef. Repeatedly they told Willis that his MCI course was all that stood between him and disaster and that he now knew what to do if he had to crack safes on the outside. When Willis received his excellent discharge he came around to say

“Goodbye.” “Captain, if you had guessed wrong when you found me with the eighty dollars you would have ruined me and killed my mother.” “No,” I answered, “It was not a matter of guessing. The evidence of your character as laid out at that inspection was conclusive. Even before we found the money I told Lieutenant Smith that he and I would have to make the money up if we failed to find it. If the money had never been found today you would be getting the excellent discharge just the same.” Willis seemed unable to speak. As he gave me an iron grip in his parting handshake I noticed tears running down his cheeks. I never saw him again.

In these days of fast shifting in the implements of war and much confusion on the tactical proportions of the various newly created types of combat organizations our own corps finds itself involved in the question of what is or is not obsolete and to what extent new methods and equipment should be adopted in common with all other military services. From a long range point of view, however, necessity will solve most of the questions of a purely military nature. The one big question that we seem to have solved fairly well for all time is that of giving our personnel the very best training to better their stations in civilian life after they leave the corps as well as special training for specialized fields in the military profession. We can properly take just pride in the fact that the Marine Corps is the only military service in the United States that pays so much attention to the self improvement of its members.

The recognized value of our special correspondence training in the subjects offered by the International Correspondence Schools as a big direct factor in the morale of the Corps comes largely through the very practical and material feature of giving the man who joins us, whether it be for one cruise or many cruises, something that will serve him as an enduring personal asset in civil life. No other form or feature of our training is half so important as that which builds up the initiative in our personnel to better their stations in life and to realize that the Corps has served as their medium of training and education. Only a small percentage of the enlisted personnel of the American services remains to retire as professional soldiers. The desire to see the world, wear the uniform, decide on a life vocation and obtain some degree of proficiency in that vocation are those that are generally uppermost in the mind of the marine recruit. The discipline and military features alone have placed our men in comparatively large numbers on almost every police force in the country and started many on their way to commissions in the national guard and in our own service. Aside from those who continue in the military profession, a steady stream of our constantly changing personnel carries back to civil life the better preparation for such life they acquired in the Corps.

By this service in offering to assist and actually assisting all who seek specialized training we give to each recruit every bit of preparation for life outside his enlistment that we promise and by this service we prepare our long timers for a better grasp of any profession they may choose upon retirement. The cash value of this training is not possible to determine but the actual cost of the instruction is a benefit few of the men or officers could well afford in civil activities. The records of our men and officers who have finished these courses and used them to advantage in and out of the service justify beyond question all that was originally hoped for in this training feature of the U. S. Marine Corps that was made permanent policy shortly after the World War.

TERRAIN AND COMBAT METHODS

COLONEL C. J. MILLER, U.S.M.C.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

■ This article is written for the purpose of stimulating among our officers a greater interest in the study of the terrain, as it affects the combat methods of all arms and especially because of its great importance in landing operations. In the observations that follow no credit is taken for originality, for the facts as deduced are well known to students of modern warfare nor is any pretense made of presenting new methods of combat. Where assumptions have been made and conclusions drawn, they are the writer's own, based on his own reflections and experience.

From long association with a large number of officers at the Marine Corps Schools and in the Fleet Marine Force, the writer is inclined to believe that few of us have a tactical eye for ground forms. However, if we are woefully deficient in an understanding of the value and the influence of the terrain, when we dispose troops and weapons to carry out assigned tasks, it may be gratifying to know that any short-coming in this respect can be attributed to the lack of training on the terrain and not to any natural inability on our part in the matter.

It is believed that the following excerpt taken from a letter of an observer relative to his observations of maneuvers held in tropical waters, is well worth quoting, because of its elucidating nature in respect to the subject matter of this article: "During the advance inland in both maneuvers, room for great improvement by officers and men in the use of cover and concealment was indicated. Better men than I am believe that that failing will be overcome as soon as the first shot is fired in battle, but I am stubborn enough to disagree. A fertile source of losses in the last war was a lack of knowledge as set forth in TR 200-5. Ducking behind a rock when fired upon, and the ability to use cover in effecting the advance so as to avoid unnecessary losses are two entirely different things. The latter requires much study and practice. Observation posts were established in the open on forward slopes without effort at concealment. Runners seemed to use little effort to use covered routes. Command post installations were frequently established with more regard for convenience than for cover. In the maneuvers, the command posts that I saw were, however, placed in what appeared to be the best available locations. The same cannot be said for the services. Radio installations were established without regard to cover, except shade for personnel. A convenient tree rather than protection against shell fire seemed to dictate the location of switchboards. The beach party made no effort to secure cover except from the sun and established its radio on the most exposed part of the beach. When dumps and distributing points were established, I hung a casualty tag on each sign due to the fact that convenience and not protection dictated the selection of them. The pronounced tendency of all services was to drop everything and set up in front of the boat from

which landed. This would have resulted in indescribable confusion and congestion in an actual operation."

The above quotation is a severe indictment of the violation of the simple elementary rules of battlefield protection and the failure to utilize the terrain and cover under simulated war conditions.

Having participated in the latest maneuvers, the writer witnessed repeated instances where little thought or consideration was devoted to the terrain during exercises ashore. This is to be deplored, because due to the inherent characteristics and peculiarities of the landing attack, it is believed that given a situation, real or assumed, the terrain will remain until the end the only stable and positive element upon which commanders will be able to base their plans and decisions. The truth of the latter statement can be found, first, in the fact that the defender of a coast line or an advanced base, will conceal his defensive installation against observation from the sea, air and ground by the skillful use of natural and artificial camouflage. Only a study of the terrain will disclose the probable location of his defensive means. Second, requests and recommendations for naval gunfire support must be based on a correct appreciation of the terrain in relation to defensive methods. Likewise, supporting aviation must possess a profound understanding of the terrain, if aviators are to know where to lay their smoke, bomb and strafe beach defenses and conduct intelligent observation missions. Lastly, troop commanders, who have the job to do ashore, must be able to read the terrain as though it were an open book—so little will they see of the enemy when once ashore.

Until recent years our Schools have been at fault for not making the proper approach to their problems and exercises. In the past there was a tendency to limit instruction to principles and generalities, instead of confining studies to the realities of war, to methods of combat as influenced by the terrain and the uncertain quantity, difficult to depict, the enemy. Too often we began our tactical studies on the map and the terrain with little or no perception of ground forms and the decisive influence they play in the conduct of battle. Incidentally, no map problem can attain its full value until the solver is able to translate in his mind's eye the represented ground forms into the actual terrain. This is an art which is only acquired by long and arduous work, practiced on terrain of varying characteristics and then always analyzed in conjunction with a concrete case.

It is edifying to note, that at the Marine Corps Schools and Army Service Schools, a great deal more attention and time is now being allotted to the military study of the terrain as relates to its influence and utilization in tactical operations. The subject is being treated exhaustively and justly so, for it should be the invariable custom never to attempt the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be on the map or the terrain, before thoroughly examining the terrain in order to determine how it may affect the operations of the "enemy's troops" as well as "one's own."

At the Marine Corps Schools, it has become the custom in many instances, to begin tactical problems in landing operations with an analysis of the terrain. It has been found that such studies are of incalculable value in deciding the feasibility of various courses of action open to both the attacker and the defender, and the operations required to carry out such courses of action. Particularly do these studies serve to simplify and clarify many other problems incident to the landing attack and the defense of advanced bases.

It is only when we begin to study methods of combat, both in the conduct of the offense and defense, that we commence unconsciously to analyze the terrain. Its tyrannical or friendly influence becomes manifest at once, when we definitely follow out a prescribed scheme of maneuver within a fixed zone of action. Even then we are constrained to look beyond the limits of the front and depth of action in order to assure ourselves that the terrain lends itself favorably to the security of a flank or may be the means of jeopardizing it.

In stressing the influence and utilization of the terrain in tactical problems, it is not intended to convey the impression that its importance must overshadow everything else. One does not deny the need of developing the initiative and spirit of aggressiveness in our leaders, of increasing the fighting value of our troops, of promoting a high state of morale and of knowing the powers and limitations of our weapons under a maze of situations. But these facts or desires should not blind us against other important matters. In actual practice do we devote the same diligent thoughtfulness to the terrain, to which the movement and disposition of our troops must always be molded? Troops together with their weapons, whether disposed for the attack or defense, are intimately associated with the terrain. We cannot consider the one without conjuring up the other. The terrain constitutes the stage for every battlefield problem. If we do not possess the proper conception of the setting upon which the greatest of all human dramas is enacted, then we will be incapable of playing our roles intelligently with the means placed at our disposal.

The terrain is an indispensable element of every battlefield problem. It should be one of the simplest factors on which to inform ourselves and yet it causes many of us grave misgivings. Reduced to its simplest form, the purpose of analyzing the terrain is to indicate how it enhances or shackles fire power, how it lends itself to the methods of advancing the attack and to the organization of the defense. This applies to the combat of all arms and services. It is from these very definite and concise points of view that we should examine it.

The ability to interpret quickly the terrain in its relation to tactical operations is of particular moment to all Marine Officers, for in the landing attack little can be expected in way of accurate data with respect to the terrain over which troops may operate. When preparing studies of prospective theaters of operation in which land forces may be employed in the seizure or defense of advanced bases, one is invariably confronted with a lamentable lack of definite and reliable information in regard to the topography of insular formations. The topographical and hydrographical studies of these localities must

after all form the basic foundation for the detailed plans in the seizure and defense of bases. Frequently terrain studies must be limited to charts. In these cases, it has been necessary to interpolate ground forms from the meager amount of data shown on charts. This data is in the nature of given elevations of prominent heights, such as the summits of hills or mountains, the courses of streams and rivers flowing into the sea and in some cases from contours of the terrain immediately inshore. Therefore, in the actual execution of a landing attack, we cannot hope to be provided with dependable maps, presenting all the details afforded by an accurate survey. Study of some localities even discloses a deplorable scarcity of hydrographic data, which is so essential in planning the ship-to-shore movement and in selecting suitable beaches. This deficiency can be compensated for, at least to large degree, by officers being able to read quickly and accurately ground forms once arriving within the local theater of operations and especially at the moment their troops are committed to the landing attack.

Some of us may contend that any lack in topographical information can be readily supplied by aerial observation and photography after arrival in the local theater of operations. Unquestionably aerial surveys will be made, but the extent to which they may be conducted is highly conjecturable, due to the time and space factors, a consideration of the surprise element, the actual difficulties of conducting such war time activities and the means available, incident to the reproduction and distribution of aerial photographs and reports of observers. As highly desirable as it may be, it is hardly probable that subordinate commanders, who will have to lead troops ashore, will be furnished with valuable information in the way of aerial photographs and mosaics.

Not only may commanders and troops be landed on uncharted shores and compelled to advance inland over unmapped terrain, but from the very nature of the landing attack, they will in all likelihood be deprived of the opportunity of conducting preliminary reconnaissances ashore. This disadvantage is further augmented by the fact that the leading troops ashore may be landed on widely separated fronts, where liaison with neighboring units may be difficult to maintain and where quick and vigorous flanking action may be necessary to relieve pressure on the front of an immobilized unit. The first battalions ashore may be obliged to land and advance on fronts normally much greater than in purely land warfare situations, rendering the exercise of control and command extremely precarious. Other conditions such as tides, currents, wind, fog, darkness, smoke and hostile resistance may all contribute to place these units well outside their designated zones of action. Moreover, zones of action may be poorly defined on the terrain and certainly will be difficult to recognize from sea. Under these adverse conditions, it may not be strange, if the troops are unable to carry out the prescribed scheme of maneuver and to identify objectives once landed. These matters and infinite variety of others will be made all the more perplexing, if the commanders are incapable of taking advantage of the terrain. Leaders of all units, from the squad to the battalion, must be able to decide

with an ever-quickening eye what maneuvers and dispositions are practicable on the terrain in order to carry out the general plan of landing.

In the defense of advanced bases, the terrain does not present many uncertainties, assuming of course, that a reasonable period of time is available for conducting reconnaissances and organizing the defense. However, while the knowledge of the terrain is admitted as one of the advantages of being on the defense, this knowledge must be acquired through study, since it is not an advantage which is inherent to the mere fact of being on the defensive. In the defense of advanced bases, the initial benefit consists in the greater opportunity to acquire information of the ground and on the use the defender makes of his opportunity. On the other hand, we may never be rich in personnel and material for defense purposes in comparison to the size and number of advanced bases we may be called upon to defend. This means that the weapons and the personnel that serve them must be utilized to the best advantage. It then becomes a question of studying the terrain from the viewpoint of beach positions, inland and flank positions, cover, concealment, fire and protective defilade, fields of fire, swept spaces, forward and reverse slopes, observation (infantry and artillery), routes of approach to and withdrawal from defensive positions, bases of departure for counter-attacks, local and general, etc. All these factors must be tied in with elaborate plans of fire for the infantry, artillery, chemical troops and the movement of local and general reserves.

TERRAIN AND THE DEFENSE

With the increased range, accuracy, power and rapidity of fire of modern armament, an intimate knowledge of the terrain becomes a primary requisite. The destructive qualities of the automatic weapon have allowed the defender to spread out in depth and width and to a certain degree have been imposed upon him, because of the necessity of reducing his own vulnerability against the concentrated effects of the assailant's weapons. These characteristics of the automatic weapon afford increased flexibility and maneuverability fires, which greatly favor flanking action in the defense.

Every time we develop new weapons or modify our armament, we are obliged to alter our views with respect to the terrain. The World War produced many startling phenomena among which was the great gain in the relative powers of the defense, due to the employment of the machine gun used in combination with the obstacle. The machine gun is the ideal weapon of the defense, because of its stability, great accuracy, rapidity and volume of fire, its flat trajectory and ease of ammunition supply in defensive situations.

Today we are witnessing in all armies a further increase in the defensive capabilities of the infantry by the attachment of a still greater number of automatic weapons to the battalion. This augmentation consists of both heavy and light machine guns of improved qualities. In the next war, machine guns made of lighter and stronger alloys, coupled with refinements in mechanism and improved ballistics will be firing at the rate of a thousand

rounds per minute. It would not be indulging in idle fantasy to predict that the future battlefield will be literally sown with these formidable weapons, thus making a still greater contribution to the defensive possibilities of the terrain.

The inherent characteristics of the machine gun have sanctioned the use of this flat trajectory weapon in putting down on favorable ground impassable barriers of fire to infantry. Under the fire of machine guns, infantry that can be seen or is unsheltered, is quickly paralyzed. Its great danger to the attacker lies in its adaptability to concealment on the terrain. In reality it becomes a strong supporting point in space. Its ominous and unrevealed presence on the battlefield leads not so much to the question of attacking a well-defined position as actually the terrain. Today we find the artilleryman calculating the number of rounds of ammunition required to neutralize an area, because of the difficulty of definitely locating machine guns prior to launching the attack. It is evident that, where it is desired to reduce the number of effectives holding a defensive position, in anticipation that it will be subjected to heavy artillery bombardment, the machine gun becomes "par excellence" the weapon for beach defense.

During the World War, the artillery never satisfactorily solved for the infantry the combination of the machine gun and barbed-wire, even when artillery preparations extended into days, weeks and attained drum-fire proportions. The rolling barrage likewise failed in its complete effectiveness to pave the way for the infantry. The success of this latter method depended on the perfectly cadenced progression of the infantry with the moving wall of fire. While this condition was assured at the "jump off," the slightest unforeseen incident occurring later separated the marching troops from their moving shield of fire, when they became exposed to the murderous fires of the defender. It was only with the advent of the tank that the infantry began to find its way opened to the defender's position, and where it was able to cope with the remaining resistance with its own means.

The long range of the automatic weapon makes it possible for the defender to put down fires at great distances in front of and within his occupied position. On favorable ground, there will be areas or sections of the terrain within and in front of the defensive position that will permit the combat groups to support each other mutually to the extreme range of the automatic weapons. The difficulty of penetrating such a defense can be attributed first, to this mutual support which results from the flanking fires covering the intervals between the combat groups and the interlocking fires across their fronts and, second, to the failure on the part of the attacker to determine definitely the strength and depth of the resistance, when making his initial attack dispositions.

The dimensions of the intervals between the various combat groups, however, must be adapted to the terrain. The more the terrain is cut up, covered or lending itself to attack by infiltration, the more the defender must be constrained to reduce the intervals. This will call for more effectives. However, to elaborate further on the defense, modern infantry has acquired confidence in the automatic weapon and its flanking fires. Combat dis-

positions are becoming more and more independent of parallel and communicating trenches, and the old linear defense is tending to disappear. These formations are replaced by a checkerboard or a mesh of comparatively small combat groups, mutually supporting, carefully concealed, holding tactical points or localities.

The exact emplacement of the automatic weapons and the combat groups will be based directly on the fires to be delivered, first, in front of the position and, second, within the position. The defender then decides upon the areas where he wishes to place the sheaves of projectiles and installs his weapons accordingly, that is, in positions from which the desired fires can be delivered. However, the terrain and the vulnerability of the defending troops will exert great influence on the final location of the defensive installations. In order to reduce the vulnerability of the troops and make the assailant disperse his efforts and fires, it will be necessary to separate the emplacements of the combat groups. This can only be attained by increasing the depth of the position, provided, of course, the terrain lends itself advantageously to the plan of fire; to extend the front of the position will materially diminish the capacity of resistance, whereas the defense in depth will be devoid of any great inconvenience so long as the terrain accommodates itself to the trajectories and effective range of the defender's automatic weapons.

As stated above, in the future, when the assailant anticipates serious opposition, it will generally be impossible to establish exactly the real position of resistance. This condition of uncertainty may be further accentuated if the defender is able to prepare alternate positions and utilize them at the last moment. Under these circumstances, the assailant will have to attack as though the terrain is occupied everywhere. Such may be the analogy, when attempting to seize an advanced base, beginning with the attack at the water's edge to include assaults against the enemy's inland and final defensive positions.

TERRAIN AND THE ATTACK

We can reiterate here again, that when we create new weapons and improve old ones, we are obliged to change our methods of combat. Likewise, we must modernize the processes by which we examine the terrain and keep them in pace with the latest developments in warfare. Reflecting on our Civil War, when infantry fought in close linear formations, we have only to recall the Sunken Road at Fredericksburg, Devil's Den at Gettysburg, Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania, the Henry House at Bull Run and Cold Harbor, to realize that combat tended to localize itself around strong defensive points such as prominent heights, ridges, woods, buildings, stone walls, etc. On these occasions, the study of the terrain took into account the special properties of the localities, such as fields of fire, and their adaptability to provide resistance against frontal and outflanking attacks. It was specifically a matter of analyzing the characteristic lines of the terrain: the military and topographical crests and stream lines in noting the unobstructed fields of fire and defilade afforded against observation and the direct fire of artillery.

We can still pursue this method of studying the terrain. It is the correct method to follow when the character of the terrain or the weakness of the effectives, or the situation, such as a delaying action, forces the infantry to elect linear formations. But such a limited study is no longer sufficient for as we already stated, infantry in the defense deploys in depth and width and makes constant use of flanking and interlocking fires. Moreover, the battlefield of today is measured in thousands of yards, where formerly it was but a few hundred yards in depth. Therefore, a thorough examination of the terrain is forced on the assaulting infantry echelons, which in the past could pass it by with immunity.

The defender desires to utilize the maximum amount of grazing fire of his automatic weapons, but it is necessary to add that the terrain seldom sanctions such fire. In the mass attacks of the World War, the infantry was often deployed with equal density on a wide front regardless of the terrain. In these attacks it was frequently observed that penetration was deepest along those portions of the front where the ground gave natural protection against the machine gun fires of the defender. Depressions, irregular slopes, woods, groups of buildings and even standing crops gave rise to dead angles or created obstacles which prohibited the full use of the automatic weapon. The trajectory of the machine gun was no longer able to conform to the configuration of the ground. Attacking infantry of today must know how to take advantage of such lines of approach or infiltration.

Based largely on World War experiences, we now resort to a comparatively new method of analyzing the terrain, which for a better word we can call compartmentation. It forms an important study whether planning for the attack or defense. A discussion of compartmentation of the terrain is fully covered in a publication issued by The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1934, under the general subject, "Terrain." Its study is recommended to the readers of this article.

A compartment of terrain is defined "as an area of terrain which is enclosed on at least two sides (opposite sides) by terrain features which limit terrestrial observation and direct fire into the included area."

Terrain compartmentation demonstrates that, in planning tactical operations, one cannot ignore ground forms. Except when the terrain is flat or nearly so, the terrain divides itself naturally into compartments or corridors. Within these compartments the crossings of fire are possible, but ordinarily as regards each other, the compartments are more or less segregated. Depending upon the accidents of the terrain, the compartments may be large or small and regular or irregular in shape. When the terrain is widely undulating and uncovered, the compartments will be large, giving rise to large visible and invisible areas. Observation will be extensive and the avenues of approach will be few in number. The defender's weapons can be expected to function most effectively on this sort of terrain. The ground must be carefully reconnoitered and the attack made on wide fronts, powerfully supported by tanks and artillery.


Where the terrain is sharply accentuated in relief the compartments will be narrow and probably irregular.

If in addition the terrain has little cover, there will be numerous visible and invisible areas, with many avenues of approach. While the defender may have little or no trouble on such terrain in utilizing flanking fires within his position, he will find it difficult to establish continuous fires in front of his position.

When the terrain is both sharply undulating and covered, there will be many small compartments, which will facilitate approach. Observation will be limited to the minimum. Such covered terrain will not lend itself advantageously to the establishment of flanking fires within the defender's position, and deep and continuous fires in front of the position will be impossible. On this kind of terrain the assailant can have recourse to infiltration and can readily build up echelons of attack for overcoming the resistance.

The size of the compartments will exercise considerable influence on the dispositions and method of attack; for example, if only a part of the compartment is attacked the defender's weapons on the unengaged front are free to continue their fire unabated. The attack must embrace the entire compartment or other measures must be taken to neutralize the unengaged front. Such means will be in the nature of protective artillery fires, tanks or even smoke screens.

Theoretically on a given extent of terrain there can be a minimum front of attack and consequently a minimum strength of means to be disposed in order to execute, support and protect the flanks of the attack. If the possibilities of the terrain permit the defender the use of flanking fires in depth, the assailant will be forced likewise to echelon his attack formation in depth. Obviously, then, the compartments of terrain have a limit in the sense of depth as well as in width. The study of the terrain will bring forth these limits.



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It sometimes happens that a portion of the high flanking ground of one compartment may dominate a part of a neighboring compartment; failure in the attack to recognize this controlling feature may result in dire consequences to an exposed flank. In many attacks in the World War, units which were making progress were ruthlessly and suddenly halted, because a unit on their flank had failed to seize dominating ground in its immediate front. In the landing attack the terrain overlooking the beaches may be shown in the following sketch:

It is apparent that the high ground on the right of compartment "A," viewed from the direction of the landing, dominates the beach in compartment "B." In this case it would be advisable to make the initial effort and landing in compartment "A," strongly supported by naval gun fire and aviation. Once the high ground on the right of compartment "A" was taken, a landing could be executed in compartment "B" without danger of the boats with their human freight being taken in enfilade during the approach to the beach and at the crucial moment of debarkation at the water's edge. Furthermore, the unit landed subsequently on the beach within compartment "B" would have to contend only with the hostile resistance within that compartment.

Some of the readers of this article may maintain that in laying so much stress on the importance of the terrain, the writer is advocating attacks with limited objectives and is opposed to the aggressive spirit of the offensive. Even if this were true, the writer would make the reservation, that ruthless, unrestrained attacks which ignore in the future the possibilities of the terrain and the defender, will be more disastrous than the mass attacks of the World War. In face of the evolution of modern armament, commanders may incur severe condemnation by placing the morale of their troops above material as the disposition of a well-trained defender. Troops can not be expected to struggle against the armament of today unless supported by powerful means of neutralization and destruction—and no amount of courage on the part of troops will compensate for the lack of it.

However, the selection of limited objectives for small units has much to commend in its favor, especially when the objectives or tasks can be made to conform tactically to the dominating features of the terrain. Limited objectives in these instances will permit a better application of fire power, both on the part of the infantry and artillery, in the effort to gain superiority. If we disregard the desire in the landing attack to land the largest force possible in the minimum period of time, the assignment of limited objectives corresponding to the dominating terrain, would seem practicable and wise for the leading battalions ashore. It would permit better adjustment of naval gunfire both in close and deep support.

An examination of many islands, located in tropical waters, reveals a series of ascending ridges rising from the sea, not always parallel to the front of a landing attack, it is true, but nevertheless forming well-defined objectives inland. If the effectiveness of artillery support on the reverse slopes of these ridges is problematical, then it would be expedient to adopt special methods of attack for the rifle battalions based on limited objectives. The advance would have to be made by bounds from crest

to crest and at each halt the battalion commander would be compelled to make new preparations for advancing the attack. He would be forced to gain some terrain forward on the reverse slope, in order to establish a base of fire for his machine guns, 37mm. gun and mortars in order to cover and support the advance to the next crest. If the terrain is sharply undulating and heavily covered, the attack could be made by infiltration or the combined action of small echelons progressing along the ridges. In case the terrain is open and undulating, it might be necessary to take dominating ground at an oblique by advancing up ascending spurs in order to outflank resistance on dominating heights and on reverse slopes, instead of endeavoring to attack frontally. In any event the progress is likely to be slow and limited to frequent halts.

Observations made during the last maneuvers is convincing proof that serious reflection should be given to the attack by infiltration or some modification of it. Advancing by small groups of skirmishers, arranged in chains of groups, or otherwise echeloning greatly in depth, will do much to avoid the destructive fire of machine guns. To advance in long successive lines of skirmishers, when employed under the perilous process of forcing egress from beaches, flanked by high ground on both sides and to the front, is unsound. Skirmish lines lose their maneuverability when once committed to a predetermined front or direction. They do not facilitate outflanking movements, so essential to the reduction of machine gun nests. When the character of the terrain encloses beaches on all three sides, forming a huge natural amphitheatre, the surrounding high ground provides ideal positions for combat groups and machine gun emplacements. Troops moving forward in long skirmish lines or fronts parallel to the beach will soon find themselves taken in flank by the destructive fires of machine guns.

Furthermore, the attack by infiltration for small groups arranged in depth, starting from the beaches, is logical, for the beach defenses will be organized in some depth and little will be known concerning the location of points of resistance. Attack by infiltration is based on the initiative and spirit of maneuver of the assaulting echelons down to and including the smallest units. The ordinary methods of infiltration, while not adaptable to all forms of terrain, consist in probing out the gaps in the defender's position by first employing small groups of skirmishers to pin down or fix the points of resistance. In case these leading echelons are held up, succeeding or following units pass through the gaps and reduce the points of resistance by taking them in reverse. This is a continuing process, based on the play of the reserves that follow. Success depends upon the combined collapse of the defender's many combat groups. However, it is manifest that any delay in exploitation will permit the defender to close the widening gap by counter-attacking or re-establishing his front by a continuity of fire within the position. The phases of the attack necessitate a judicious echeloning in depth to widen and deepen the gaps by successive impulses. Attack by infiltration demands well trained troops, but no other kind of troops have a place on the battlefield of today.

TERRAIN AND FIELD FORTIFICATION

Field fortification is becoming a lost art in the Marine Corps; the knowledge of which is only acquired by hard practice. This may be attributed to several reasons. In the Fleet Marine Force we train primarily for the offensive. Probably we hesitate unconsciously to train ourselves in the art of battlefield protection for fear of destroying the offensive spirit of our troops. This feeble solicitude for protection disregards the great natural law of "self-preservation" and the powerful effects of modern armament which is incessantly increasing. Troops that are incapable of protecting themselves against the devastating fires of modern armament can expect a comparative short life on the battlefield. In our desire to train exclusively for the landing attack, we should not be misled into believing that it will necessarily follow in actual combat, that we can constantly adhere to this form of combat. One could not safely deny that the landing attack may not be subjected to periods of immobilization, extending into hours, even days, when the landing force or portion of it, will be forced to adopt a defensive attitude. Moreover we shouldn't be deluded by such false theories as advanced in a training manual that: "An infantry that knows how to attack will know how to defend, because it is easier to defend than to attack."

Where there exists, as in the Marine Corps, a paucity of trained engineers, the construction of field fortifications will devolve upon the rifle battalions. Foot troops must receive training in the planning and actual laying out and construction of field works.

Field fortification is an integral part of the organization of the ground and is influenced naturally by the terrain thus organized for combat. However, we should caution ourselves that the fact of fortifying the terrain should not cause us to lose sight of ground forms, or expressed more clearly the terrain should be carefully analyzed both from the viewpoint of the defense and attack before beginning to study its fortification.

The fortification of the terrain is the most economical means of strengthening the defense. When intelligently applied, troops and material are conserved for local and general reserves, the vulnerability of the defending troops is lessened while that of the attacker is increased, the maximum yield of the available fire power of the combined arms is obtained and the movement of reserves is facilitated.

Fortification enables us to make the greatest use of ground forms. If the terrain is defensively weak fortification compensates for its natural weaknesses, and if on the other hand, the terrain is defensively strong, fortification enhances its defensive value, enabling us to hold positions with reduced numbers of effectives. Fortification does not change the general conformation of the terrain or its inherent properties. It does, however, modify the superficial accidents of the terrain such as cover and other natural obstacles. Natural obstacles are removed for the purpose of clearing fields of fires, cutting lanes of fire for machine guns and facilitating observation, while others are strengthened by using barbed wire, by creating a system of demolitions, constructing trenches, etc.

In the defense of advanced bases, fortification will concern itself primarily with the organization of beach positions; inland positions, barring the more probable lines of operation or avenues of approach; the all-around defense of a final position, covering the base establishments, the harbor and anchorages.

TERRAIN AND AVIATION

Some readers may regard the discussion that follows as being inconsistent with their own views on the matter of aviation. Manifestly with a comparatively new arm of such great magnitude, one can set forth all sorts of opinions as to its future use and effectiveness without fear of being categorically convinced of being in error. The writer admits that he may not be on safe ground in discussing aviation in relation to terrain and yet even with his most profound faith in the capabilities of military aviation, he believes that many of our aviators do not thoroughly understand the many problems that may confront ground troops in an actual landing attack.

Recent maneuvers were convincing proof that aviation cannot operate under all conditions of weather and that its action is likely to be intermittent during crucial moments in the landing attack. In peace time one prepares for the kind of war that one would like to follow in reality. However, history reveals that our peace time desires are not always realized in actual battle. We find later that tactical conceptions conceived in peace time do not measure up to the demands of the moment, and we end by being disagreeably surprised.

The following observation is cited in the belief that when our aviators erect targets in the open, unsheltered and plainly discernible from the air, to represent machine gun emplacements, artillery positions, troops in occupation of beach positions, etc., it is done purely for the object of determining, technically, the accuracy and effect of aerial bombing and machine gun firing. Nevertheless, such practices introduce an artificiality that has no counterpart in war and certainly does not conform to our ideas of the manner in which an enemy will defend a shore line or an advanced base. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that aerial bombing will be more accurate than artillery fires, which are put down for the purpose of neutralization. If artillery is forced to attack the terrain for the want of definitely located targets, aviation will be forced to do likewise.

We must emphasize again, that given a reasonable period of time, the defender's capabilities of concealing his presence will reach a high degree of perfection. There will be few, if any, evidences of his installations (machine gun, anti-tank and boat gun emplacements and combat groups) seen from the air—certainly not to aviators flying over the terrain at speeds of 150 miles per hour or more with the intention of strafing and bombing beaches or inland defensive positions. Troops in the open and on the march present a totally different target to attack aviation, than troops in occupation of a defensive position, who have mastered the art of self-concealment.

The terrain must mean something more to the aviator than a place where he regains contact with Mother Earth for the purpose of repairing, rearming and refueling his plane. Aviators must also be able to read the terrain


with a discerning eye and possess a broad knowledge of the tactical employment of ground troops. Only with such training and knowledge will aviators know where and when to render their support in behalf of ground troops. It is just as important for the aviator to be familiar with the tactical methods or doctrines of a hostile defender as the artilleryman, when supporting friendly ground troops in the attack.

Probably the following example will serve to illustrate one of the reasons why aviators must be able to read the terrain with an intelligent eye. This will be brought home forcibly to the aviator when engaged in hostile combat with ground troops on the defensive. At a casual glance it would appear that every advantage is with the high speed target as against the ground target. However, the effectiveness of the fire of machine guns, semi-automatic weapons and rifles will be greatly enhanced, when ground troops consistently include anti-aircraft defense firing in their training programs. Substitute the machine rifle for the present rifle and use tracer ammunition in all small arms weapons, and infantry, occupying carefully camouflaged positions, will give a good account of itself against low-flying planes.

In any future war we can expect to find in the hands of the defender an increased number of machine guns of improved characteristics. These weapons will be found in considerable numbers within the organization of beach positions, covering the probable landing places. Many of these guns will have the primary mission of taking under fire low-flying attack and smoke-laying planes. When the terrain overlooking beaches is similar in relief and conformation to that shown in the following sketch, the fires of these guns will be a source of great menace to low-flying aircraft.

With machine guns emplaced on high ground both on the flanks and in rear of beaches, low-flying planes, when strafing beaches or laying smoke, will be flying at intervals directly or obliquely toward these guns at altitudes not greatly superior to their emplacements. These guns are readily concealed against air observation, when not obliged to fire at high angles. Under these circumstances, the element of surprise is all with the ground machine gun. These guns can be assigned other important fire missions when not firing at aircraft.

In a recent critique of maneuvers, an aviation officer of long experience stated that we had still a lot to learn concerning the use of smoke screens and clouds in the landing attack. He spoke with authority and understanding. It is admitted that the aviator is directed to



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lay smoke screens to cover or blind certain definite areas during landing attack maneuvers, and often with little regard to the terrain or the probable locations of points or areas of hostile resistance. It is believed that satisfactory results will not be attained in the tactical use of smoke, whether laid from aircraft by spray or dropped candles, until more latitude is given to aviators in these operations. As the aviator and his plane are the actual instruments for securing the desired results at the proper time and place, instructions relative to areas to be smoked should be given within wide limits. But this latitude should be granted on the principle that the aviator is a competent judge as to how, when and where the smoke should be laid. To accomplish this, the aviator must not only be thoroughly conversant with the travel, vertical rise, spread and drag effect of smoke screens, but he must possess a profound understanding of the terrain and the tactical doctrines employed by the enemy in its defense. For instance, when smoke is used in the initial phases of the landing attack, it is employed for the primary purpose of blinding the enemy's aimed fires. The best results are obtained in this event by placing the smoke on the defender's installations and points of observation. If the aviator is familiar with the enemy's methods of defense and can read the terrain in relation to its defensive organization, smoke will be laid intelligently and effectively.

In our probable theaters of operation, reliance will have to be placed almost solely on aviation for information of the terrain and the enemy. This being true, the utmost attention should be given to the training of aerial observers in the Fleet Marine Force, especially if aerial reconnaissance is to be the only sure and positive means of securing and verifying information in landing operations. Aided by the camera, our observers will need an all-penetrating eye, reinforced by a broad tactical knowledge and an understanding of the terrain to extract evidence of the defender's presence. It would appear that aerial reconnaissance, including the taking of aerial photographs and the making of visual surveys, is hardly an art that is acquired overnight, particularly when conducted under actual war conditions.

Now let us look at aviation from the viewpoint of ground troops and the precautionary measures that must be taken to avoid the annihilating effect resulting from aerial attack and observation.

During the World War, the battlefield attained great depth and the attacking infantry was compelled to take up approach formations several miles from the defender's front lines. This was forced on the infantry by the increased power and range of the automatic weapon and artillery, coupled with improved methods of communication and observation. With the future advent of the employment of aircraft in great numbers, the danger to marching infantry on foot or in trucks is greatly increased. It is doubtful whether, in a future war, it will be safe at any time to march large bodies of troops in close formations. Already it has been clearly demonstrated that technical development and the use of scientific means adapted to war use have exerted a decided influence on the formation, disposition and size of infantry units as well as their combat methods.

Troops of today must learn, more and more, how to use the terrain and its natural cover in order to conceal their movements and dispositions from hostile air activity. These precautionary measures will have to be taken against aerial observations as well as aerial attack from low altitudes. Formerly, attacking infantry had only to conceal itself against terrestrial observation, but today aerial observation compels attacking echelons to seek more than ever before the natural cover and accidents of the terrain or have recourse to artificial or atmospheric conditions, such as smoke, fog, mist or darkness to render themselves less visible or vulnerable from the air.

If troops are assembled in more or less close formation, and feeling themselves secure behind some mask, such as a ridge or woods, they are likely to be taken by surprise. They may be brought under the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery, because some hostile observation plane spotted their position and immediately communicated it to a waiting battery. Similarly, a machine gun nest, an anti-boat or tank gun, or a combat group may be prematurely destroyed because someone failed to abide by the simple rule of ground discipline and thus revealed its presence to the never-failing eye of the aerial camera.

If it is disconcerting for ground troops to feel that they are being constantly spied on from the air, how much more demoralizing it must be to be taken unexpectedly under the whip-lashing machine gun fire of aerial gunners or the blasting effect of aerial bombs. Troops at rest or in bivouac must seek cover, if they are to escape casualties from the air. Troops in the approach march must adapt their movements to the accidents of the terrain and elect open formation to avoid successive waves of hostile attack planes flying at low altitudes.

In the defense of advanced bases, when contemplating the use of the general reserve in the counter-attack, many of us are convinced that if the assailant gains control of the air, the movement of reserves will cause the commander grave concern. Movement to a line of departure will probably have to be covered by artificial means or delayed until the hours of darkness.

TERRAIN AND ARTILLERY (NAVAL AND FIELD)

The effectiveness of naval gunfire against shore targets in support of the landing attack still continues to be an open and debated question. But aside from the capabilities of naval gunfire to effect neutralization and destruction against shore objectives, to search reverse slopes and to conduct fires of interdiction and counter battery fires, we can be assured that these potential and powerful fires will be ineffective, if we are not prepared to make precise recommendations for fire support based on terrain studies. Before requests and recommendations can be formulated for naval gunfire support, the terrain must be exhaustively examined in order to arrive at definite conclusions as to the possibilities and dispositions of the defender.

As stated repeatedly, given a reasonable period of time and utilizing all the natural and artificial means of concealment, the character and location of the defend-

er's shore installations are more than likely to remain an unknown quantity. Direct observation from the sea will disclose little or nothing of the enemy's defensive arrangements. If little can be observed from seaward, then dependence must be placed mainly on aerial observation and photography to provide the information so urgently needed. It must be conceded, however, that the prudent defender will conceal all evidence of his defenses with far greater care and skill than in the past. He will subject his camouflaged defenses against aerial discovery to much severer tests by employing his own aviation for detection, than methods used by hostile aviation to ferret out the location of his installations.

Still, if we are familiar with the defender's tactical methods of defense, many of his dispositions are certain to be indelibly written on the ground. From a study of the terrain shown by aerial photographs or maps, deductions can be made as to the location of hostile points and areas of opposition, such as beach positions, inland positions, artillery and machine gun emplacements, reserve assembly areas, etc. From these deductions definite concentrations of naval gunfire can be safely requested in noting the probable size and location of hostile organized areas of resistance. For example in beach defense, the defender will be constrained to sweep the beaches with the enfilade fire of machine guns, which in turn must be covered by combat groups and other machine guns located farther inland; his anti-boat and tank guns will ordinarily be placed in rear of the beaches where they can fire directly to sea with good observation or deny the avenues of approach inland from the beaches; machine guns with the primary mission of taking low-flying planes under fire must be emplaced where they can fire directly at on-coming aircraft; combat groups, mutually supporting, will be holding the more important tactical points or areas of the terrain. Thus we can arrive at logical conclusions as to where the defender may be located in strength. Only when these targets, known or suspected, are transposed to maps, charts, or aerial photographs, provided with grid lines, can we be assured that naval gunfire will furnish the landing force with support approaching the accuracy and effectiveness of land artillery.

For the large class of artillery that can only deliver flat trajectory fire, dead angles are bound to occur. This will be especially true of naval artillery in the support of the landing attack, although the naval gunner will endeavor to overcome the disadvantage of flat trajectory fire when firing at shore targets with means and by methods which already have practical application. However, the fire of naval guns will be much more effective on ascending than on descending or reverse slopes. In fact, the fire on reverse slopes may be almost nil, unless naval gunners continue to exhaust the possibilities and potentialities of naval gunfire on such slopes. It is a fact that in the World War, for the same amount of artillery means put in line, more attacks were successful against ascending than reverse slopes. Moreover, the aerial spotting of naval gunfire will not be continuous and may even be impracticable at times. Consequently,

the action of naval gunfire in liaison with the landing troops will always be more positive on those portions of the terrain that can be seen directly from the sea.

For the artillery landed in close support of the troops, it will be at a great disadvantage starting from the water's edge. In most islands, the terrain rises more or less abruptly from the sea and increases in altitude as one progresses inland. Landed artillery will have great difficulty in registering and adjusting its fires, because of the lack of suitable ground observation. This condition will prevail until such time as the covering troops, first landed, will have secured terrain inland from which the artillery can observe its fires.

On the contrary, the defender of an advance base or coast line is likely to enjoy all the advantages of superior observation for his artillery. Ranges will have been carefully registered and guns emplaced as to type and position so as to sweep descending slopes, to place concentrations on beaches and to cover the sea approaches. Therefore in the landing attack we can anticipate the defender's artillery to function with accuracy and effectiveness.

These descending or reverse slopes that diminish the effects of flat trajectory fire will be habitually included in the zones that cannot be seen from the sea. Artillery liaison with the landing troops will then be easier to maintain on the visible or ascending slopes than on the invisible or reverse slopes. With maps or even aerial photographs we can note the visible and invisible areas and thereby determine approximately what influence the terrain is going to have on naval gunfire and landed artillery fires. From this we can further predict on what terrain the troops can be effectively supported by gunfire.

The lack of artillery support or the difficulty of placing artillery fires on reverse slopes may necessitate supporting aviation to take over initially at least the counter-battery fires normally assigned to artillery. In any case this factor of uncertainty is going to impose successive halts on the leading infantry battalions ashore, even if such fires are premeditated or planned for. These enforced halts are significant in themselves, in that they confirm the influence of the terrain on artillery fires and prove that we must consider ground forms whether we wish to or not.

These gaps or lapses in artillery support will be further aggravated by the early lifting of naval gunfire from the water's edge and the doubtful advisability of landing artillery with the first wave. Obviously, then, the rifle battalions are going to be without close and continuous fire support at crucial moments of landing and subsequent thereto. What other means are available for aiding the troops to get forward? Tanks, yes, but they may not be available, or at least in adequate numbers for opening the way across fire swept beaches and the terrain inland. Aviation support will be intermittent at the best. Lacking positive and continuous fire support, the rifle battalions should be organically and powerfully armed with their own means to meet such contingencies. New mortars of the 81 mm. and 60 mm. type, attached organically to the rifle battalions

and companies, would increase tremendously their fighting powers without decreasing their mobility.

TERRAIN AND TANKS

In response to the increased powers of the defense, which the infantry-artillery team never completely overcame during the World War, nations today are feverishly building tanks of numerous types of greater speed, durability, shielded by tougher armor and carrying more effective armament, the assumption being that the tank is the only weapon that can venture into the hail of shell and small projectile and live to open the way for the infantry.

However, hand in hand with the development of tanks, the defense is not lagging far behind in improving its anti-tank weapons and armor piercing projectiles even for its small arms. Anti-tank guns of larger caliber, greater range and accuracy, with a wide angle of traverse and capable of maintaining a high rate of fire with armor piercing and tracer ammunition, are being furnished in foreign armies. In certain sources, these guns are being mounted on self-propelled armored vehicles in order that they may cope with fast moving tanks or permit of their rapid employment on fronts threatened by tank attacks. Infantry battalions and regiments are being supplied with more and better anti-tank guns. New methods are being developed in the use of anti-tank mines and obstacles to cover the more probable avenues of tank approach, to protect anti-tank guns, command and observation posts, to cover the front of the main battle position and even to the scattering of mines in front of the outpost troops.

Paralleling the theory of the invulnerability of the tank, we may well ask ourselves, will naval gunfire and aviation effectively prepare the way for the landing troops in rupturing beach defenses that are obstructed and swept by the fire of automatic weapons? Drawing lessons from World War experiences, we are able to estimate, at least theoretically, the number of rounds of artillery ammunition required to cut lanes through barbed-wire entanglement of a given width and depth. We know that huge expenditures of ammunition were consumed in this task and that even then, the problem of cutting the wire was not always satisfactorily accomplished. In the landing attack it is not contemplated that combat ships will carry sufficient ammunition in their magazines for the destruction of barbed-wire obstacles at the water's edge, and still carry out their other fire missions. Other ingenious methods for destroying barbed-wire entanglements have been proposed, but their practicability has yet to be proven by actual experiment. We do know that the tank is a much more suitable and economical weapon than artillery for opening breaches through barbed-wire. But the use of tanks in the landing attack is not even in the experimental stage. Landing of tanks ahead of the leading subwaves is problematical. One can hear a great variety of opinions expressed on the subject. Still the landing or debarking of tanks from tank lighters may be a slow and painful process and if landed in advance of the rifle companies, they are certain to draw the concentrated fire of the defender's artillery and anti-boat or tank

guns. Some suggest the landing of tanks under the cover of darkness or smoke, but this in turn might interfere with the visibility so essential to tank operations. Still another solution consists in landing tanks under the cover of darkness and then at the proper moment illuminate the beaches with powerful flares. This would require a nicety of judgment with respect to the hour of daybreak. Amphibian tanks, under favorable conditions of sea and water, may afford a partial solution of overcoming hostile resistance at the water's edge in advance of the landing waves. Where the hydrographical conditions off-shore restrict passage to beaches through openings in coral reefs, amphibian tanks may be unable to negotiate such navigational difficulties.

Tanks operate by fire and movement and, while their fire action has been greatly improved in recent years, their principal mode of action is still one of movement. Their movement is not probable on all sorts of terrain. Deep ravines, streams, heavily wooded areas, steep banks and ordinary cliffs along shore lines will offer formidable obstacles to their use. Therefore, from a careful study of the terrain, the defender should be able to determine where hostile tank attacks are probable, possible or impossible. Such a study will disclose the more likely routes of approach and the forming-up areas of hostile tanks prior to their attack.

Undoubtedly fast moving tanks will greatly affect the organization and methods of defense in purely land warfare situations. If tanks can cross the short expanses of terrain that separate the attacker from the defender's position in a few minutes, the defender will be obliged to organize his position in great depth and probably on several positions. He will seek whenever possible to place his positions behind a stream or behind other natural obstacles, which will greatly handicap tank movement. The selection of such a position may, however, limit the fields of fire and immobilize the defense if the counter-offensive is contemplated. But the defense of a shore line presents quite a different picture. Good fields of fire will always exist over the water and the counter-attack can be opportunely delayed until it is certain that the beach defenses are to be ruptured. There again tanks must land or be landed on suitable beaches, where in all probability the defender will be strongly installed.

TERRAIN AND CHEMICAL AGENTS

No discussion on the military features of the terrain would be complete without focusing our attention for a moment on its influence relative to the use of the chemical agent or weapon. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the defense of advanced bases, the terrain often lends itself favorably to the use of chemical agents on the part of the defender. Frequently on the windward sides of islands are to be found high and precipitous cliffs and on the lee side, the sheltered coves and small bays with their beaches. Here the wind blowing off shore permits the establishment, at the water's edge, of chemical barriers of a static nature, which can be detonated during the assailant's approach to beach, without any great danger to the defending troops.

When the enemy resorts to the use of the chemical weapon, troops must know how to use the terrain and estimate wind directions and velocities in order to avoid gas infected areas or know from the very nature of ground forms the areas that are likely to be contaminated. For example, low ground has the advantage of creating gas pockets. Gas concentrations will flow into these low areas. This flow of gas may make it profitable for the enemy to use chemical agents (vesicants in particular) on reverse slopes or in ravines and valleys, which are frequently the natural avenues of approach to a defender's position. The combination of low ground and woods forms a most desirable target for chemical agents.

Fire with high explosives is not highly effective against personnel sheltered or concealed in woods. On the other hand, woods that have been contaminated with chemicals are extremely dangerous to troops seeking cover or operating therein. Gas shells explode on impact with the trees and in the case of vesicants the area underneath is sprayed with the liquid agent, contaminating both the soil and lower vegetation. With the combination of shade and the trees themselves, the gas is dissipated very slowly, because air currents are at a minimum.

Open and high ground gives free passage to the winds and gas concentrations are quickly blown away. Since there is no shade to cool the ground, there are generally convection currents in the open, particularly on sunny days. Chemical agents may, however, be used with good effect on open terrain during still, cool nights. If the terrain is covered with high grass or vegetation of a similar nature, and the area is liberally sprayed with a vesicant, troops passing across the area will come in contact with the vesicant-covered vegetation. Lanes can be readily cleared through contaminated areas of this kind and too much reliance cannot be placed on denying them to advancing troops, unless the enemy is willing to cover them by small arms or artillery fires. The attacking troops may then have to seek cover and crawl through the contaminated vegetation.

In brief, low and wooded areas are to be avoided and high, wind-swept areas will be safest when the enemy is using chemical agents.

CONCLUSION

The terrain is an indispensable element in every tactical operation. From a military point of view, every officer must be capable of interpreting a map or the actual terrain with precision, exactitude and rapidity. Terrain studies impose an observation to details, a clear view of the facts presented on the ground and of their consequences. These studies should assist every leader of a large or small unit to draw the best advantages from the terrain and especially to anticipate the surprises that it may hold in store for him. They apprise the infantry leaders of the aid they can reasonably expect from other arms on a given area of terrain and at the same time they indicate to the other arms the difficulties that the infantry is likely to encounter. Such an understanding of the terrain will permit us to prepare intelligent plans for the employment and cooperation of

all the task groups in the landing attack.

In the landing attack losses in personnel are likely to be appalling and react adversely on the morale of the troops. Every effort must be taken to conserve troops and material by wise precaution and sagacious judgment. History is replete with examples where troops were needlessly sacrificed, because a leader failed to read the danger signals displayed on the terrain and to dispose and maneuver his troops to conform to these warnings. The more vague the situation and the less evidence of the enemy, the more concern we must exercise in estimating the possibilities of the terrain and its utilization by the enemy.

OFFICERS OF FIELD RANK OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE ACCORDING TO LINEAL STAND- ING AS OF JANUARY 31, 1937

COLONELS

Mark Sullivan William G. Fay

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

James F. Rorke Anthony J. D. Biddle
Joseph J. Staley Melvin J. Maas
William R. Coyle Clark W. Thompson
Victor I. Morrison James Roosevelt
Littleton W. T. Waller

MAJORS

Charles G. Sinclair Carlton Hill
Ralph L. Schiesswohl James Wood
Louis F. Timmerman, Jr. Chester L. Fordney
William M. McIlvain Earl C. Lane
John D. Macklin Harvey L. Miller
Sydney D. Sugar Charles A. Ketcham
Melvin L. Kruehlich Frank A. Mallen
Alfred A. Watters Charles L. Herterich
Donald T. Winder Louis S. Rosenthal
Vincent E. Stack Charles C. Bradley
Iven C. Stickney Robert E. Stone
John J. Flynn William J. Platten
Frederick M. Boch, Jr. Bernard S. Barron
Harry C. Grafton, Jr. Stephen A. McClellan
George W. Bettex Alford J. Williams, Jr.
William O. McKay Bertrand T. Fay
Chauncey G. Parker Francis E. Turin
John J. Mulligan Carleton Penn
Bernard W. Bierman Harold M. Keller
Woodbridge S. Van Dyke Otto Lessing
Karl S. Day Joseph R. Knowlan
Alton N. Parker Wethered Woodworth
Edward P. Simonds James McB. Sellers
Clarence H. Baldwin Paul Sullivan
Caleb J. Milne

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The changes have occurred since the last issue of the GAZETTE:

APPOINTMENTS:

To rank from July 1, 1936:
2d Lieut. Sidney S. McMath.

2d Lieut. Gordon Warner.
 To rank from Jan. 21, 1937:
 2d Lieut. Embrey C. Rucker.
 To rank from Feb. 3, 1937:
 2d Lieut. Thos. F. Forrester.
 2d Lieut. James T. Patterson.
 To rank from Feb. 11, 1937:
 Captain Will H. Walker.
 2d Lieut. Wilfred Weaver.
 2d Lieut. Geo. H. Muller.
 2d Lieut. James H. Moffett, Jr.
 2d Lieut. Laun M. Reis.
 2d Lieut. Robert C. Hiatt.
 2d Lieut. James H. Tinsley.
 2d Lieut. William H. Hirst.
 To rank from Feb. 24, 1937:
 Major Caleb J. Milne.
 2d Lieut. Neal R. Fosseen.
 To rank from March 10, 1937:
 2d Lieut. Lafayette B. Kirby.
 2d Lieut. Leeman C. Baird.
 2d Lieut. Harvey C. Van Buhler.
 2d Lieut. Russell W. Schmidt.

PROMOTIONS

To rank from Dec. 23, 1936:
 Captain Edward G. Schultz.
 Captain Valentine Gephart.
 Captain Benjamin W. Norris.
 Captain Nathaniel S. Clifford.
 To rank from Jan. 28, 1937:
 Captain Thos. H. Raymond.
 To rank from Feb. 11, 1937:
 Captain Chas. W. McWillie.
 Captain William J. Wise.
 1st Lieut. Reginald G. Sauls, 3d.
 To rank from Feb. 24, 1937:
 1st Lieut. Martin W. Storm.

RESIGNED

2d Lieut. Thos. E. Gurnett—Feb. 28, 1937.

DISCHARGED—HONORABLY

Captain Chas. P. Williamson—March 9, 1937.

LEGISLATION

Since the passage of the Marine Corps personnel act of May 29, 1934, the Navy act of the same date, and the amendatory acts of July 22, 1935, and May 1, 1936, there has been little legislation of universal interest to the Marine Corps. House Joint Resolution No. 296, introduced by Representative Ditter March 25, would suspend action by selection boards until July 1, 1938. No hearings have been held on this resolution as yet.

The Naval Appropriation Act, which provides the sinews of war for the fiscal year 1938, has passed both houses of Congress and now awaits the President's signature. Sufficient funds are provided to maintain a commissioned strength of 1,184, with 147 warrant and chief warrant officers, and 17,000 enlisted men. The total appropriation for maintaining the Corps during the year is \$26,580,213.

BILLS ENACTED

The following bills have been enacted by the present session of Congress, which convened January 5, 1937:

S. 1130, H. R. 3303 and H. R. 3607, to authorize the exchange of lands at San Diego, Calif., approved March 4, 1937.

This authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to accept from the city of San Diego tide lands comprising 5¼ acres adjoining the Marine Corps Base and pueblo lands, now used for rifle range purposes, comprising 544 acres, and in exchange to transfer to the city of San Diego some 60 acres in the southeast portion of the Marine Corps Base. This exchange of lands is considered mutually advantageous to the United States and to the city of San Diego.

S. 1455, H. R. 5227, to authorize certain officers and enlisted men to accept such medals, orders, and decorations as have been tendered them by foreign governments in appreciation of services rendered, approved April 24, 1937.

The Marine Corps personnel included in the bill are: Colonel Frank E. Evans, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro A. Del Valle, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, Captain Harold D. Hansen, First Sergeant Frederick Belton, Major General Charles H. Lyman, Lieutenant Colonel James Roosevelt (U. S. M. C. R.), and Captain John D. Blanchard.

H. R. 4686, approved Apr. 14, 1937, provides \$2,900.04 to reimburse certain enlisted men and former enlisted men of the Marine Corps for the value of personal effects lost, damaged or destroyed by the Signal Battalion fire at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, on October 5, 1930.

S. 1310, for the relief of Mrs. Cesaria Del Pilar, approved April 14, 1937.

Mrs. Del Pilar's son was accidentally killed by being shot with a pistol fired by a member of the Marine Corps at the target range at Maquinaya, Olongapo, P. I., April 25, 1933. Appropriation of \$1,500 is made, as recompense for her loss.

S. 1133, to extend commissary privileges to widows of officers and enlisted men, also to officers of the Foreign Service of the United States at foreign stations, approved April 14, 1937.

PRIVATE BILLS

Private bills in behalf of former members and members of the Marine Corps have been introduced:

H. R. 1028, to place George K. Shuler on the retired list of the Marine Corps.

H. R. 714, to authorize the appointment of Max Dole Gilfallan as a captain on the retired list of the Marine Corps.

H. R. 2849, to authorize the appointment of Corporal Robert Slover, as a first lieutenant on the retired list of the Marine Corps.

S. 126 and H. R. 4918, authorizing the President to present, in the name of Congress, a Medal of Honor to Harold R. Wood.

H. R. 2976, authorizing the President to present, in the name of Congress, a Distinguished Service Cross to Hal N. Potter.

S. 1112 and H. R. 3661, awarding a Navy Cross to John W. Thomason.

H. R. 5324, authorizing the President to present, in the name of Congress, a Distinguished Service Cross to George F. Thompson.

H. R. 5440 "To authorize the award of a decoration for distinguished service, namely, the Congressional Medal of Honor, to Acors Rathbun Thompson."

S. 1734, to authorize the presentation of a Distinguished Service Cross to Gilder D. Jackson, Jr.

H. R. 2778, granting retired pay of a lieutenant colonel to Edmund Sears Sayer, retired.

BILLS OF GENERAL INTEREST

Of more general interest perhaps are the following:

S. 22, to amend the World War Adjusted Compensation Act to make it apply to probationary officers the same as it applies to temporary and Reserve officers.

S. 3161 and H. R. 5120, to increase the pay of warrant officers and chief warrant officers.

H. R. 5049, to limit selection boards for the selection of officers for promotion to the consideration of professional records.

S. 1868, to retire as officers certain enlisted men of the Marine Corps who served as officers of the Garde d'Haiti.

H. R. 4606, to grant double-time credit for retirement purposes to enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard for certain service during the World War.

S. 874, to establish a Government monopoly of the armaments and munition industry to provide for the exclusive manufacture by the Government of all war supplies for the Army, Navy, and air forces of the United States, etc.

S. 611 to safeguard veterans' estates derived from pensions, etc.

H. R. 160, to prohibit the transfer of officers above rank of lieutenant in Navy or captain in Marine Corps for flying training and duty.

S. 947, to provide national flags for burials of honorably discharged former service men and women.

S. 774, to incorporate the Marine Corps League.

Three bills to authorize the Marine Band to attend and give concerts, and to provide for the expenses of the band—

At the United Confederate Veterans' 1937 Reunion at Jackson, Miss., June 9 to 12, 1937; S. 1330.

At the National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars to be held in Buffalo and Niagara Falls, N. Y., August 29 to September 3, 1937; H. R. 5556.

At the Thirty-ninth National Encampment of the United Spanish War Veterans at Columbus, Ohio, August 22 to 26, 1937; S. 2011.

S. 883, "Authorizing the attendance of the Marine Band and Drum Corps, from San Diego, Calif., at the Annual Rose Festival to be held at Portland, Oregon," June 9 to 12, 1937.

H. R. 2887, to authorize pensions for Reserve officers and Reserve enlisted men disabled by injury or disease in peace time.

H. R. 5820, granting compensation for death of Reserve officers or Reserve enlisted men by aviation accidents.

H. R. 6182, to provide for the construction of a federal building for use as a Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve armory of the District of Columbia.

H. R. 5464, to provide for the appointment of a Di-

rector of Aviation in the Marine Corps, to have the same rank, pay, allowances, privileges, and status as heads of staff departments.

H. R. 4192, authorizing certain deductions from the retired pay of retired officers and enlisted men who are required by any court to support their wives or minor children.

H. R. 5137, "To provide further for the national defense."

This bill would increase the personnel of the Marine Corps to 1,633 officers, exclusive of chief warrant and warrant officers, and 27,200 enlisted men, said increase to be accomplished by July 1, 1939: 200 of the officers to be assigned to aviation duty as additional numbers; and that Reserve officers not above the grade of captain may be placed on extended duty until the desired number of regular officers have been commissioned.

H. R. 2273, "To authorize settlement of inequitable losses of pay by officers under economy legislation."

H. R. 1514, to prohibit expenditures for members of the military or naval forces who are not citizens of the United States.

H. R. 5047. Naval and Marine Corps aviators who qualified prior to April 1, 1917, and have since been disqualified for active duty, to be advanced one grade on the retired list.

S. 1676, to promote two grades on the retired list a retired lieutenant commander of the Navy and a retired major of the Marine Corps.

H. R. 3805, enlisted men to be eligible for retirement after 25 years' service.

H. R. 3804, to provide a minimum pay for retired enlisted men.

S. 1532 and 1596, to exempt retired officers from prohibition of holding two offices.

S. 1663, to advance on retired list those who served in the Spanish-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, or the Philippine Insurrection.

H. R. —, to give pay of rank to those holding increased rank.

H. R. 3151, to create an Air Corps.

H. R. 3423, to provide for the preferred employment of American citizens by the Government of the United States.

S. 1966, to amend the World War Adjusted Compensation Act so as to give adjusted compensation to any cadet of the Military Academy or any midshipman of the Naval Academy for such period if he served on active duty with troops between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918.

NAVY MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION

The proposed amendments to the By-Laws of the Navy Mutual Aid Association have been approved by majority membership vote and became effective on April 15th.

The changes which are of particular interest to service personnel are the establishment of a stabilized benefit, a paid up benefit at the age of 84, membership loans and extended insurance.

Paid up benefits have been awarded to the following members:

Rear Admiral P. F. Harrington
Rear Admiral Perry Garst
Rear Admiral N. E. Mason

Rear Admiral A. G. Berry
Rear Admiral R. F. Nicholson
Mr. J. D. Keeler
Mr. E. B. Barry

Paid up benefits have also been awarded to the following members who have not yet reached the age of 84, but who have sufficient unused assessments to their credit to pay their premiums in advance to that age:

Rear Admiral W. F. Worthington
Commodore B. T. Walling
Commodore G. R. Salisbury
Captain E. J. Dorn
Lieut. Commander W. B. Dunning.

HOURLY METER NOW STANDARD EQUIPMENT ON "CATERPILLAR" DIESEL TRACTORS AND ENGINES

Henceforth an hourly meter will be standard equipment on all three, four and six-cylinder Diesel engines produced

by the Caterpillar Tractor Company, according to an announcement made recently.

This meter was made available as an attachment about two years ago. The many that have been used during this period have definitely proved the value of such an instrument and its use will eventually mean as much to the Diesel engine owner and operator as the speedometer does to the automobile owner.

The hour meter is a sturdy, durable unit with a large dial that is easy to read. It is attached to the rear of the fuel injection pump housing and is driven by the end of the shaft, fitting between the heads of the cap screws in the end of the fuel injection pump camshaft. The hour meter registers one number for every hour the engine operates at standard rated speed.

Just as the mileage indicator part of the speedometer has become the standard for measuring the life and maintenance intervals of the automobile, so will the hour meter be generally used as a guide for lubricating and maintaining the "Caterpillar" Diesel engine.

THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT'S SPEECH TO THE GRADUATING CLASS, BASIC SCHOOL, 1937

■ It is a great pleasure to be here today to address the graduating class at the Basic School. Much of my career has been spent in close contact with service schools, and the welfare of the Marine Corps school system, and the officers associated with it, is very near to my heart. It is perhaps true for most of us older officers, that as we look back upon our careers in the service, the first year stands out in memory as the best of all, and I am particularly pleased to be here to share with you the pleasure you must feel in having successfully completed your first course of military instruction as commissioned officers.

It was in 1891 that Congress first instituted a system of examinations for officers, and since that time education in the Marine Corps has passed through various stages. Institutions of a worthwhile character, such as the Marine Corps Schools, do not spring into being in full perfection, but they are rather the product of a slow and often painful growth over a considerable period of time. They are seldom the result of the genius or enterprise of any one person, but are rather the result of the thoughtful and earnest labor of many individuals, each building on and improving the work of his predecessors. The Marine Corps Schools is an excellent example of such an institution. The highly efficient, well coordinated, and universally appreciated schools that we have in the Marine Corps today had their origin in a most elementary, inadequate, and unimpressive school started many years ago by a small group of far-sighted officers who had to contend with formidable obstacles. There was lack of interest in schools on the part of many of the higher ranking officers of those days, and lack of appreciation of the possibilities for the professional improvement of officers by the utilization

of schools. There was lack of suitable buildings and other material facilities for the schools, and there was a complete absence of any precedent for the conduct of the instruction.

Institutions never remain long in a static condition. They either improve or they deteriorate. It is my belief that in future years you young gentlemen will yourselves witness a great improvement in our present school system, excellent as it now is.

I am not unmindful of the fact that young men are naturally somewhat impatient of advice. They must, in large part, learn their lessons for themselves, from their own experience, and by their own mistakes. However, some of the mistakes of youth are so far reaching in their effect on an officer's career that I can not refrain from reminding you of a few of them.

As you undoubtedly know, we have now in the Corps a system of promotion by selection, and your prospects of promotion will depend almost entirely upon your military record and your service reputation. Of necessity there must be some officers eliminated in each grade, and the ones eliminated will be those whose military records are inferior in comparison with the records of their contemporaries. Under such a system, the consequences of thoughtless mistakes made during the first few years of an officer's service may adversely affect his career as long as he lives. From the point of view of the individual, it is even more important now than it was in former years for an officer to strive continuously to maintain the highest military and professional standards, and for his personal conduct to be at all times above reproach. Every officer, by exemplary conduct, by strict attention to duty, and by professional competence can keep his record free from criticism.

It is not, however, sufficient merely to keep one's record clear; that in itself has great merit, but it is not enough. The avoidance of trouble is a purely negative virtue. What should be sought is the positive virtue of achievement. Every officer must put forth an extra effort for the best possible accomplishment of every task. "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." Aside from any consideration of selection or non-selection, the satisfaction which comes to an officer from a knowledge that every duty assigned to him has been performed to the best of his ability, is a definite reward in itself.

There is an important phase of military life which is too often neglected by young officers, to their own disadvantage and to the detriment of the post or ship where they are serving. I refer to the social life of the service community to which they, at least for a time, belong. It is most important that young officers as well as older officers take their places in this social life and do their part in promoting and fostering it. I urge you all to be prompt and punctilious in the matter of making and returning calls, and in your careful attention at all times to the social customs of the service.

After you leave this school you will, for several years at least, be on duty with troops. All of your training has been directed to the end that you may in all respects be worthy to be entrusted with the command of men. So much can be said on the subject of leadership that I shall not attempt to discuss it at length. There is, however, one characteristic of enlisted men that I especially wish to point out to you, and that is their rapid and accurate appraisal of their officers.

You will not for long be able to deceive your men, either with regard to your professional ability or your character. If there is anything wrong with you, you

may rest assured that your men will speedily know about it.

Every military organization, by virtue of the power of example, is like a mirror in which the commander sees himself reflected. Whether consciously or unconsciously, men take their cue from their officers. If the officer is diligent, his men will strive to exceed him in diligence; if he is thorough they will be thorough; if he is thoughtful of them, they will constantly be seeking opportunities to do something for him. The power of example is particularly noticeable in the appearance of a command. An officer who is himself neat and soldierly will find that his men also try hard to present the best possible appearance.

You are about to leave this school that has given you such excellent preparation for your new duties, and go out into the service to undertake the varied tasks that are awaiting you. Wherever you go, you may be sure that you will be needed, but the measure of your usefulness will correspond to your own effort.

It is perhaps superfluous for me to tell you that every Marine officer should have a knowledge of the illustrious history of the Marine Corps. It is the privilege of each succeeding generation of its officers and men to uphold the traditions that have been handed down to them, and, by their own acts, to add distinction to the name of their Corps. I know that you young gentlemen will, in the years to come, add many a splendid page to its long and glorious record.

In conclusion, I congratulate you and your instructors upon your successful completion of the course at this school. I know it has not been easy. On behalf of the entire Corps I welcome you to your new duties, and on my own behalf I extend to you my most sincere wishes for your happiness and success.

A BILL

To authorize the assignment of officers of the line of the Marine Corps to duty as assistant quartermasters and assistant paymasters, and for other purposes.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED. That officers of the line of the Marine Corps of the grades of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel may, upon application, and with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, be assigned as assistant quartermasters and assistant paymasters to staff duty only: PROVIDED, That any officer so assigned shall thereafter be required to perform staff duty only and shall take precedence with, but next after, that officer of the line immediately above him in the Marine Corps at the time of such assignment, which officer shall be his running mate for promotion purposes: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the selection for promotion and the promotion of such majors and lieutenant colonels to the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel, respectively, and their transfer to the retired list by reason of nonselection or ineligibility for consideration for selection for promotion or failure professionally to qualify therefor, shall be governed by the provisions of existing law and of laws hereafter enacted relating to lieutenant commanders and commanders of the Supply Corps of the Navy, except as may be necessary to adapt the said provisions to the Marine Corps: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That any officer so assigned shall be carried as an additional number in any grade to which he may thereafter be promoted.

SEC. 2. That hereafter details of officers of the line of the Marine Corps below the grade of major as assistant quartermaster or assistant paymaster shall be for a period of three years unless sooner relieved.

THE HEADQUARTERS BARRACKS— PAST AND PRESENT

An Interesting Historical Sketch of Washington Barracks and the Commandant's House.

COLONEL J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C.

■ When George Washington took the oath of office as the first President of the United States on April 30, 1789, the government of the new republic was located at New York but the seat of government was later moved to Philadelphia, the site of the First Continental Congress and of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, which is universally accepted as the origin of the nation.

Early in the administration of President Washington the question of a permanent site for the Capital of the United States came up for discussion in the Congress and various sites had their advocates in the debate which ensued, including Philadelphia, Germantown, Havre de Grace, Wright's Ferry, an indefinite site on the Susquehanna River and another indefinite site on the Potomac River. The debate waxed warm


and the first North and South division in the government arose on the question, the North threatening to leave the confederation and set up its own government if a site too far south were selected and the South just as vehemently asserting that it would secede from the general government and set up its own establishment if the site of the capital should be placed too far to the north.

The calm judgment of the first President calmed the fury of the debate and in July, 1790, the Congress passed an Act which read—"Provided: That a district or territory not exceeding ten miles square, to be located as hereafter directed on the river Potomac at some place between the mouths of the Eastern Branch and Conogocheague, be, and the same is hereby accepted for the permanent seat of the Government of the United States." This act further provided that the seat of the Government should remain at Philadelphia and the sessions of the Congress should be held in that city until the first Monday in December of the year 1800.

Previous to this enactment of Congress the states of Maryland and Virginia had offered to Congress the required territory the exact location to be left to Congress.



MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1863
"Center House" and Enlisted Men's Quarters.



MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1900
Building at south side of quadrangle occupied by the Sick Bay on first floor and the Band Room, second floor.

In January, 1791, President Washington appointed a Commission to select the site of the new Federal District for the Capital of the United States. General Washington had surveyed the Potomac River from the mountains to the Chesapeake, his own home at Mount Vernon gave him familiarity with the surrounding country, and as an officer on the staff of General Braddock in 1753 he had encamped with Braddock's army on what was later known as Observatory Hill, east of Georgetown overlooking the Potomac valley. As a result of this knowledge of the terrain he directed the Commissioners to run preliminary "lines of experiment" beginning at a point on Hunting Creek southeast of the court house at Alexandria; the first of four boundary lines to run due northwest ten miles; thence the second line into Maryland due northeast ten miles; thence the third line due southeast ten miles, and thence the fourth line due southwest ten miles to the original point on Hunting Creek. Thus was determined the original District of Columbia, the site of the Federal District and the Capital of the United States.

Then followed years of planning of the city which was to occupy the new Federal District and the buildings which were to house the President, the Congress and the Governmental Departments. President Washington and Thomas Jefferson took an active interest in this planning and their advice and counsel had great effect in the final plans, but the actual engineering work was done largely by Major Charles l'Enfant, a young French engineer who had volunteered his services to the struggling Colonies in 1777 and served throughout the Revolution as an Engineer officer.

Early in 1800 President John Adams issued instructions for the removal of the Governmental offices from Philadelphia to the new city of Washington and he arrived there on June 3, 1800, the Departments following shortly after and Congress assembled for its first

session in the new Capitol on November 27, 1800.

The United States Marine Corps Headquarters at this date were located in Philadelphia and Lieutenant Colonel William Burrows was the Commandant.

The first Secretary of the newly created Navy Department, Benjamin Stoddert, arrived at Washington June 15, 1800, and on the 23d he wrote to Colonel Burrows that "a thousand reasons plead for your being at once in this city" and that "the place languishes for a little spirit of exertion" and he directed the Commandant to "hold yourself in readiness to leave Philadelphia with all your dependencies." Colonel Burrows replied that he "would lose no time in removing himself and dependencies" and that he would "use every exertion when there to promote the City of Washington."

The Marines moved from Philadelphia to Washington by water transportation, by stage coach and wagons and by marching, the different methods being used on different sections of the then "long and arduous journey" from city to city. Arriving in Washington at the end of July, 1800, the Marines pitched their first camp on a "beautiful hill overlooking the Potomac." This site, then styled Prospect Hill, had been selected as the site for the proposed National University (which has never been built) and was later the site of the Naval Observatory, from which it took the later name "Observatory Hill." It is now the site of the Naval Hospital. In 1891 it became advisable to move the Naval Observatory to a site less exposed to the effect of street traffic and the present site was acquired for the Naval Observatory at Observatory Circle on Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.

As this hill was the first site used as Marine Corps Headquarters Barracks (or Camp) in the District of Columbia it is of interest to note that in 1893, when the Observatory was moved to the present site on Massachusetts Avenue, the old site on Observatory

Hill was offered to the Marine Corps as a site for Headquarters and Barracks for the Corps. The Colonel Commandant at that time felt constrained to decline this offer as funds for the erection of the necessary buildings and for their maintenance were not available or in sight in the future. The site was then assigned to the uses of the Navy Medical School and Naval Hospital and it is now proposed to build a modern hospital on the site when the appropriation is made available. Overlooking the valley of the Potomac, the Mall, the Lincoln Memorial, and new Memorial Bridge to Arlington, and Arlington House and Cemetery, this site is probably the finest in Washington and it seems unfortunate that it was not acquired for the Headquarters Marine Corps Post when it was abandoned by the Naval Observatory, especially as it was the site of the first Marine Corps establishment within the limits of the Capital City.

In November, 1800, the cold weather caused the camp on the hill to be abandoned and the Marines were quartered in several houses rented from the War Department. This was unsatisfactory and the Colonel Commandant urged the Secretary of the Navy to obtain authorization from Congress for the purchase of a suitable tract of land and for the erection of quarters, barracks and offices for the Commandant, officers and enlisted force of the Marine Corps.

On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson was installed into office as President of the United States. He was a personal friend of the Commandant of the Corps.

Lieutenant Colonel William Burrows, and the President and the Commandant were wont to take long rides on horseback through the surrounding country. During these rides attention was given to the selection of a suitable site for the proposed Marine Barracks and in June, 1801, the site north of the Navy Yard known as Square No. 927 of Washington City was selected by the President and the Commandant and its purchase was authorized by the President. It was stated at the time that "the site selected occupies high ground overlooking the Navy Yard and within easy marching distance of the Capitol buildings."

This square is the site of the present Marine Barracks at Washington. It is bounded by G and I and 8th and 9th streets, and its dimensions are 615 feet north to south and 250 feet east to west. The original purchase price was \$6,247.18, a high price for the times.


Efforts to secure an appropriation from Congress at Once for the erection of the necessary buildings failed and it was not until March 3, 1801, that Congress appropriated \$20,000.00 to build a Marine Barracks on the newly acquired site. This sum was too small to employ civilian labor for the project and the Commandant wrote the Secretary that "labor must come from the Marines to erect a building sufficient for their accommodation on such a sum allowed but all that can be done shall be done."

On April 3, 1801, the newspapers carried advertisements stating that "a premium of 100 dollars will



COMMANDANT'S HOUSE, MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

This house has been occupied by every Commandant of the Marine Corps since its completion in March, 1804.



MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, D. C., COMPLETED IN 1906

be given to any person who will exhibit the best plan of barracks for the Marines, sufficient to hold 500 men, with their officers and a house for the Commandant. The plan to be so drawn as to be capable of being enlarged later and so arranged as to suit the dimensions of the lot. The completed plans to be lodged at the Navy Office before the 1st of May." In June, 1801, the Navy Department made contracts with "sundry persons for building barracks for the Marine Corps," and on June 12th Acting Secretary of the Navy Dearborn requested the Commandant "to undertake the superintendence of the business and to see that the contractors perform their several parts faithfully and agreeably to the terms of the contracts by them entered into." Soon thereafter work was started on the first building which was destined to be the famous Center House of the Old Marine Barracks.

The Center House, designed for officers' quarters, was of two stories with dormer windows affording additional rooms in the attic. The buildings to the north and south of the Center House were of one story with an arcade running along the front facing upon the parade ground. Various troubles with contractors ensued and it was not until well into 1802 that the barracks were occupied by the officers and enlisted men of the Corps.

In 1802 the Commandant's House was begun and it was ready for occupancy in February, 1804. On March 1, 1804, the Commandant at that time, Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Wharton, moved into the house. The house at that date was of two stories without wings and servants' quarters and a stable were erected near it. Later the roof was raised by the erection of a mansard roof to give a third floor and wings were added on the east and west sides of the house.

This famous old house has been occupied by every Commandant of the Marine Corps since 1804, including the following:

Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Wharton	1804-1818
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Gale	1819-1820
Brevet Brigadier General Archibald Henderson	1820-1859
Colonel John Harris	1859-1864
Brigadier General Jacob Zeilin	1864-1876
Colonel Charles G. McCawley	1876-1891
Major General Charles Heywood	1891-1903
Major General George F. Elliott	1903-1910
Major General William P. Biddle	1911-1914
Major General George Barnett	1914-1920
Major General John A. Lejeune	1920-1929
Major General Wendell C. Neville	1929-1930
Major General Ben H. Fuller	1930-1934
Major General John H. Russell	1934-1936

The Commandant personally supervised the work of constructing the barracks and officers' quarters. The smallness of the appropriations made it necessary for most of the work to be done by Marines and in 1805 it is noted that all of "the mechanics, carpenters and bricklayers are Marines, who were constantly working on the buildings." This same system was followed at other barracks located at various Navy Yards. It is also noted that the Commandant "never allowed the men for their services as carpenters, etc., any extra pay * * * sometimes—particularly in building the Commandant's house, the men were allowed some extra drink," but the Commandant considered that it was "optional with the men whether to work as mechanics or not and he therefore viewed it as a matter of indulgence as they were exempt from military duties." The lure of rum seems to have been a potent factor a hundred and thirty years ago and who can say that it might not have the same effect today.

The Commandant's House occupied the north side of the square occupied by the post, as it does to this day, the Center House stood at the center of the western side of the square with barracks for the enlisted men to north and south of it, the offices of the Commandant and his staff stood on the eastern side of the square, and quarters for the sick and for the Marine Band were at the south side of the square. In the center of the rectangle of buildings was the parade ground as it is today.

The barracks and office buildings and officers' quarters stood much the same for about a century, gradually becoming more obsolete and unsuitable for occupancy, except for the Commandant's House which was kept in condition for occupancy by frequent additions, repairs and renovations.

During the War of 1812, when the British troops under General Ross marched into Washington after defeating the American forces at the Battle of Bladensburg, the Commandant's House was taken as quarters by General Ross and on this account it was spared destruction by burning which was the fate of the Capitol, the White House and most of the government buildings. The quarters and barracks of the Marine Barracks and the buildings at the Navy Yard nearby were occupied by the British troops and were also spared the torch.

For the century from 1801 to 1901 the offices of the Headquarters of the Marine Corps were maintained in small buildings unsuitable for the purpose on the eastern side of the barracks square. In the latter year the offices had to be moved to make way for the construction of the new barracks and the Headquarters of the Corps was established in rented

office space in the Bond Building on the southwest corner of New York Avenue and Fourteenth Street in Washington. From here the Headquarters moved in March, 1903, to offices in the Navy Department Annex, Mills Building, Pennsylvania Avenue and Seventeenth Street, N. W., where they remained until April, 1914, when they moved to more commodious offices in the Walker-Johnson Building at 1734 New York Avenue, N. W.

Upon the completion of the war-time temporary building erected for the Navy Department on the south side of Constitution Avenue from Seventeenth to Nineteenth Streets, N. W., the Marine Corps was assigned office space therein for its Headquarters Offices and these offices have been so occupied from May 15, 1919, to the present time.

Due to the fact that from 1804 to the present time the Commandant of the Marine Corps has occupied the quarters there provided for him and that the offices of his headquarters were located there for one hundred years from 1801 to 1901, the Marine Barracks, Washington, has been known throughout the Corps as the Headquarters Barracks, an apt appellation which should ever be preserved.



From Harper's Weekly. Sept. 14. 1861

MARINE BARRACKS, WASHINGTON, 1861

Civil War Marines Marching Up Eighth Street Past the Center House and Enlisted Men's Quarters

COMMANDANTS OF THE MARINE CORPS

(Continued from page 19)

mentioned by General Hancock, U. S. Army, who was in general command, and received the thanks of the Navy Department for his services. His next two tours of duty carried him to widely separated posts—Mare Island, California, and Brooklyn, N. Y. In April, 1885, he organized, within twenty-four hours from the time of the order, a battalion of 250 Marines for duty on the Isthmus of Panama to open the transit. Heywood subsequently had under his command on the Isthmus nearly eight hundred Marines, besides a strong detachment of bluejackets and artillery. For his arduous service there the admiral commanding asked Colonel Heywood to "receive his grateful acknowledgments."

Heywood was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on March 9, 1888, and on January 30, 1891, was appointed Colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps. By special acts of Congress he was promoted to brigadier general in March, 1899, and to major general in July, 1902. The energy, experience and training which General Heywood had shown and obtained in his early days in the Marine Corps were fully brought into play from the very moment he assumed command of the Corps. When he became Commandant the Corps consisted of seventy-five officers and 2,100 enlisted men, which was gradually increased during his tenure of office until at the time of his retirement in 1903 it had reached the total of 278 officers and 7,532 enlisted men. The various reforms and improvements in the Marine Corps during Heywood's incumbency as commandant were many. He ever had in mind the problem of more closely associating the Corps with the Navy so that the work of the two branches could be in the closest harmony. He established for the first time a regular system of examinations of officers for promotion and set up the system of officers' schools which has continued with slight interruption since then. By increasing the efficiency of the Corps he tried to demonstrate to the Navy how absolutely essential it was as an auxiliary to the naval service. Under his administration the number of Marine Corps posts were increased from twelve to twenty-one, a large number of new buildings were erected and many of the old buildings in the shore establishments were repaired, modernized and increased in accommodations. The principal new posts established were at Bremerton, Wash., Pensacola, Fla., Cavite, P. I., and Guam. There was scarcely a regular post at which Heywood was not able to provide new barracks or officers' quarters. He caused a regular system of target practice to be established and adopted good conduct medals for the betterment of the discipline in the Corps. The declaration of war with Spain found the Marine Corps prepared.

The principal services performed by the Marine Corps during the War with Spain were on board vessels of the Navy in the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleets and with an expeditionary battalion which was sent to Cuba. The Marines performed their usual shipboard duties with Dewey's squadron in the Battle of Manila Bay and with Sampson's Fleet in the operations around the West Indies. A battalion of Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington was organized early in the war

and rendered conspicuous services by its capture of the ground controlling Guantanamo Bay and driving the Spaniards from that vicinity. During the Philippine Insurrection which followed soon after that war the Marine Corps sent four battalions of Marines to the Philippines, where they assisted the army during several operations, and part of them participated in the relief operations during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.

General Heywood closed a most distinguished career of over forty-five years as a commissioned officer in the Marine Corps, when on October 3, 1903, in accordance with the law, having attained the age of sixty-four years, he was placed on the retired list. His death occurred in Washington, D. C., on February 26, 1915, and he was interred in Arlington National Cemetery on March 1. He, together with Archibald Henderson, stand out clearly as the two most outstanding officers and Commandants of the Marine Corps during the first century of its history.

GEORGE F. ELLIOTT


NINTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Alabama provided the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, for it was in that state that George F. Elliott was born on November 30, 1846. Little is known of his life prior to his entry in the Marine Corps, other than that he was honorably discharged from the United States Military Academy in June, 1870, upon the successful completion of a two year course there. On October 12 of that year he was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps, and reported for duty at the Marine Barracks in Washington, where he remained until the first of the following year. He next served at Portsmouth, N. H., Brooklyn and at Norfolk, and on board the *Vermont*, *Frolic* and *Monongahela*.

In the summer of 1877 serious disturbances arising from a strike of railway employees in Washington, Baltimore and vicinity necessitated the dispatching of a battalion of Marines from Norfolk to Washington for service with the Army during the emergency. Lieutenant Elliott was placed in command of a detachment of Marines that guarded the B. & O. tunnel, and later with his detachment guarded the paymaster of the railroad from Baltimore to Martinsburg with funds to pay the employees of

GEORGE F.
ELLIOTT

Ninth Commandant of
the Marine Corps
1903-1910



the road. On August 15, upon being relieved from further service with the Army, Elliott returned with the battalion to Norfolk, where he remained until January, 1880.

He was promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant on June 4, 1878. From 1880 to 1892 he served ashore at Boston, Norfolk, with the Marine Battalion on the Isthmus of Panama, at Newport and Brooklyn, and aboard the *Alliance*, *Vandalia*, and *Michigan*. On July 7, 1892, he was promoted to the rank of captain and in that same month was detached from Brooklyn and ordered to the *Lancaster*, remaining on that ship until January, 1894, when he joined the *Baltimore*. During the war between China and Japan, the *Baltimore* with Captain Elliott aboard as Fleet Marine Officer was sent to Korea to guard American interests. It was thought that the presence of an American ship would give a feeling of security to the numerous missionaries living in Seoul, some twenty-six miles from its seaport, Chemulpo. On July 23, 1894, telegraphic messages were received on board the *Baltimore* requesting a guard to protect the legation, also stating that the Japanese had seized the palace and the King the night before. Numerous difficulties presented themselves, but Elliott, feeling that the guard was urgently needed, expressed himself as willing to attempt the march to Seoul, and that evening he was ordered to proceed immediately with a detachment. His little column, in spite of many hardships encountered along the route, such as having to ford two large streams, pass over clay hills and a mountain pass, cross three miles of deep sand and make a detour through submerged rice fields, finally arrived in Seoul, having covered thirty-one miles in eleven hours. Elliott was highly praised by his commanding officers for his services and conduct.

After being detached from the *Baltimore* in June, 1895, Elliott returned to the United States and reported at the Marine Barracks, Brooklyn. He was on duty during the Spanish-American War with the Marine Battalion of the North Atlantic Fleet which was sent to hold a position at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that being the only harbor in the locality where vessels could seek shelter during the hurricane season. On July 14, while on that duty, Elliott in command of two companies consisting of 150 Marines and fifty Cubans was ordered to destroy the well at Cuzco, about six miles from Guantanamo, which was the sole water supply of the Spanish within twelve miles. The existence of that well had made possible the continuance of the annoying Spanish attacks upon the United States forces. After a spirited engagement with the enemy near Cuzco Valley the Spaniards retreated, and the Marines under Elliott returned to their camp at Guantanamo Bay. Elliott, for his eminent and conspicuous conduct in this engagement, was advanced three numbers on the list of captains in the Marine Corps and was promoted to the rank of major on March 28, 1899.

After brief tours of duty at Brooklyn and Washington he was ordered to command the Second Battalion of Marines for duty in the Philippines. On September 13 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. He arrived at Manila, P. I., with his battalion September 21, 1899. During the following four months he was in command of the First Brigade of Marines in the Philippines. On October 8, 1899, with a force of 358 Marines, he attacked

the insurgents entrenched in and around the town of Novaleta, dislodging them and capturing the town, thus enabling the Marines to carry out their mission of effecting a juncture with the army under General Theodore Schwan. The real significance of this victory may be appreciated from the fact that the Spanish had made numerous unsuccessful attempts to take the place. In the words of Colonel Elliott, "the fight was a dogged, steady rush through mud and water, with heavy firing from the left flank and lighter firing from the right flank." Elliott was highly commended by the commanders of the naval, army and volunteer forces for the very timely and effective aid rendered with his battalion.

He was detached from the Philippines in March, 1900, and served at Norfolk and at Washington during the next three years. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel on March 23, 1903, and seven months later, on October 3, was appointed Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps. In December he was ordered to command a Provisional Brigade of Marines organized for service on the Isthmus of Panama which sailed on the 27th on board the *Dixie* and arrived at Colon January 3, 1904. He commanded the Brigade of Marines ashore in Panama until February 15 and returned to duty at Headquarters, Marine Corps, on the 25th of the same month.

On May 21, 1908, he was appointed Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, which position he held until November 30, 1910, when, upon having attained the age of 64 years, he was placed on the retired list of officers of the Marine Corps. His death occurred in Washington on November 4, 1931, culminating a long and eventful life.

During his tour of duty as Commandant, General Elliott made several substantial contributions towards the permanent betterment of the Marine Corps. He was personally prone to be somewhat fiery and hot-tempered, but in spite of that was considered a just man. He paid particular attention to the type of man who was selected to be an officer in the Marine Corps and insisted on a substantial preliminary education as well as other desirable qualifications before recommending a young man's appointment as an officer in the Corps. Another of his substantial contributions was the development of rifle shooting during his tour as Commandant and by the interest he showed in the same in spite of his advanced years until the time of his recent death. Many important Marine Corps expeditions were sent out while he was Commandant and the successful manner in which they coped with the many difficult situations speaks well for Elliott's thoroughgoing plans for their organization and their preparations. He was very successful in dealing with Congress and when he spoke in Committee hearings they listened and accepted his opinions with little modifications. His predecessor had been made a major general by personal legislation and Congress twice offered to bestow the same honor upon Elliott, which he flatly refused and insisted that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be a major general and not he personally. By his persistent refusal to be personally rewarded he not only got the office of Commandant made that of the rank of major general but also got a substantial increase in the strength of the Corps. He was faced with the difficult situation of having the marines withdrawn from the vessels of the

Navy and by his skillful handling of the situation brought the matter to the attention of the public and of Congress, which led to their being restored to their normal sea duties. He was not only courageous in dealing with Congress but on several critical occasions boldly appealed to President Theodore Roosevelt when he thought the needs of the Corps demanded it. While Elliott may not be considered one of the most outstanding of our Commandants, he must be accorded at least a place far above the average in his accomplishments for the long time good of the Corps.

WILLIAM P. BIDDLE

TENTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

The tenth Commandant of the Marine Corps came from the family of Philadelphia Biddles. He was born in that city December 15, 1853, and was educated in private schools in the vicinity, by tutoring and in the University of Pennsylvania. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps June 22, 1875, and after short tours of duty in Washington, New York and Philadelphia, made the first of his many tours of sea duty on which he passed nearly half of his active service. After three years on the *Hartford* and *Powhatan* he again went ashore for duty at Philadelphia and New York. He returned to sea duty on the *Kearsarge* on March, 1882, and was promoted to First Lieutenant two years later. With a break of less than three years at the same stations as his previous shore duty he again went to sea for three years on the *Savata*. He returned to Philadelphia for duty in February, 1891, where he was promoted Captain three years later. He resumed sea duty on board the *Baltimore* in June 1895 and was shortly afterwards transferred to the *Olympia*, on which ship he served during the Spanish-American War, and was with Dewey in the Battle of Manila Bay.

Soon after the close of the war he returned to Philadelphia for duty but was soon called to join the Fourth Battalion of Marines organized for duty in the Far East. With that battalion he arrived in China just in time to take part in the famous relief expedition to Peking in 1900. After the affairs of the Boxer Rebellion had been somewhat adjusted Biddle was transferred with his battalion to the First Brigade of Marines, Philippine Islands,

where he served a little over two years, and then returned to the United States for duty at Headquarters. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel March 23, 1903. In December of that year he was sent to Panama in command of the battalion of Marines on the *Dixie*, which arrived just in time to participate in affairs when the independence of that country was declared. He returned to the United States soon afterwards, however, and served for short tours of duty in Philadelphia and at Headquarters. He was promoted to Colonel in February, 1905, and during the following year returned to the Philippine Islands, where he commanded the First Brigade of Marines for about two years. He reported for duty at Headquarters in May, 1908, and was soon afterwards detailed in command of an expeditionary brigade which was organized in Philadelphia and went to Panama to reinforce the troops protecting the construction of the Canal, and for potential duty in Nicaragua. He returned to Headquarters in April, 1910, where he continued to serve the remainder of his active duty. During the closing months of General Elliott's commandancy, Biddle acted as Commandant most of the time.

He was chosen as Commandant of the Corps on February 3, 1911. Biddle's tour of duty as Commandant was a comparatively quiet, short and uneventful one. He concerned himself primarily with the routine affairs of the Corps. Several minor expeditions took place, including the first intervention in Nicaragua, which gave a good account of itself in the usual Marine Corps fashion. After about three years in office, Biddle applied for retirement on the ground of having completed more than thirty years' service and he was retired on February 24, 1914. He was called out for active duty during the World War and served primarily on court-martial duty at San Diego, California. He died in Nice, France, exactly nine years after his retirement, and was buried a month later in Arlington National Cemetery with the usual military honors.

General Biddle personally saw the importance of the Navy and Marine Corps being drawn closer together, and in his final report to the Secretary of the Navy, made recommendations which were vigorously pushed by his successors, with the result that the Navy and the Marine Corps have continued to be drawn together in closer and more cordial relations. On the whole it may be stated that the close of his tour as Commandant found the Marine Corps about as it was at the beginning with the exception of a slight increase in personnel.

GEORGE BARNETT


ELEVENTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Major General George Barnett was born at Lancaster, Wisconsin, December 9, 1859. He entered the U. S. Naval Academy in June, 1877, and graduated from that institution in 1881. After spending two years at sea as a cadet-midshipman he transferred to the Marine Corps and was appointed as Second Lieutenant July 1, 1883. While serving in the lowest grade of commissioned officer he did duty at the various Marine Barracks in the eastern part of the United States and served on board the U.S.S. *Pinta* for three years and was again at sea on the U.S.S. *Iroquois* at the time he was promoted as First Lieutenant



WILLIAM P.
BIDDLE

Tenth Commandant of
the Marine Corps
1911-1914



GEORGE BARNETT
*Eleventh Commandant
 of the Marine Corps
 1914-1920*

in September, 1890. After completing the second two years' tour of sea service he served one year at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Washington, and was then attached to a Marine guard at the World's Columbian Exposition at Chicago, where he remained until it closed, when he resumed his regular station at the Navy Yard, Washington. In June, 1896, he again went to sea, this time on the U.S.S. *Vermont*. He transferred to the U.S.S. *San Francisco* in December, 1897, and to the U.S.S. *New Orleans* during the following April. While serving on that latter vessel during the Spanish-American War he participated in several bombardments of the forts at Santiago, Cuba. He was promoted to Captain August 11, 1898, and transferred to the U.S.S. *Chicago* in November of that year. He came ashore for duty at Headquarters of the Corps in May, 1901, and was promoted to Major shortly afterwards. During the following year he served at various shore stations and in September, 1902, was given command of a battalion of Marines on the U.S.S. *Panther*, sent for duty on the Isthmus of Panama, where they protected American interests and guarded the railway transit of the Isthmus. Major Barnett returned to Washington in December, 1902, only to be placed in command of another battalion of Marines being transferred less than a month later to join the First Brigade of Marines in the Philippine Islands. A few months after arriving in the Philippines he was transferred to duty as Fleet Marine Officer of the Asiatic Fleet and served on several vessels of that fleet until December, 1904, when he rejoined the First Brigade.

Major Barnett was transferred from the Philippines to Washington in April, 1905, and shortly after arriving in the United States received a promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. He served as commanding officer at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, for a period of about one year, when he was again placed in command of an expeditionary battalion which sailed on board the U.S.S. *Minneapolis* for Havana, Cuba, where it landed and became part of the Cuban Army of Pacification. Barnett's organization was augmented to a regiment soon after landing in Cuba, while the entire Marine Expeditionary Force was increased to a brigade under the command of Colonel L. W. T. Waller. Colonel Barnett's regiment was almost immediately transferred to Cienfuegos, where it spread

out over a wide area with Barnett controlling a considerable portion of the island. A large army expeditionary force relieved part of the Marines in Cuba and Colonel Barnett returned to Washington early in November, 1906. After commanding the Marine Barracks in Washington for a period of one year, he was transferred to the Headquarters of the Corps and was shortly afterwards ordered to command the Marine Detachment, American Legation, Peking, China. On completing his tour in the Far East he returned to the United States during the summer of 1910 and assumed command of the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel on October 11 of that year. During the next three years he was sent to Cuba each year in command of the First Regiment of Marines, which was repeatedly sent to that troublesome island on account of serious domestic disturbances which the United States was obligated to control under provisions of the Platt Amendment. While this series of expeditions was being conducted, the First Advanced Base Brigade of Marines was organized at Philadelphia, under the command of Colonel Barnett. He went with that organization on extensive maneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet to Culebra, P. R., from which he returned on February 15 and was appointed Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps on February 21, 1914, for a period of four years, from February 25. He was the first Commandant to be appointed on a four-year detail in accordance with a law passed the previous year.

General Barnett was also the first Commandant of the Marine Corps who had received his early military training at the U. S. Naval Academy. This early contact with the Navy together with his many years at sea placed him in an advantageous position which he skilfully used to draw the Marine Corps into closer and more cordial relations with the Navy. His tour of duty as Commandant, which was extended by a second detail, was doubtless the most eventful period in the history of the Marine Corps. In addition to the World War, several important expeditions to countries in the Caribbean area took place.

The first important military event of his administration as Commandant was the sending of a reinforced brigade of Marines to take part in the operations which occurred at Vera Cruz, Mexico, during 1914. A minor intervention in Haiti was made during that year and an expeditionary force of Marines was kept afloat for some time along the west coast of Mexico. Serious trouble began to brew both in Haiti and Santo Domingo and within a year it was necessary for the Marine Corps under General Barnett's guidance to place a brigade of Marines in each of these two countries, where they continued on duty until after the close of Barnett's administration.

Soon after becoming Commandant General Barnett was able to establish most cordial relations with the Navy Department, the Secretary of the Navy and with Congress. For the first time the Commandant of the Marine Corps was made an ex-officio member of the Navy General Board and the Commandant began a drive for a much needed increase of the Corps to take care of its greatly expanded duties in the Caribbean area. The necessary legislation finally became a law as part of the National Defense Act of August, 1916, increasing the Corps by 220 officers and slightly over five thousand men and in addition providing for considerable reorganization within the

Corps, including the initiation of the detail system to the staff departments. The Corps for the first time was given an adequate proportion of higher ranking officers for a proper organization of larger military units. The increases and reorganization allowed by law had scarcely been put into effect before the United States joined the allied countries in the World War and it was necessary to expand the Marine Corps to many times its previous maximum strength.

The World War activities of the Marine Corps which were carried on under the general direction of General Barnett were too far-flung, complicated and well-known for detailed mentioning in this brief biography. The Marine Corps expanded to more than three thousand officers and approximately 75,500 enlisted men. In addition to continuing the occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo and reinforcements of the regular stations of the Marine Corps, two brigades of Marines were sent to France, a brigade occupied parts of Cuba, while another was held in reserve at Galveston, Texas, and large training centers were maintained at Quantico, Va., and Parris Island, S. C.

General Barnett not only saw the Marine Corps through the World War but also through the difficult period of demobilization and reorganization at the close of the war. Throughout the entire war period General Barnett proved to be a popular and capable leader. For his outstanding service he was honored by the French Government by being made a commander of the Legion of Honor and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by the Secretary of the Navy.

He was relieved as Commandant of the Corps on July 1, 1920, by order of the Secretary of the Navy.

Barnett had been made a brigadier general in the Marine Corps as of August 29, 1916, while serving as Commandant, and on March 5, 1921, he was given the regular rank of Major General. He spent the remaining years of his active service as Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific and retired on December 9, 1923, having reached the statutory age limit of sixty-four years. He died on April 27, 1930, and was interred in the Arlington National Cemetery, Va.

It is still perhaps too near to the many complicated circumstances and events of his career correctly to evaluate the policies and official acts of the World War Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was doubtless one of the most beloved, considerate and respected officers to fill that important position. That he was faced with the biggest problem which has ever faced a Commandant of the Corps goes without saying. During the period of the World War he seems to have been especially governed by the idea that the Marine Corps should place as many of its personnel as possible in the theater of active operations. He succeeded in obtaining a sufficient increase in the strength of the Corps to permit the placing of more Marines in the actual war zone than actually participated. The Fifth Brigade of Marines, unlike the Fourth, which played so conspicuous a part in the operations with the Second Division, failed to reach the battle front. The records plainly show that it was sent to France with a definite understanding that it would be used for combat purposes. It was dispersed to several localities and remained in the Service of Supply area upon the responsi-

bility of the Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F. Barnett's handling of officers and enlisted men during the trying period of the World War was such as always to assure him their complete respect and undying loyalty. He appreciated his position as one of the war-time leaders of the country, and arose to the occasion, showing his leadership by many outstanding examples. In this respect and in many others he may be classed with General Archibald Henderson, Commandant of the Marine Corps during the Mexican War. Both of these two great leaders of the Marine Corps envisaged the mission of the organization from the same point of view, that was to be of the greatest possible service to the nation by placing every possible marine in active operations.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE

TWELFTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

John Archer Lejeune was born January 10, 1867, in Pointe Coupée Parish, Louisiana, and as his name suggests, of French antecedents. He received his early education from his mother's teaching and in other ways and in 1881 entered Louisiana State University, which he attended first in the preparatory department and completed most of the sophomore year in 1884, when he secured an appointment to the United States Naval Academy. He attended the latter institution during the academic years 1884-1888 and graduated in the upper division of his class. He spent the following two years as cadet-midshipman on different vessels of the navy and was on board the ill-fated *Vandalia* during the hurricane at Samoa in 1889 when that vessel and the *Trenton* were totally wrecked. He returned to Annapolis after his regular two-year midshipman cruise for reclassification, and much to his distaste was assigned to engineering duty instead of to the Marine Corps, as he preferred. With the assistance of Senator Randall L. Gibson, of Louisiana, and by the direct order of the Secretary of the Navy, he received the assignment to the Marine Corps and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant July 1, 1890. He served at the Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Va., during the following year and again went to sea aboard the *USS Bennington* in October, 1891. He was promoted First Lieutenant February 26, 1892, and finished his tour of sea duty in August, 1893, when he returned to Norfolk for duty.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE
Twelfth Commandant
of the Marine Corps
1920-1929



He again went to sea in August, 1897, on board the USS *Cincinnati*, on which vessel he served during the Spanish-American War and took part in the West Indian campaign. Soon after the war the *Cincinnati* was placed out of commission and Lieutenant Lejeune was transferred to the USS *Massachusetts*. While serving on this vessel he was promoted to the rank of Captain in March, 1899, and completed his tour of sea duty in May, 1900. During the next three years he did a round of several brief shore assignments at various places in the eastern part of the United States. He was promoted to the rank of Major in March, 1903, and in August of that year was assigned to the command of a battalion of Marines which shortly afterwards participated in the operations ashore on the Isthmus of Panama, which had material influence in bringing about the independence of Panama. During his stay of about one year on the Isthmus he became thoroughly acquainted with Panamanian affairs and on several occasions rendered valuable assistance by helping to maintain peace among the contending factions. During these experiences he showed considerable diplomatic ability which was destined to stand him well on a number of other occasions later on in life.

In January, 1905, he returned to Washington for duty, where he remained for the next three years in command of the Marine Barracks there, spending much of his time in assisting to rewrite and draft various regulations for the governing of the Corps. In May, 1906, he returned to Panama in command of a battalion of Marines which assisted for some months in maintaining order in that country. After returning from Panama he resumed command of the Marine Barracks, Washington, for a few months and in March, 1907, he was ordered to the First Brigade of Marines in the Philippines. He commanded the Marine Barracks at Cavite for a time. In June, 1908, he assumed command of the Marine Brigade and was promoted shortly afterwards to Lieutenant Colonel. He returned to the United States in June, 1909, and was assigned to take the course of instruction at the Army War College during the following academic year. While pursuing the course at that institution he became acquainted with a great many influential army officers and gained the reputation of being a very competent officer. Both proved to be of great value to him a few years later during the World War.

His next post of duty after the War College was commanding officer, Marine Barracks, New York, to which post he was assigned until November, 1913; during that time, however, he participated in two expeditions to Cuba and was for a time on the Isthmus of Panama. During the winter of 1913-1914 he took part in maneuvers at Culebra, P. R., and at Pensacola, Fla., as commanding officer of the Second Advanced Base Regiment. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in February, 1914, and with his regiment was transferred ashore at New Orleans for a short period before being ordered to Vera Cruz, Mexico, on April 22. He participated in the occupation of Vera Cruz and in the various engagements incident thereto. During the American occupation of that city, which continued until late in November, 1914, he served as brigade commander for a short period and during the remainder of the time commanded one of the

regiments of the Marine brigade. Upon his return to the United States he was ordered to Headquarters for duty as Assistant Commandant. While on duty there he served as a member of the Personnel Board of which Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt was senior member. The Board's report contained the recommendations for the reorganization of the Marine Corps including a proviso for the establishment of the grade of Brigadier General. The recommendations of the Board were initiated by Colonel Lejeune and he was partly instrumental in their being enacted into law on August 29, 1916. He was promoted to Brigadier General in November, 1916, and on September 26, 1917, upon his urgent request was detached from Headquarters to command the rapidly-expanding war time camp at Quantico, Va. In the early spring of 1918, Colonel Cyrus S. Radford, in a letter to Colonel Henry L. Roosevelt initiated the project of increasing the enlisted strength of the Marine Corps to seventy-five thousand men, with a corresponding increase of the number of officers. This project was aided by Colonel Roosevelt, Colonel Smedley D. Butler, other officers at Quantico and friends in Congress. When the heroic conduct of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, together with the list of casualties was published, the project received the unanimous support of Congress. General Lejeune remained at Quantico during the winter of 1917-1918 where in spite of difficult circumstances, large contingents of Marines were prepared for war service under his supervision. The Fifth Marine Brigade was partly organized and trained under his direction and it was planned that he should command it in France. He preceded its units overseas, however, on account of the fact that Brigadier General Doyen was invalidated home, and was assigned to a series of the important commands in the A.E.F., where he had the most important and stirring experiences of his life.

He arrived at Brest, June 8, 1918, and shortly afterwards went to duty with the 35th Division in the Alsace sector in the Vosges Mountains. He commanded the 64th Brigade of the 32nd Division on the Swiss border during most of July, 1918, and on the 28th of that month he assumed command of the Second Regular Division, which office he held during the remainder of the war and until the Division returned to the United States in August, 1919. He was promoted to the regular rank of Major General of the Marine Corps August 3. As commanding general of that mixed division of regular army troops and the Fourth Brigade of Marines he ably led in the Marbache Sector and during the battles of St. Mihiel, Mont Blanc Ridge (Champagne offensive), and the Meuse-Argonne. Shortly after the armistice his division took up the march on November 17 into Germany. On December 13 it crossed the Rhine and occupied a sector of the Coblenz Bridgehead until July 15, 1919. For his distinguished services as commanding general of the Second Division he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, both Army and Navy, the Croix de Guerre and made a Commander of the French Legion of Honor. The citation on which was based the award by the President of the Distinguished Service Medal to Major General John A. Lejeune was as follows:

For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service. He commanded the Second Division in the

successful operations at Thiaucourt, Massif Blanc Mont, St. Mihiel, and on the West Bank of the Meuse. In the Argonne-Meuse offensive, his division was directed with such sound military judgment that it broke and held by the vigor and rapidity of execution of its attacks enemy lines which had hitherto been considered impregnable.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL PERSHING.

After the Second Division had participated in a parade in New York it was disbanded and most of the troops demobilized. General Lejeune again assumed command of the Marine Barracks, Quantico, in October, 1919, where he remained during the rest of the period of demobilization of the war time establishment. His appointment as Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps on June 30, 1920, occurred at about the end of the demobilization of the World War Marine Corps and marks the beginning of the reorganization of the Corps for a larger field of usefulness to the nation.

The problem of rebuilding the Marine Corps was largely one of personnel. A great majority of the enlisted men who served during the war were drawn from positions in life to which they had reasonable assurance of returning upon being discharged and only a small percentage of them cared to continue in the Corps. An intensive recruiting program was carried to a successful conclusion and the Corps was built up to an enlisted strength of over twenty-two thousand. The permanent officer personnel of the Corps had more than doubled its pre-war strength and the difficult problem of selecting and arranging new officers in grades was solved, though to the disappointment of a number of them. Some former temporary majors for example found themselves well down in the second lieutenants' list. The problem having been disposed of the Corps resumed its peacetime mission and settled down to digest the lessons learned from the World War and to reorganize itself in accordance with the principles which had been evolved during that experience. General Lejeune, supported by a staff of officers of extensive World War experience, was the guiding spirit in the remaking of the Marine Corps.

The rebuilding of the Corps was simultaneously approached in several ways. Left over World War equipment was assembled for a considerable expeditionary force, Quantico was made the center of most of the military activities, an officers' school system providing for three courses of advanced study was initiated and the program begun of sending all officers to one or more of these schools. In addition to attending Marine Corps schools a considerable number of officers attended the schools of the Army system which had been greatly enlarged after the war. Sufficient enlisted strength was made available for an expeditionary force on each coast. A brigade was organized at Quantico, together with certain artillery, aviation units and other specialized troops, while a regiment was kept in readiness at San Diego.

During the decade immediately following the World War when the country was going through a period of intense business activity, when sports were developed into big business, when journalism ran rampant with propaganda and ballyhoo and the public sought the spectacular, and when the military service, including the Marine Corps was in danger of lapsing into obscurity, sports under the

leadership of General Butler and Major Fegan were developed, especially football, with the view of keeping the Marine Corps in the public eye. Extensive maneuvers were undertaken by the troops at Quantico and the public's attention attracted by reenacting famous battles of the Civil War and usually by the attendance of the President of the United States. Extensive maneuvers with the Fleet were also carried on in Hawaii, Panama and Culebra, P. R. Many lessons were learned from these affairs which were soon to be put to more practical use in real military activities.

A considerable force of Marines continued to occupy both Haiti and Santo Domingo and some parts of Cuba for some time after the World War. The Marines were withdrawn from Santo Domingo in September, 1924. These activities continued to absorb a considerable part of the Corps' strength, but larger and more serious interventions in which the Marine Corps was called upon to furnish most of the military strength were initiated in 1927. Both the east and west coast expeditionary forces, together with all available Marines of the Corps were hurried off to either China or Nicaragua with reenforced brigades attempting to provide the necessary protection for American interests in each of those turbulent countries. These two expeditions were the principal concern of the Marine Corps during the remainder of Lejeune's commandancy.

In addition to all of the successful undertakings mentioned above, Lejeune also attempted to have the necessary laws enacted to establish a selection system for the promotion of officers. He believed that the old promotion examination system was a failure and repeatedly recommended promotion by selection, but was unable to procure the necessary legislation during his term of office to make the change which he considered most important for the future efficiency of the Marine Corps. Congress was persuaded, however, because of their high opinion of the Corps to give it fairly liberal annual appropriations in spite of the fact that allowances for the military establishment of the country were being substantially curtailed. During the administration of Presidents Harding and Coolidge, the program of economy caused the Army, Navy and Marine Corps enlisted strengths to be reduced. However, General Lejeune succeeded by means of strenuous efforts in having the Marine Corps kept at an enlisted strength of above eighteen thousand, although the Budget Bureau recommended a further reduction of about fifteen hundred. Interspersed with expeditions and other activities of the Corps were outbreaks of crime which necessitated the Marine Corps furnishing mail guards throughout a large part of the country for a considerable period of time during the years 1921 and 1926.

General Lejeune had served as Commandant under three Presidents—Wilson, Harding and Coolidge. When his last four-year detail was approaching its close in 1929 and when he had only about two years' service before retirement for age he declined to accept a re-detail and made an announcement to that effect. Almost immediately afterwards he was offered a position in which he could continue his active life well past the statutory age for retirement from the military or naval service. He was selected as Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, Va. Since his retirement he has

continued to be the Superintendent of that famous military School, at which "Stonewall" Jackson was a professor at the outbreak of the Civil War, and at which Commodore Maury, the famous naval scientist, was a professor from 1868 until his death.

John A. Lejeune by his long and useful service prior to the outbreak of the World War, his outstanding service in command of the Second Division during the World War and by his long and eventful detail as Commandant of the Marine Corps must be considered as one of the most outstanding officers which the Corps has ever produced. His career was colorful and one which tradition will probably enlarge upon as the years go by and he will likely continue to be regarded as one of the Corps' great "makers of history."

WENDELL C. NEVILLE

THIRTEENTH COMMANDER OF THE MARINE CORPS


Wendell Cushing Neville, known to his intimates as "Buck," was one of the most colorful characters in the recent history of the Marine Corps, but his tour of duty as Commandant was cut short to a mere sixteen months by his untimely death. He was born in Portsmouth, Va., May 12, 1870, and received part of his early education at Galt's Academy, Norfolk. He entered the United States Naval Academy September 12, 1886, and completed its course of instruction in June, 1890. He then did his regular naval cadet two-year course of sea duty prior to final graduation and on July 1, 1893, together with four other members of his Naval Academy class was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. The first year and a half of his service in the Corps was at the Marine Barracks, Washington, and during that time he was promoted to First Lieutenant. He went on his first tour of sea duty as a Marine officer on board the USS *Cincinnati* in July, 1894, and during that cruise also served on board the *Texas* and *Raleigh*, and was transferred ashore to the Marine Barracks, New York, after three years at sea.

During the Spanish-American War he served with distinction in the Marine Battalion of the North Atlantic Squadron, which took part in the operations around Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and was later brevetted

Captain for his conspicuous conduct in those operations. He was promoted to the regular rank of Captain in April, 1899. After the close of the War with Spain he served on recruiting duty for a few months and then joined the Fourth Marine Battalion organized for duty in the Far East. As a company commander in that organization he took part in the Boxer Campaign and participated in the capture of Peking. He proceeded with the battalion to the Philippines and participated in the Philippine Campaign and for a time served as Military Governor of the province of Basilan. He was transferred to the United States in March, 1903, and during the next three years performed a wide range of duties at various places in the eastern part of the United States. In August, 1905, he was ordered to the North Atlantic Fleet as Fleet Marine Officer. He was promoted to Major in May, 1906, to rank from June 4, 1904. He landed with the Fleet Marines and helped to take possession of Havana at the beginning of the intervention in Cuba in 1906. As Commanding officer of the First Battalion, Second Regiment of Marines he served in that country with the Army of Pacification and for a short time was commanding officer of that regiment. When the Army relieved part of the Marine brigade in Cuba in November, Major Neville resumed his duties as Fleet Marine Officer.

He finished his tour of sea duty and was transferred to Washington in October, 1907, and joined the First Regiment, Expeditionary Brigade of Marines when it was organized in Philadelphia about two years later. With that organization he served on the Isthmus of Panama for a brief period during the following spring and then returned to Washington for duty. In October, 1910, he transferred to the Marine Barracks, Honolulu, T. H., where he served for the next two and a half years. Soon after his return to the United States he found himself continuing to take part in a rapid series of expeditionary and foreign duties which did not terminate until after the end of the World War.

During the winter of 1913-1914 he participated in the Advanced Base maneuvers at Culebra, P. R., and Pensacola, Fla., as commanding officer of the Second Battalion, Second Advanced Base Regiment. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel to rank from February 25, 1914, and soon afterwards sailed in command of the regiment to Vera Cruz, Mexico, and participated in the landing operations which resulted in the capture of that city on April 21-22. He received a commendatory letter from the Secretary of the Navy for his conspicuous courage, coolness and skill during those operations and was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. After the withdrawal of the American forces from Vera Cruz in November, 1914, Colonel Neville returned to a brief period of duty in the United States before being transferred to command the Marine detachment, American Legation, Peking, China, in July, 1915. He was promoted to Colonel as the result of the National Defense Act of August 29, 1916. He was in China when the United States entered the World War but returned to the United States a few months later and was transferred overseas early in December, 1917, to command the Fifth Regiment of Marines. He took command of that regiment January 1, 1918, and



WENDELL C.
NEVILLE

*Thirteenth Comman-
dant of the Marine
Corps
1929-1930*

from then until the end of the war performed the most distinguished services of his colorful career.

As commanding officer of the Fifth Marines, Fourth Brigade, Second Division, he put that organization through the final phases of its wartime training and commanded it while holding a defensive sector near Verdun and during the Battle of Belleau Wood. He was promoted to Brigadier General in time to take command of the Marine brigade which led in the Battle of Soissons, in the Marbache Sector during the reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient, in the Battle of Blanc Mont Ridge (Champagne sector) and in the Meuse Argonne offensive. He continued in command of that brigade during the march to the Rhine and its occupation of a sub-sector in the Coblenz Bridgehead in the German Army of Occupation. Neville returned to the United States as brigade commander and after the ceremonies of welcome awarded the Second Division he was transferred for duty to Quantico, Va. The honors and decorations which were awarded him for distinguished service during the World War, together with other decorations are noted below.

During the period immediately following the World War he served at Quantico and at Headquarters, Marine Corps. He was promoted to the regular rank of Brigadier General in May, 1920, and in August of that year was detailed as assistant to the Major General Commandant. He served as commanding general, Department of the Pacific, from November, 1923, until May, 1927. While on this duty he was promoted to the rank of Major General early in 1924 to rank from December 10 of the previous year. He next served as commanding general, Marine Barracks, Quantico, until he was made Commandant of the Marine Corps, March 5, 1929, after being strongly recommended to that office by his predecessor, General Lejeune.

During a greater part of his tour of duty as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Neville was in poor health. The activities of the Corps which had been initiated under the previous Commandant were carried on. The expeditionary forces both in China and Nicaragua were continued with periods of considerable activity by the Marines in their effort to suppress banditry in the latter country. Substantial appropriations were provided by Congress and the permanent development of Quantico was begun. The advanced training of Marine officers was continued as much as the urgent call to expeditionary duty would permit. Marine Corps aviation found a larger field of usefulness with the expeditionary forces and on the foreign station during Neville's administration. The Corps was maintained at its approximate previous enlisted strength of eighteen thousand despite the depression which set in. General Neville was ill almost continuously from March, 1930, until his death on July 8 of that year. He was interred in Arlington National Cemetery.

During his brief tour of duty as Commandant of the Corps General Neville did not make any substantial changes in the running of its affairs. His outstanding career in the Marine Corps is to a considerable extent recognized and symbolized by the many decorations and

honors which were bestowed upon him as indicated below:

West Indies Medal (Sampson)
Spanish Campaign Medal
Brevet Medal (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)
China Campaign Medal
Philippine Campaign Medal
Cuban Pacification Medal
Expeditionary Ribbon (Nicaragua, 1910)
Medal of Honor, Navy (Vera Cruz)
Mexican Campaign Medal.

For distinguished World War Service:

Distinguished Service Medal (Army)
Distinguished Service Medal (Navy)
Victory Medal with 5 Clasps—Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Defensive Sector.
Silver Star Medal with 5 oak leaf clusters.
Legion of Honor, French (with rank of Officer)
Croix de Guerre—4 Palms, 1 Silver Star, 1 Bronze Star, 6 Diplomas
Fourragere.


BEN H. FULLER

FOURTEENTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Ben Hebard Fuller, known to all of his intimates by the affectionate term of "Uncle Ben," had a career in the Marine Corps which is outstanding in many respects. His total length of active service of forty-eight years, nine months and eight days is the longest of any living Marine officer. His considerate and courteous treatment of all he came in contact with has caused him to be one of the most beloved of the leaders of the Marine Corps. General Fuller was born at Big Rapids, Mich., February 27, 1870. He entered the United States Naval Academy in May, 1885, and after finishing the four years' course of instruction at that institution was assigned to the prescribed two years' cruise as a naval cadet, during which he had many interesting experiences on various vessels of the Pacific Squadron. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps on July 1, 1891, with six other members of his graduating class. Together with his classmates in the Marine Corps he took the first course ever given for Marine officers in the School of Application at the Marine Barracks, Washington, from which he

BEN H. FULLER

*Fourteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps
1930-1934*



graduated in March of the following year. His military education continued in after years by his taking the courses of instruction of the Army School at Fort Leavenworth, the Army War College and the Navy War College. He had considerable experience as an instructor in officers' schools and as commanding officer of the Marine Corps Schools established in Quantico after the World War.

Fuller's first three years of service in the Marine Corps were spent ashore at different posts in the eastern part of the United States. On September 7, 1893, he was promoted to First Lieutenant and went to sea for the first time as a Marine officer on the U.S.S. *Atlanta* in April of the following year. During his active career he spent nearly seven years at sea on a dozen different vessels of the Navy. During the War with Spain he was in command of the Marine detachment of the U.S.S. *Columbia* and served in West Indian waters. Shortly after the close of that war he was promoted to Captain and transferred to the Philippines for duty, where among other experiences he participated in the Battle of Novaleta. At the outbreak of the Boxer trouble in 1900 he was hurried off in command of a company of artillery in an expeditionary force of Marines. He participated in the siege and capture of Tientsin and was commended in Navy General Orders for his "gallant, meritorious and courageous conduct" in battle. He joined in the march of the relief column to Peking and was in command of an independent detachment at Fong Chow, China.

Captain Fuller returned to the Philippines in October, 1900, and early in the following year to the United States. During the next three years he was given several peacetime shore assignments in addition to spending a few months at sea. He was promoted to Major in March, 1904, and shortly afterwards transferred to the command of the Marine Barracks, Honolulu, T. H., where he served for about two years, and then went to New York for duty. Again after a brief tour of duty in the United States, a part of which was spent as instructor in the School of Application at Annapolis, he again went to foreign duty—this time to the Canal Zone, where he served as commanding officer of the battalion of Marines from August, 1908, until February, 1910. His next regular station of duty was in command of the Marine Barracks at Charleston, S. C. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel March 8, 1911. While serving at Charleston he commanded a regiment of an expeditionary brigade of Marines which went to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in May, 1911, to be in readiness to intervene in that country due to a serious disturbance instigated by the veterans of the war of independence who were attempting to oust from office officials who had not sided with them during that war. The show of force alone being sufficient to quiet the Cuban political situation, the expedition was withdrawn and Colonel Fuller resumed his duties at Charleston. He spent most of the next two years in attending service schools.

Fuller joined the Fifth Regiment of Marines as second in command in July, 1914, and spent several months with that organization on the *Hancock*, cruising around the Island of Haiti-Santo Domingo and in camp at Guantanamo Bay. Some two years later, after a short cruise as Fleet Marine Officer, Atlantic Fleet, and while attend-

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ing the Navy War College, he was promoted to Colonel in March, 1917. He commanded the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, for about one year from early in September, 1917, and was then assigned to the command of the Second Provisional Brigade of Marines engaged in a military occupation of Santo Domingo. He was promoted to temporary Brigadier General in August, 1918, but reverted to his regular rank of Colonel about one year later. While serving in Santo Domingo he had extensive experience in administering several cabinet positions in the military government of that country. He joined the staff of the Naval War College as an instructor in November, 1920, and in July, 1922, took command of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, which position he held for the next year and a half. He was assigned to command the First Brigade of Marines occupying Haiti in January, 1924, where he continued on duty until December, 1925, during a comparatively peaceful period for that usually turbulent country. He was promoted to the regular rank of Brigadier General as of February 8, 1924. During the next two and a half years he spent most of the time serving on various boards and on court-martial duty in Washington. He was made Assistant Commandant of the Corps in July, 1928, under Major General Lejeune and continued to serve in that capacity not only during the remainder of Lejeune's tenure of office but also throughout that of General Neville. During General Neville's brief period as Major General Commandant in 1929-1930 General Fuller frequently acted as Commandant when the Commandant was ill.

For some time after the death of General Neville on July 8, 1930, there was considerable conjecture as to who would succeed to the office of Commandant. Fuller was at the time the third ranking Brigadier General and in addition there were two Major Generals in the Corps. General Fuller had at one time been senior to all of these officers but the fortunes of the World War and other reasons had caused them to be placed ahead of him. General Fuller was selected as Major General Commandant on August 6, 1930, and thereby restored to his old position of seniority among the several officers of the Marine Corps.

The period of tenure of office of General Fuller as Commandant of the Marine Corps which continued until his retirement for age on March 1, 1934, was one of general retrenchment, due to the world-wide depression, the initiation of the good-neighbor policy in dealing with Latin American countries and other reasons. The depression brought about a sharp reduction in the federal revenue and in an effort to offset this appropriations for the Marine Corps were reduced and the curtailments were offset by reductions in the enlisted strength, a flat reduction in pay and certain other economies. Plans for the ultimate withdrawal of the Marine Brigades from both Haiti and Nicaragua continued to be developed from the beginning of Fuller's commandancy. The position of the Marines in Nicaragua was particularly difficult due to their lack of authority and their position being reduced practically to one of watching and being a mere moral force. Their strength was gradually reduced and the outlying posts drawn in a few at a time until only Managua remained. As this process continued more and more duties were taken over by the Nicaraguan national guard. The last

contingent of Marines was withdrawn from Nicaragua early in January, 1933. The same process of curtailing the activities of the Marines in Haiti had been continuing for a number of years and by 1934 and some time previously they were serving only in Cape Haitien and Port-au-Prince and as officers in the Garde d'Haiti. The Fourth Regiment of Marines continued on duty in China throughout this period.

With the gradual release of Marines on foreign duty the number attending schools was greatly increased and substantial progress was made in the education of officers and in the more advanced technical training of enlisted men. The sweeping changes in foreign policy, with the possibility that interventions in Latin American countries would be discontinued, caused the Marine Corps to redefine its mission in the scheme of national defense. The necessity for a substantial expeditionary force of Marines to be in readiness to accompany the Fleet was an idea that had taken form not long after the turn of the century but it was not until 1933 when personnel became available as a result of withdrawal of Marines from foreign countries that the idea was fully developed and such a force organized as the Fleet Marine Force. That organization came into being in December of that year, with part of its force at Quantico, Va., and part at San Diego, Calif. Since then it has been developed as the principal striking force of the Marine Corps in the event of emergency.

The gradual expansion of the Navy during Fuller's tenure of office called for more and more Marines to be sent to sea. This together with the further development of the Fleet Marine Force tended to concentrate the attention of the Marine Corps more towards the Navy and influenced substantially the educational system of the Corps and the scope of its military training.

General Fuller was transferred to the retired list of the Marine Corps March 1, 1934, on having attained the statutory age limit of 64 years. Since his retirement he has resided at Hamilton, near Leesburg, Va., and at Miami, Fla.

JOHN H. RUSSELL

FIFTEENTH COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Major General John H. Russell, U. S. Marine Corps, retired, had upon his retirement on December 1, 1936, a



JOHN H. RUSSELL
Fifteenth Comman-
dant of the Marine
Corps
1934-1936

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career of active service second only in length to that of General Fuller of the living officers of the Corps. His services were outstanding in many ways, but were particularly noteworthy in that he served as American High Commissioner to the Republic of Haiti for a period of nearly nine years, during which time he had to deal with the many complicated diplomatic, political and economic problems of that country, which made great advancement during his administration of that difficult position. He was promoted to the leadership of the Corps when he was nearly 62 years of age and for that reason his tour as commanding general of the Corps was only slightly in excess of two years.

General Russell was born at Mare Island, California, November 14, 1872. He was the son of a naval officer of the same name who retired as a Rear Admiral in 1886 and died eleven years later. The junior Russell entered the naval service as a midshipman in May, 1888, nearly a half century after his father had begun his naval career in the same manner. The younger Russell graduated from the Naval Academy with the class of 1892 and after the usual two year assignment as naval cadet transferred to the Marine Corps, in which organization he was given a commission as Second Lieutenant, July 1, 1894. He received his initial training with the second class attending the Marine Corps School of Application at the Marine Barracks, Washington, and finished the course of instruction the following spring. While attending that school he made a reputation as a student of the military arts which he retained throughout his career, and as a result of that reputation was detailed repeatedly as an instructor in various officers' schools. He served ashore until June 1, 1896, when he went to sea for the first time as a Marine officer on the U.S.S. *Massachusetts*. During the Spanish-American War he served on that vessel in Commodore Schley's "Flying Squadron" in the blockading operations around the West Indies and in the bombardment of the forts of Santiago, Cuba. He was promoted to First Lieutenant in November, 1898. During the closing months of that year he performed duty at Philadelphia, Norfolk and Washington. He was transferred to the U.S.S. *Yosemite* early in the following year and was promoted to Captain, March 28, 1899. Captain Russell soon afterwards was detached from the *Yosemite* to a Marine battalion ordered for duty in Guam, where it arrived in August, 1899, and established a garrison under very primitive conditions. He returned to the United States during the following summer and during the next two years served at several posts along the east coast and was then transferred to Mare Island, where he went to sea on the U.S.S. *Oregon*. Russell served on that vessel for about a year and a half and was then sent as an instructor to the School of Application for Marine officers at Annapolis, Md. Promoted to Major in July, 1906, he was shortly afterwards transferred to the command of the Marine Barracks, Honolulu, T. H. In June of the following year he was transferred to the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama, and given command of the Marines at Camp Elliott. After about one year in Panama he returned to the United States and joined the Navy War College in September, 1908, as a member of the staff. Two years later we find him again transferred to an important assignment on foreign duty—this time in com-

mand of a legation guard at Peking, China, where he was stationed for the ensuing two and a half years. At the expiration of that duty he returned to the United States in June, 1913, and shortly afterwards was assigned to duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington.

Revolution and general chaotic conditions in Mexico early in 1914 caused practically all available Marines to be turned out for expeditionary duty to both coasts of that country. Major Russell was given command of the Second Battalion, Third Regiment of Marines, and landed with that organization at Vera Cruz, Mexico, April 30, 1914. A brigade of Marines serving with a reenforced brigade of the army occupied the vicinity of that city on an indefinite mission of "watchful waiting" until late in November, when both were withdrawn and Russell returned to his regular assignment in the Navy Department. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel as a result of the National Defense Act of August 29, 1916, and joined the Second Provisional Brigade of Marines occupying the Republic of Santo Domingo in March, 1917, where he was given command of the Third Marine Regiment. Russell was promoted to Colonel in October of the same year and early in the following month was transferred to the command of the First Provisional Brigade of Marines occupying Haiti with his headquarters at Port-au-Prince. This experience was the beginning of his contact with Haiti which continued with a brief interruption for nearly thirteen years.

Colonel Russell commanded the First Brigade until near the end of 1918 and after a few months of duty in Headquarters of the Corps he returned to the same assignment. He participated in action with the Haitian bandits during the outbreak at Port-au-Prince in January, 1920. He became thoroughly acquainted with Haiti and its political and economic difficulties and won the confidence not only of the government officials of the country but of his own government as well. During this period of his service he was decorated by the Haitian Government and by the Navy Department for his distinguished services in the handling of his brigade and dealing with the Haitian government and people and was further rewarded by being promoted to Brigadier General in January, 1922. On February 11 he was appointed to an unusual position for an officer of the regular service, as High Commissioner to Haiti with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary, in which position he was made the direct representative of the President of the United States to assist in conducting the relations between the two countries and to have large supervisory authority over internal affairs in Haiti. The appointment also placed him in supreme command not only of the occupying American force but of the Haitian Gendarmerie. His success in handling the many difficult affairs of that important assignment is evidenced by the fact that he continued in that office for nearly nine years and further by his being awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and commended both by the State Department and the President of the United States for his outstanding services while holding that important office. During that time Haiti undoubtedly made the greatest progress that it has ever witnessed since the rebellion of the country against France following the French Revolution.

General Russell was transferred from Haiti in No-

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vember, 1930, and took command of the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California, on December 26. He was transferred to the command of Quantico about a year later. He went to duty at the Headquarters of the Corps, February 1, 1933, where he was detailed as assistant to the Major General Commandant, and designated to conduct the affairs of that office in the absence of the Commandant during his five months' inspection tour of the various foreign and home stations of the Corps. Russell was promoted to the rank of Major General in September, 1933, and continued on duty as assistant to the Major General Commandant until he was appointed Commandant on April 5, 1934.

The administration of General Russell as Commandant of the Marine Corps which lasted for the comparatively short period of two years and eight months was nevertheless very significant in the annals of the Corps in that it was a period of transition. It marked the end of a long series of military and naval intervention for which the Marine Corps had furnished most of the military strength and which had continued with a few brief interruptions since the turn of the century. Another significant change was the old system of seniority promotions of officers, which had been in effect throughout the history of the Corps, to that of advancement by selection.

A change in the system of promoting officers had been agitated in the Corps for a number of years but failure of agreement as to what major changes should be made and the refusal of Congress to enact the necessary legislation had postponed this revolutionary change until the beginning of General Russell's tour as Commandant. He was a strong advocate of the proposed system and finding Congress in a receptive mood rather unexpectedly procured the necessary law for selection in the upper grades of the Corps as well as for the re-arrangement of officers in the different grades. Sweeping changes in the standing of officers resulted from the actions of the first selection board in particular while later laws have extended selection to the lower grades as well. As a result of the new system a large number of officers were made extra numbers while many others were retired, resulting in a speeding up of promotions and an influx of new officers into the Corps. This reform in the promotion system like most other reforms created new problems the solution of which are still to be fully worked out.

The first Marine Brigade completed its withdrawal from the Republic of Haiti on August 15, 1934. A short time previously the Haitianization of the Garde d'Haiti had been completed and all of the Marine Corps personnel who had been attached to that organization had been withdrawn. The withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti marked the end of the longest military intervention which had ever been undertaken by the United States. The Marines had been continuously in that country since 1915 and with the changes in national policy developed by the last two administrations, this withdrawal appears to mark the end of an era in the history of our country and the annals of the Marine Corps. The Fourth Marines continued at approximately the usual strength to be stationed at Shanghai, China, but carried out no military operations. There was like-

wise no substantial changes in the assignment of Marines to the several regular foreign stations.

The organizing, educating and training of the Corps continued to make substantial progress. The Fleet Marine Force assumed even a larger position of prominence and came to be considered as the Corps' most important activity. The school systems for both officers and enlisted men was further enlarged. The Base Defense Weapons School was added to train officers for technical duties in connection with base defense weapons that had been added to the Corps' equipment as the result of the development of the Fleet Marine Force. The guiding principle for the courses of instruction in the Marine Corps Schools and of the training of the Corps' entire personnel looked towards a closer affiliation of the Marine Corps to the Navy and especially to furnishing a supporting expeditionary force for the Fleet.

Substantial progress was made in the handling of the Marine Corps Reserves, the activities of which were extended to include summer training camps for selected college students who were given an intensive course of training as platoon leaders. The number of ships of the navy carrying Marine detachments continued to grow throughout the period, thus calling for an ever-growing strength of that part of the Marine Corps which was assigned to sea duty.

Considerable development took place during General Russell's tenure of office as Commandant in some of the posts of the Marine Corps. Quantico, in particular, was further developed by the addition of a number of permanent buildings and other facilities. With the general world-wide tendency towards expansion of armaments the Marine Corps together with the other branches of the regular service was able to procure many valuable additions to its military equipment. This resulted to some extent in a greater mechanization of the organization of the Corps which with the growth of the Fleet Marine Force and the uncertainties of an officer's career growing out of the selection system tended decidedly to step up the tempo of the organization and in the opinion of at least the majority to add to its efficiency.

General Russell reached the statutory age limit in November, 1936, and retired from active duty December 1.

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